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The Navy as a Political Instrument: Freedom of Navigation Operations 1958-2013 
Michael P. O’Hara 
Through the Freedom of Navigation Program, established in 1979, the United States 
exercises diplomatic and military options for disputing maritime claims it judges to be 
inconsistent with customary international law and the United Nations Convention on the Law of 
the Sea.  Yet, despite the United States’ universal commitment to freedom of navigation and the 
law of the sea, it has behaved inconsistently from 1979-2013.  This dissertation examines the 
variation and asks under what conditions the United States demonstrates its refusal to acquiesce 
to maritime claims—either by issuing a diplomatic protest or driving a warship through the 
disputed waters.  This dissertation introduces a new dataset of every coastal state in the world 
over this 34-year period, coding each type of maritime claim made by every coastal state in the 
world, whether the United States disputes that particular claim, and whether the United States 
takes some kind of diplomatic or operational action to dispute it.  The mixed-method analysis 
proceeds with a large-n quantitative analysis that sets up a qualitative case study on the Strait of 
Hormuz.  The dissertation begins and concludes with a discussion of current conditions in the 
South China Sea and the United States activity in this disputed region.   
This study finds that territorial and usage claims are twice as strongly correlated with 
operational assertions as a response than diplomatic protests.  More specifically, coastal states 
that require foreign ships to obtain permission prior to entering their territorial sea are most 
highly correlated with operational assertions.  When the United States disputes a maritime claim, 
military powers and wealthy states are no more likely to receive Freedom of Navigation 
operations (FONOPS) than others.  Moreover, bilateral trade relationships and polity type hardly 
seem to matter. Similarly, neither the number of ships nor diplomatic representation increases the 
likelihood of FONOPS.  Rather, a coastal state’s possession of nuclear weapons significantly 
increases the likelihood of receiving an operational assertion—especially if that states has made 
a declaration upon ratification of UNCLOS.  
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CHAPTER 1.  INTRODUCTION 
 
“The commerce of the United States has become an interesting object of attention, whether we 
consider it in relation to the wealth and finances or the strength and resources of the nation. With 
a seacoast of near 2,000 miles in extent, opening a wide field for fisheries, navigation, and 
commerce, a great portion of our citizens naturally apply their industry and enterprise to these 
objects. Any serious and permanent injury to commerce would not fail to produce the most 
embarrassing disorders. To prevent it from being undermined and destroyed it is essential that it 
receive an adequate protection.” 
-President John Adams, Special Message to the Senate and the House; May 16, 
1797 
 
“Absolute freedom of navigation upon the seas, outside territorial waters, alike in peace and in 
war…” 
-President Woodrow Wilson, Fourteen Points, December 8, 1918  
 
“Navigation we want.  Let them fish if they want.  That’s my view.” 
-President Richard Nixon, White House Tapes, 1971 
 
 
1.1 Background: Contemporary Illustration of Freedom of Navigation Operations 
 
On 30 January 2016, USS Curtis Wilbur, a guided-missile destroyer sailed within 12 
nautical miles of the Triton Island, a disputed land feature among the Paracel Islands located in 
the South China Sea.  Months earlier on 27 October 2015, USS Lassen, a ship of the same class, 
had conducted a similar transit inside 12 nautical miles of five islands in the Spratly Islands – 
including an artificial island recently constructed by China in disputed waters of the South China 
Sea.  In both cases, a warship of the United States Navy conducted an operational assertion under 
the Freedom of Navigation program.  These peacetime deployments of the Navy demonstrate the 
United States’ refusal to acquiesce to maritime claims that the United States disputes as 
inconsistent with customary international law as reflected in the United Nations Convention on 
the Law of the Sea.  As a matter of policy, the United States does not take a position on territorial 
claims, nor does it opine on which nation’s claim is superior when multiple states claim a land 
feature.  Rather, the United States focuses on the sea—specifically, on the navigational rights in 
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the territorial seas, exclusive economic zones, and high seas surrounding land features of all 
coastal states.  According to Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter, Freedom of Navigation 
operations are part of a “broader strategy to support an open and inclusive international security 
architecture founded on international law and standards.”1 
While some may view Freedom of Navigation operations as part of a strategy specific to 
the United States designed to increase its own security and advantage, a broader view recognizes 
that navigational freedom—and the international legal regimes pertaining to maritime claims 
more broadly—represent an important condition for international cooperation in an anarchic 
international system.  This dissertation argues that the Freedom of Navigation program fulfills 
dual functions for the United States, benefiting itself and others.   
Insofar as “international politics is the realm of power, struggle, and accommodation,” it 
is also the realm of institutions and regimes to minimize the likelihood of armed conflict and to 
foster cooperation and greater prosperity for all states.2  The Freedom of Navigation program 
does not reflect an exclusively realist view of the world, in which international politics is a 
struggle for military power dominated by organized violence.3  Neither does the Freedom of 
Navigation program reflect an exclusively institutionalist view of the world, naïve about power 
and conflict, in which economic interdependence demands norms, rules, and institutions to 
facilitate altruistically the Pareto efficient outcome for all states.4   Rather, the Freedom of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Ashton Carter, “Regarding U.S. Military Operations in the South China Sea,” December 21, 2015, 
http://news.usni.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/01/Sen.-McCain-FONOP-Letter-Response.pdf. 
 
2 Kenneth N Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Long Grove, IL: Waveland Press, 1979), 113. 
 
3 Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Power and Interdependence (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1977), 
23. 
 
4 Robert O Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy (Princeton, N.J: 
Princeton University Press, 1984), 7–10; Keohane and Nye, Power and Interdependence, 23–29. 
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Navigation program uses military and diplomatic instruments to support and demonstrate its 
commitment to customary international law as reflected in the United Nations Convention on the 
Law of the Sea of 1982 in a manner pursuant to both the interests of the United States and the 
global public good.    
Despite this support for the provisions in UNCLOS, the United States has not signed the 
treaty for a number of reasons related to American domestic politics over the decades since the 
conclusion of the final UNCLOS conference.5  However, insofar as UNCLOS reflects customary 
law and the law contained in the 1958 Geneva Convention on the Law of the Sea to which the 
US was a signatory, the US abides by the law of the sea and articulates its commitment to 
“promote and protect the oceans interests of the United States in a manner consistent with those 
fair and balanced results in the Convention and international law.”6  Upon his announcement of 
the United States’ decision not to accede to the UNCLOS treaty, President Reagan also his intent 
to “exercise and assert navigation and overflight rights and freedoms on a worldwide basis in a 
manner that is consistent with the balance of interests reflected in the convention.”7  He 
concluded the United States will “not acquiesce in unilateral acts of other states designed to 
restrict the rights and freedoms of the international community in navigation and overflight and 
other related high seas uses.” 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 James Malone, “The United States and the Law of the Sea After UNCLOS III,” Law and Contemporary Problems 
46, no. 2 (April 1, 1983): 29–36.  The primary reason the United didn’t ratify UNCLOS in December 1982 stemmed 
from its disagreement with provisions on deep seabed mining as articulated in Part XI of UNCLOS. The United 
States objected to the terms for exploitation of minerals in the seabed and its exclusion from decisionmaking in the 
International Seabed Authority.  The scheme for the distribution of sovereign mineral wealth of the coastal state was 
seen contrary to United States’ national and commercial interest. 
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The patrols of USS Lassen and USS Curtis Wilbur demonstrate this refusal to acquiesce 
to claims of other states it disputes.  USS Lassen’s patrol entered the territorial seas of “five 
maritime features in the Spratly Islands […] which are claimed by China, Taiwan, Vietnam, and 
the Philippines” to challenge the “policies of some claimants requiring prior permission or 
notification of transits within the territorial sea.”8  Similarly, USS Curtis Wilbur drove within the 
12-nm territorial sea of Triton Island to challenge “the attempts by the three claimants—China, 
Taiwan, and Vietnam—to restrict navigation rights and freedoms around the features they claim 
by policies that require prior permission or notification of transit within territorial seas.”9  In both 
cases, the United States did not voice opposition to the territorial sovereignty of any land feature.  
Rather, the United States challenged the restrictions on the freedom of navigation into territorial 
seas without prior permission or notification.  These Freedom of Navigation assertions are finely 
tuned efforts of the United States to communicate political and legal messages not through 
words, but through actions—the patrols of warships during peacetime.  
In a statement by a spokesperson from the Vietnamese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
Vietnam responded to the patrol of USS Curtis Wilbur by reaffirming sovereignty over the 
Paracel and Truong Sa Islands and restating its respect for “the right of innocent passage through 
the territorial sea conducted in accordance with relevant rules of international law, in particular 
the UNCLOS (Article 17).  We request all countries to make positive and practical contribution 
to maintaining peace and stability in the East Sea (South China Sea) and to respect international 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 Carter, “Regarding U.S. Military Operations in the South China Sea.”  According to Carter’s Letter to Senator 
John McCain, USS Lassen entered the territorial seas of Subi Reef, Northeast Cay, Southwest Cay, South Reef, and 
Sandy Cay. 
 
9 Full text of the January 30 press statement from the Department of Defense on the USS Curtis Wilbur’s freedom of 
navigation mission is available in Sam LaGrone, “U.S. Destroyer Challenges More Chinese South China Sea Claims 
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law.”10  Freedom of Navigation assertions constitute American efforts to make “positive and 
practical contribution to maintaining peace and stability” around the world—not only regarding 
maritime disputes in the South China Sea, but around the “wide common” of all seas.11  
1.2 Question: Explaining Variation in Freedom of Navigation Operations 
These contributions by the United States Navy, however, do not occur in every case when 
the United States has a legal disagreement with another coastal state about its maritime claims.  
Rather, the United States tends to conduct operational assertions rarely—approximately 10% of 
all country-year-disputes—and in chapter 4, the frequency is explored in greater detail.  So why 
is this activity so rarely undertaken?  Under what conditions does the United States assert its 
freedom of navigation?  When does it act to demonstrate its disagreement with disputed maritime 
claims?  Why does it send the navy to demonstrate its refusal to acquiesce to disputed claims 
against some coastal states and not others?  This dissertation examines a particular peacetime use 
of the United States Navy and considers the political choices made in directing its efforts along 
one aspect of United States foreign policy.  Specifically, this dissertation examines the Freedom 
of Navigation program and seeks to explain variation of policy implementation from 1958 to 
2013.   
Relatively little literature exists on the peacetime use of navies.  Many studies of naval 
power in international politics consider the warfighting utility of navies during combat.12  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 Le Hai Binh, “Remarks by MOFA Spokesperson Le Hai Binh on US Navy’s FONOP,” MLNews, Bo Ngoai Giao 
Viet Nam: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, accessed March 20, 2016, http://www.mofa.gov.vn/en/tt_baochi/pbnfn/ 
ns160131221102. 
 
11 Alfred Thayer Mahan, The Influence of Sea Power Upon History, 1660-1783 (Boston: Little, Brown and 
Company, 1918), 25. 
 
12 For example, Alfred Thayer Mahan, The Influence of Sea Power Upon History, 1660-1783 (Boston: Little, Brown 
and Company, 1918); George W. Baer, One Hundred Years of Sea Power: The U. S. Navy, 1890-1990 (Stanford, 
CA: Stanford University Press, 1993); Paul M. Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of British Naval Mastery, 2nd edition 
(Amherst, NY: Humanity Books, 2006); Samuel Eliot Morison, History of United States Naval Operations in World 
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Additionally, the effects of gunboat diplomacy or the use of navies to coerce adversaries in crises 
have received scholarly attention.13  This gap in the literature regarding navies in times of peace 
is surprising not only because of the expeditionary nature of naval forces, which maintain an 
active and distributed presence around the world in times of peace and in war, but also because 
of the relationship between maritime security and international trade.  Navies have long deployed 
to ensure security of seaborne trade, and in 2013 approximately 90% of world trade of 
merchandized goods (by volume) moves by water (approximately 65% of goods measured by 
value moves by water).14  Additionally, interstate disputes over maritime law and maritime 
claims have raised tensions and increased the likelihood of conflict in places like the South 
China Sea.  
This dissertation contributes to this body of literature by examining one class of 
operations conducted by the United States Navy in peacetime for political and legal purposes. 
Formally established in 1979, the Freedom of Navigation Program provides a mechanism with 
clear processes to protest maritime claims that the United States interprets as being inconsistent 
with international law.  Freedom of Navigation has been a concern of maritime states for 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
War II: Leyte, June 1944 - January 1945 (University of Illinois Press, 2002); Bruce A. Elleman and Sarah C. M. 
Paine, Naval Blockades And Seapower: Strategies And Counter-Strategies, 1805-2005 (Taylor & Francis US, 2006); 
John H. Maurer, “American Naval Concentration and the German Battle Fleet, 1900–1918,” Journal of Strategic 
Studies 6, no. 2 (1983): 147–81. 
 
13 For example, James Cable, Gunboat Diplomacy 1919-1991: Political Applications of Limited Naval Force, 3rd ed 
(New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1994); James Cable, The Political Influence of Naval Force in History (New York: 
St. Martin’s Press, 1998); Henry J. Hendrix, Theodore Roosevelt’s Naval Diplomacy: The U.S. Navy and the Birth of 
the American Century (Annapolis, Md: Naval Institute Press, 2009); Joseph F. Bouchard, Command in Crisis: Four 
Case Studies (New York: Columbia University Press, 1991); Brent Alan Ditzler, “Naval Diplomacy Beneath the 
Waves: A Study of the Coercive Use of Submarines” (Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 1989), 
http://calhoun.nps.edu/mgmt/handle/10945/27152; Bradford Dismukes and James M. McConnell, Soviet Naval 
Diplomacy (New York: Pergamon Press, 1979); Ronald O’Rourke, “The Tanker War,” U.S. Naval Institute 
Proceedings, May 1988, http://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/1988-05/tanker-war; Edward N. Luttwak, The 
Political Uses of Sea Power, Studies in International Affairs 23 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1974). 
 
14 Stephen M. Carmel, “Globalization, Security, and Economic Well-Being,” Naval War College Review 66, no. 1 
(Winter 2013): 45. 
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centuries, and the United States has asserted its navigational rights through diplomacy and force 
for as long as it has existed as a republic.  Indeed, some of the earliest debates about the utility of 
an American navy responded to the threats to commerce from piracy and the imperative of free 
navigation for a commercial trading nation.15  Moreover, the United States issued diplomatic 
protests prior to formal establishment of the Freedom of Navigation program in 1979.16  Through 
the Freedom of Navigation program, a dual-department program of the United States 
Government administered by the Departments of State and Defense, the United States uses 
diplomatic and military mechanisms to demonstrate its refusal to acquiesce to maritime claims 
with coastal states it interprets as inconsistent with international law.   
1.3 Between the Two Poles of Idealism and Realism 
The stated objectives of the Freedom of Navigation program are apolitical.  According to 
Department of Defense publications, the program constitutes the United States government’s 
universal commitment to oppose all maritime claims that threaten freedom of the seas.  Some 
may infer that the program is an altruistic American commitment to challenge any disputed 
claim—anywhere, any time.  As such, the United States would seem to assume a role of the 
global guarantor of freedom of the seas.  According to this view, the United States would 
provide—idealistically and benevolently—the global good of maritime freedom for all to enjoy.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 For example: John Jay, “Federalist, No. 4,” November 7, 1787, http://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/fed04.asp; 
Alexander Hamilton, “The Federalist Papers No. 11,” November 23, 1787, http://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/ 
fed11.asp; Merrill D. Peterson, “Thomas Jefferson and Commercial Policy, 1783-1793,” The William and Mary 
Quarterly 22, no. 4 (October 1, 1965): 584–610; Samuel Flagg Bemis, John Quincy Adams and the Foundations of 
American Foreign Policy, Fourth Ed. (New York: A.A. Knopf, 1969); Charles N. Edel, Nation Builder: John 
Quincy Adams and the Grand Strategy of the Republic (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 
2014). 
 
16 From 1958 until the formal establishment of the Freedom of Navigation program in 1979, the United States issued 
diplomatic 28 diplomatic protests: Algeria 1964, Argentina 1963 1967, Bangladesh 1978, Brazil 1970, Cameroon 
1963 1968, Canada 1967 1969, Ecuador 1967, Guinea 1964, Haiti 1973, India 1976, Liberia 1977, Libya 1973 1974, 
Mauritania 1973, Mexico 1969, Panama 1967, Philippines 1961 1969, Sierra Leone 1973, Soviet Union 1958 1964 
1965 1967, Thailand 1963, Uruguay 1970. 
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Indeed, President Woodrow Wilson articulated this vision in 1918 for “absolute freedom of 
navigation upon the seas, outside territorial waters, alike in peace and in war” in his Fourteen 
Points.  Today, this message resonates in the United States’ maritime strategy, Cooperative 
Strategy for Twenty-first Century Seapower and even in its recruiting commercials for the United 
States Navy, portrayed as a “global force for good.”   
Wilson’s peace program reflected in his Fourteen Points sought a “just and secure peace” 
to improve the stability and prosperity of the world beyond the former methods of realpolitik and 
balance-of-power politics.  Yet, many in the United Kingdom perceived Wilson’s idealistic 
vision in a more troubling light as the rapidly growing naval power of the United States 
challenged the Royal Navy’s command of the sea and appeared to some observers to be “‘more 
ambitious and sensational’ than even the German prewar expansion,” an underlying cause of the 
First World War.17   
Even after the transition of naval mastery from British to American power after World 
War II, the prospect of peace through an Anglo-American alliance prompted caution from 
sympathetic realists.  Some rejected the notion that “an Anglo-American policeman wielding a 
Big Stick in the velvet-gloved hand of the Good Neighbour” could preserve a “fantastical idea” 
of world peace.18  Such a dominant force would likely result in a “partition of the world into two 
antagonistic blocs” and inevitable conflict.19  Wielding unrestricted power in the Pacific after 
1945, some even questioned whether the United States would turn the world’s largest ocean into 
an “American lake” as officials of the United States Navy and Army revealed plans in late-1945 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 Bernard Semmel, Liberalism and Naval Strategy: Ideology, Interest, and Sea Power During the Pax Britannica 
(Boston: Allen & Unwin, 1986), 167. 
 
18 Aylmer Vallance, “The Future of Anglo-American Relations,” The Political Quarterly 17, no. 1 (January 1, 
1946): 78. 
 
19 Ibid., 77. 
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for basing on Pacific islands such as Wake, Midway, and Eniwetok.  Debates ensued over 
whether they would be sovereign holdings of the United States or operated under international 
trusteeship.20  The Soviets accused Truman of imperialism in the Pacific for military 
aggrandizement not the creation of a benign buffer zone.21  Although the Atlantic Charter had 
sought “no aggrandizement, territorial or other,” American leaders after 1945 assumed implicitly 
the role of maintaining peace in the Pacific because it was the only country capable of doing so.  
Moreover, the pre-war policy statement of the Atlantic Charter extended the Wilsonian vision of 
the world, characterized by “access, on equal terms, to the trade and to the raw materials of the 
world” enabled by the ability to “traverse the high seas and oceans without hindrance.”22  
Between such idealistic visions of world peace and realistic suspicions of national 
interests, the empirical evidence of United States behavior over the last 55 years indicates some 
interesting variation that suggests the program is neither apolitical and altruistic nor focused on 
increasing American power.  The variation in policy implementation varies in ways that 
confound clear conclusions that the United States’ motivations are really so altruistic or whether 
the United States uses freedom of navigation as a fig leaf for maintaining its hegemonic status in 
the world.  Such simplistic descriptions overlook the politics involved in Freedom of Navigation 
operations, which this dissertation explores. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 Eleanor Lattimore, “Pacific Ocean or American Lake?” Far Eastern Survey 14, no. 22 (1945): 313–314.  These 
concerns echoed statements printed in Pravda on 7 November 1945 and later reprinted on 11-12 November 1945 in 
the New York Herald Tribune.  Some further discussion of the Pacific as an “American lake” appears in a telegram 
(12 November 1946) from the U.S. Chargé d’Affairs in Moscow (Durbrow) to the Secretary of State discussion 
Pravda’s descriptions of President Truman’s plan for mandate over Japanese mandates. 
 
21 For discussions of the competing grand strategies of the United States and Soviet Union in the post-war period, 
see: John Lewis Gaddis, The United States and the Origins of the Cold War, 1941-1947 (Columbia University Press, 
1972), 319; Hal M. Friedman, Creating an American Lake: United States Imperialism and Strategic Security in the 
Pacific Basin, 1945-1947 (Greenwood Publishing Group, 2001), 90. 
 
22 Winston S. Churchill and Franklin D. Roosevelt, “The Atlantic Charter” (Great Neck Publishing, August 14, 
1941). 
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1.4 Dissertation Plan 
This dissertation considers both of these perspectives and introduces a third.  First, I 
examine the variation of the program through the lens of a Liberalism Model.  This explanation 
argues that the United States’ Freedom of Navigation program reflects a commitment to 
increasing peace and cooperation through institutions such as maritime law.  The Liberalism 
Model argues for the pacifying effects of democracy and the economic interdependence.  Thus, 
according to this model, the United States would protest and assert against all claims that are 
inconsistent with international law.  And when resources are scarce and difficult choices need to 
be made, then the United States would be more likely to use the Freedom of Navigation program 
to assert against autocratic states and those least engaged in the global economy. 
Second, I examine the variation of the program through the lens of a Security Model.  
This explanation argues that the United States’ Freedom of Navigation Program uses 
international law as a means of increasing its own security and securing relative power 
worldwide.  In a realist world conditioned by anarchy, the absence of a supranational 
government means that states cannot appeal some top-cop for safety and services, but must 
provide for their own security.  According to this theory of the international system, states will 
either seek security or strive to maximize power relative to other states.  These views suggest the 
United States would use the Freedom of Navigation program to balance against threats and rising 
regional powers, or it would use legal action to pick on weaker states to increase its own relative 
power.   
Finally, I consider a third explanation that argues the variation in the Freedom of 
Navigation program results from the politics within and among the organizations tasked to plan, 
coordinate, and execute policy.  To really understand why the United States acts against some 
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countries and not others, one must look inside the “black box” of the United States’ Departments 
of Defense and State to consider the opportunities and challenges, and incentives and constraints, 
facing those who represent the United States in diplomatic and operational capacities.  This 
Organization Model recognizes that strategy is a bridge linking desired policy ends with 
available means.  Thus, one must be attentive to the resources necessary for implementing the 
policies reflected in the Freedom of Navigation program and the human organizations, 
bureaucratic structures, command-and-control configurations, and operationally ready forces 
who do the work.   
Through a nested analysis of large-n quantitative analysis that motivates case selection 
for qualitative analysis, this dissertation demonstrates that no one of these models alone explains 
the variation observed over the 55 years broadly since 1958 or since the formal establishment of 
the Freedom of Navigation program in 1979.  However, this study calls particular attention the 
importance of the organizational variables in determining outcomes.  These models are indeed 
interactive, and, taken together, they offer a more complete understanding of the United States’ 
approach to Freedom of the Seas that ever produced. The selected case in Chapter 5 
demonstrates how variation in organizational priorities and resources and bureaucratic tensions 
between the President and the Department of Defense account for a significant amount of 
variation under some conditions 
Additionally, this dissertation introduces a new dataset comprising 55 years of operations 
(both before and after the formal establishment of the Freedom of Navigation program).  This 
dataset contains approximately 7,400 observations recording the maritime claims of every 
coastal state in the world from 1958 to 2013, whether the United States disputes those claims, 
and whether the United States took diplomatic or operational action to demonstrate their refusal 
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to acquiesce to those disputed claims.  These data are assembled primarily from two primary 
sources to construct the dependent variable:  the Department of State’s annual Digest of United 
States Practice in International Law and the Department of Defense’s Maritime Claims 
Reference Manual published by the Operational Law Division of the United States Navy Judge 
Advocate General on behalf of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy.  From these sources 
and others, the dataset records whether the United States conducted diplomatic protests and/or 
operational assertions against each coastal state in the world over the entire time period.    
The dataset also assembles information on economic, military, political, legal, 
diplomatic, and other independent variables for every coastal state in the world from 1958 to 
2013.  It categorizes each maritime legal claim made by the coastal state, whether the United 
States disputes the claim, and what action (diplomatic or operational), if any, that the United 
States has taken to demonstrate its refusal to acquiesce to the claim.  The dataset also includes 
information regarding the organizations responsible for acting on behalf of the United States 
government whether diplomatic or naval the theater and naval component levels during the time 
period.   
This dissertation introduces a specific policy problem to the political science literature 
and employs theories of international law, diplomatic communication and international signaling, 
and even coercion and gunboat diplomacy.   The goals in doing so are threefold. First, the 
dissertation asks under what conditions does the United States employ a particular tool of 
statecraft—diplomatic protests or military assertions under the Freedom of Navigation 
program—to influence international law?  In considering this question, the dissertation makes a 
theoretical contribution to literature on both a state’s ability to coerce another and a state’s 
compliance with international law.  This dissertation addresses a gap between the two 
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fundamentally divergent viewpoints in international law: the utopian view which sees 
international law as a “branch of ethics” and the positivist perspective which views international 
law as a “vehicle of power.”23  
Third, this dissertation asks question about signaling.  Under what conditions are military 
forces used to convey political signals to other states?  By concentrating on one discrete use of 
the navy, this dissertation explains the conditions under which a particular message may be sent 
on ocean policy issues.  FON operations are ostensibly “apolitical operations” intended to be 
nonprovocative and nonconfrontational.  However, despite these intentions, FON operations may 
be 1) perceived as politically motivated, 2) may provoke adversaries, and 3) create confrontation 
where they sought to avoid it.  This therefore has implications for our understanding of naval 
signaling and crisis stability.24  However, before we can assess why some routine operations 
escalate, one must consider why the U.S. conducts them in some places and not others.  Routine 
operations are not conducted at random. They are relatively deliberate activities and they occur 
in regions of the globe where the United States has been present for decades.  Finally, this 
dissertation provides insight into the value of naval presence during peacetime and the non-
combat use of the navy as an instrument of foreign policy. 
 The dissertation proceeds with the following organization.  Chapter 2 reviews the 
Freedom of Navigation program and essential terms and concepts pertaining to the law of the 
sea.  Chapter 3 reviews literature and introduces three theoretical models—a liberalism model, a 
security model, and an organizational model—and hypotheses to be tested subsequently.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 E. H. Carr, The Twenty Years’ Crisis, 1919-1939, New Edition (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2001), 161. 
 
24 See Avery Goldstein, “First Things First: The Pressing Danger of Crisis Instability in U.S.-China Relations,” 
International Security 37, no. 4 (April 1, 2013): 49–89; Jonathan G. Odom, “True Lies of the Impeccable Incident: 
What Really Happened, Who Disregarded International Law, and Why Every Nation (Outside of China) Should Be 
Concerned,” Michigan State University College of Law Journal of International Law 18 (2010): 411–52. 
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Chapter 4 introduces a new dataset of every maritime claim of every coastal state in the world 
from 1958-2013, whether the United States disputes that claim, what kind of action if any the 
United States takes each year to demonstrate its refusal to acquiesce to that claim.  The chapter 
describes the sources of the data and offers some descriptive statistics.  Chapter 5 describes the 
nested analysis method used in this dissertation and conducts a large-n quantitative analysis 
using logit regression techniques.  The results are discussed and used to select cases for 
qualitative analysis in the next chapter.  Chapter 6 focuses on two coastal states, Iran and Oman, 
to offer a set of qualitative case studies that illuminate the reasons why the United States 
conducts operational assertions under the Freedom of Navigation program against some states 
and not others.  The chapter is organized to look at a set of contiguous maritime dyads.  By 
examining the United States behavior with respect to Iran and Oman, the reader observes 
American behavior in important ocean areas of the world.  These two cases exhibit important 
variation on variables in each of the theoretical models, and the qualitative approach 
complements the quantitative analysis from Chapter 5.  Chapter 7 concludes the dissertation with 
a focus on the maritime legal disputes in the South China Sea, discussion of the greater strategic 
implications of freedom of navigation operations there, and policy recommendations. 
The Freedom of Navigation program provides a window into the ways in which the 
United States chooses diplomatic and military tools to achieve national objectives.  This is 
theoretically interesting because three different theoretical approaches suggest different 
empirical outcomes.  By examining the implementation of a particular policy through Freedom 
of Navigation operations, this study makes a theoretical contribution to the literature on uses of 
power, coercion and naval signaling, complex interdependence, and bureaucracy.  Additionally 
this study offers guidance to diplomats, policy planners, and operational practitioners whose 
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challenge to draft and implement policy from the State Department, the Chief of Naval 
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CHAPTER 2. OVERVIEW OF THE LAW OF THE SEA 
 
2.1 UNCLOS: A Sea Change in Maritime Law 
Long before 1982 when the United Nations member states concluded “the largest and 
most complex international negotiation every held,” it appeared unlikely the international 
community would ever achieve agreement on comprehensive ocean policy.25  Indeed, decades 
earlier, the negotiations on the 1958 Geneva Conventions on the Law of the Sea had fallen short 
of its intended mark: to negotiate a new equilibrium for an acceptable breadth of the territorial 
sea.  Decades earlier, the 1930 Hague Codification Conference also had tried and failed to codify 
3nm as the international norm for the breadth of territorial seas.  No state disputed that territorial 
waters may include a coastal belt of 3nm, but several states advocated for a greater breadth of 
territorial seas such as 4nm, 6nm or 18nm.26  Although the desire for an international standard 
was widely shared by most major powers, a draft convention eluded the delegates in 1930.27   
The 1958 Geneva Convention on the Law of the Sea achieved some important goals, producing 
four conventions and one optional protocol.28  However, these accomplishments were widely 
regarded as low-hanging fruit, and consensus on the limits of a territorial sea remained out of 
reach.  
The obstacles to consensus on territorial seas had been erected centuries earlier as states 
clashed over ownership of the seas.  States long have asserted sovereign rights to territorial 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25 William Wertenbaker, “The Law of the Sea, Part 1,” The New Yorker, August 1, 1983, 39–40. 
 
26 “Territorial Waters,” The American Journal of International Law 24, no. 1 (January 1, 1930): 27–28. 
 
27 James Kraska, Maritime Power and the Law of the Sea: Expeditionary Operations in World Politics (Oxford 
University Press, 2011), 96. 
 
28 Tullio Treves, “1958 Geneva Conventions on the Law of the Sea: Introductory Note” (United Nations 
Audiovisual Library of International Law, 2008), http://legal.un.org/avl/pdf/ha/gclos/gclos_e.pdf.  The four 
conventions address Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, the High Seas, Fishing and Conservation of the Living 
Resources of the High Seas, and the Continental Shelf. The optional protocol regards the Compulsory Settlement of 
Disputes. 
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waters, a belt of water adjacent to the coastline.  The incentives to claim ownership are strong: a 
wide territorial sea not only increases the resource wealth of the coastal state, but it provides a 
security buffer.   
The customary definition of territorial water hinged on the idea of control, which was 
perhaps best captured in Cornelius van Bynkershoek’s 17th century maxim, “Imperium terrae 
finiri ubi finitur armorum potestas,” and has been referred to as the “cannon-shot rule.”29  
According to this custom, waters within the range of cannon-shot were considered de facto 
territorial waters.  Insofar as customary law is the result of actions by strong states, the cannon-
shot rule persisted as customary international law, determined by a state’s ability to control its 
adjacent seas with cannons that ranged a short distance offshore.30  When backed explicitly by 
fire-power from shore batteries, claims to greater distances endured as accepted state practice 
until the mid-20th century.  If coastal states tended to view the oceans as a public good, that 
idealism militated against an impulse to territorialize the sea.   
The extent to which states seek to increase their share of the oceans and restrict activity 
within their zones of jurisdiction depends to some extent on two contrasting visions of states’ 
relation to the sea—namely whether seas are free or under state dominion.  This question can be 
traced to a centuries-old debate between Dutch jurists, Hugo Grotius and Cornelius van 
Bynkershoek.  Grotius’ treatise on the freedom of the seas, Mare Liberum, challenged the claims 
to the high seas by Spain and Portugal, which had divided the waters of the New and Old World 
along a line of longitude in the mid-Atlantic.  The Treaty of Tordesillas (1494) split the world 
into two maritime spheres of influence.  These spheres represented the two halves which Spain 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29 Translated from the Latin, this expression says, “The rule of land ends where the power of arms ends.”   
 
30 Wyndham L. Walker, “Territorial Waters: The Cannon Shot Rule,” British Year Book of International Law, Vol. 
210, 1945, 211. 
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and Portugal declared to be their “enclosed waters,” thus excluding all other political and 
economic claims.31  On behalf of his client, the Dutch East India Company, Grotius argued that 
the oceans are a public good and that all states enjoy the right to use the sea freely. The world’s 
oceans are a global commons over which no one state or international body has dominion.32   
This principle became the basis for the Declaration of Paris (1856) and subsequent doctrine on 
the freedom the sea.  Today, this is represented in the United Nations Convention on the Law of 
the Sea.   
Contemporary maritime jurists like John Norton Moore reflect the Grotian perspective on 
freedom of navigation in statements such as this offered during a preparatory meeting of the UN 
Convention on the Law of the Sea: 
The costs associated with any failure to recognize freedom of navigation [. . . ] 
will not necessarily be immediately manifest.  Initial challenges may be subtle, 
plausible, and limited.  Through time, however, the common interest will be 
eroded by unwarranted restrictions on transit, discrimination among users, 
uncertainty of transit rights, inefficient and inconsistent regulations, efforts at 
political or economic gain in return for passage, increased political tensions, and 
perhaps even an occasional military confrontation.33 
 
This statement highlights the shared responsibility of all states to respond to threats to the public 
good on the high sea.  Excessive claims threaten freedom of the seas just as direct threats like 
piracy do.  Article 100 of UNCLOS provides that “all States shall cooperate to the fullest 
possible extent in the repression of piracy on the high seas or in any other place outside the 
jurisdiction of any State.”  Thus, fighting piracy is an international obligation, but by similar 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31 Ann L. Hollick, U.S. Foreign Policy and the Law of the Sea (Princeton University Press, 1981), 5. 
 
32 Magnus Wijkman, “Managing the Global Commons,” International Organization 36, no. 3 (July 1, 1982): 511– 
536. 
 
33 John Norton Moore, “The Regime of Straits and the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea,” 
The American Journal of International Law 74, no. 1 (January 1, 1980): 77, 79. 
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logic, any disputed legal claim that seeks to restrict navigational rights through international 
waters represents a threat to the international community, too.   
Beginning with the first and second UN Conferences on the Law of the Sea in 1958 and 
1960, efforts to address contentious issues of territorial seas, baseline claims, limits of 
continental shelf, and jurisdiction of fisheries proved difficult and ultimately unable to find 
resolution.  The principle cleavage at these first two conventions fell along Cold War lines where 
issues of military security, commercial navigation, and fishing interests had the greatest 
salience.34  The particular weakness of these two conferences was their failure to reach 
agreement on two key issues: the breadth of territorial seas and limitations on the scope of claims 
of a national continental shelf.  In September 1945, President Harry S Truman triggered a “sea 
change” in maritime claims.  Although not pertaining to navigation per se, the Truman 
Proclamation declared the entire continental shelf of the United State under its jurisdiction, 
thereby upsetting the equilibrium of territorial seas as defined as 3nm.  This proclamation 
prompted negotiation that led to the Geneva Convention on the Law of the Sea in 1958, and 
eventually catalyzed the creation of the EEZ under UNCLOS in 1982.35 The United States held 
equities in each of the negotiation areas at the Law of the Sea Convention including the breadth 
of the territorial sea, but freedom of navigation was its priority issue.  Freedom of Navigation 
was then, and remains today, a cornerstone of American economic and military policy.   
In a 1971 Top Secret Memorandum for the President, Henry Kissinger stressed this 
priority to President Nixon.  Following the review of U.S. Oceans Policy and the release of 
National Security Decision Memorandum 125, Kissinger highlighted the threat to American 
interests emerging from diplomatic negotiations regarding the extension of territorial seas and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
34 Hollick, U.S. Foreign Policy and the Law of the Sea, 137. 
 
35 Martin Ira Glassner, Neptune’s Domain: A Political Geography of the Sea (Boston: Unwin Hyman, 1990), 5. 
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other issues.36  In a cover memorandum accompanying the National Security Decision 
Memorandum for the President, Kissinger explicated his concerns to President Nixon:  Coastal 
states were tending toward “extensive unilateral territorial sea claims” stretching as far 200nm, 
and this territorialization of the seas posed a direct threat to freedom of navigation.37  According 
to Kissinger, “generat[ing] broad multilateral support for issues most vital to us, namely a 12-
mile territorial sea and free transit through straits” should be pursued above all else. The priority 
for many coastal states had been simply to protect exclusive fishing rights and access to other 
resources, but a consequence of these policies was the encroachment upon navigational freedom 
in territorial seas.  For the United States, establishing a new norm of 12nm and preserving transit 
through international straits were of “paramount importance to US security.”38  The root of the 
coordination problem for United States negotiators was that few coastal states “care much about 
freedom of navigation, but very many want to maximize their claim to fisheries and seabed 
resources.”39  For the United States, the major objective to be gained though institutional 
frameworks was the preservation of “maximum naval and air mobility.”40  
As the first of eleven rounds of negotiation for the Law of the Sea Conference began in 
1973, the priority of the United States negotiating team was clear.  In its response to a tasker 
from Henry Kissinger (then the National Security Assistant to President Nixon), the Interagency 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
36 Henry A Kissinger, “National Security Decision Memorandum 122” (National Security Council, July 22, 1971), 





38 Henry A. Kissinger, “Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to 
President Nixon, Washington, July 22, 1971,” July 22, 1971, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), National 
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Task Force on the Law of the Sea sought first to build consensus among a “common front of 
states with similar interests to demonstrate well in advance the futility of attempting to outvote 
the U.S. […] on the straits issue and [maintain] strong opposition to their innocent passage 
proposal.”41  In earlier meetings, the Soviet Union—with US support—had proposed codifying 
freedom of transit through straits used for international navigation and a 12-mile territorial sea.   
Negotiation blocs formed between industrialized naval powers and lesser powers that 
balanced their interests.  A special regime for straits used for international navigation was 
opposed by a coalition of “hard-line strait states” and “archipelago states” whose definition of 
innocent passage was “more restrictive and subjective” than the customary international law at 
the time.42  Responding to this coalition, the United States (with support from UK, France, Japan, 
Soviet Union, Kuwait, Madagascar, Tunisia, Norway, and Denmark) argued for its “vital 
national interests.”  The status quo powers position demanded a “12-mile territorial sea coupled 
with free and unimpeded transit through and over straits used for international navigation, and 
straits transit considered separately from that of passage generally in the territorial sea.”43  To 
many members of the delegation, the Third World states fulfilled an expectation of the neorealist 
theory of international relations; they coordinated around similar interests to balance the 
“superpowers.”  
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Third World to oppose the “superpowers.” The Chinese accused the Soviets and Americans of pursuing narrow 
limits “to dominate the oceans militarily and to plunder the resources of the oceans.” 
 
43 Ibid. President Nixon approved this position and disseminated policy guidance one month later via National 
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Delegates to the UNCLOS talks expressed a wide array of security threats to coastal 
states from pollution and fishing to territorial sea delimitation and scientific exploration.  For 
example, the primary concern for Canadian negotiators at the Law of the Sea Conference was 
pollution.  In particular, Canada singled out oil tankers transiting Canadian territorial sea as 
posing a threat to their environmental security.  On these grounds, Canada sought to restrict 
innocent passage to this class of ships.44  Still other conference delegates expressed unrestricted 
fishing as a threat to security of the coastal state.  Careful management of fish stocks is a central 
economic concern of many coastal states, but the rapid depletion of fish stocks in the late 20th 
century had prompted increased vigilance of coastal states to illegal fishing.  Increasingly, this 
sensitivity to maritime resource management in the territorial sea has also led to international 
disputes—and occasionally violence (e.g. the Cod Wars between Iceland and Britain, Tuna 
disputes between Ecuador and United States).   
The Central Intelligence Agency stated with even greater clarity the divisions among the 
delegates.  In a 1974 analytical study, the CIA drew a distinction between two general camps.  
First, there were a powerful but relatively small number of industrialized nations with navies, 
commercial maritime interests, fishing fleets and offshore mining enterprises.  This group was 
balanced by a large majority of states that possessed none (or few) of these maritime interests.  
The CIA assessed the fundamental aim of this latter group to be profit through exploitation of the 
ocean’s resources.  By contrast, the industrial nations sought “unobstructed movement and 
access” as a primary objective of oceans policy.   
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Experts at the State Department believed that these divisions resulted from three factors: 
available technologies, increased coastal jurisdiction, and decolonization.45  First, technological 
innovations occurred in the 1940s to facilitate maritime resource exploitation farther offshore.  
Although submerged oil wells had been drilled in the 1890s, oil companies focused their efforts 
in shallow waters close to shore.  In 1947, the Kerr-McGee Oil Industries (in partnership with 
Phillips Petroleum) drilled an oil deposit over the horizon out of sight of land.  This step was the 
advent for more sophisticated rotary drilling techniques and barge drilling, and other adaptations 
of land drilling.46  But oil and gas are not the only valuable resources in the sea.  Additionally, 
new fishing techniques emerged for more efficient fishing.  As fisheries achieved greater 
mechanization and scale in the 1950-1960s, trawler-factories, based on the factory whaling ships 
of the 19th century, hauled in unprecedented amounts of fish.  This non-stop, all-weather 
industrial capability led to fishing rates of 200 tons of fish per hour.  In 1968, the cod catch 
peaked at 800,000 tons. But soon after, annual catch totals began to plummet.47  The fish stocks 
had been depleted.  The living resource of the sea was exhausted.  To manage the problem, 
Canada tried to keep foreign fishing trawler-factories farther offshore by extending its fishing 
limit for foreign vessels from 12 to 200 miles from the coast.48 
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The second factor that caused division of United Nations member states into two blocs 
was expansion of sovereignty farther offshore.  This application of the principle of sovereignty to 
the littorals may be better conceived of as the “territorialization of the sea.”  The expansion of 
jurisdiction beyond 12 miles to adjacent waters 200nm offshore concerned many members of the 
negotiation team from the United States.  In most cases, expansive behavior was simply an effort 
by coastal states to obtain new resources for themselves or protect their existing resources 
against foreign fishing.  Additionally, they sought to control oil and minerals in the seabed, and 
to protect themselves against pollution.  Increases in coastal state claims corresponded to desire 
for greater jurisdiction of resources offshore. 
Third, decolonization caused division at the United Nations as the emergence of many 
new states in the international system with misgivings about the status quo increased.  Bristling 
against the old order dominated by powerful states, newer less developed states coordinated their 
objectives in voting coalitions at the UN which would better account for their interests. However, 
United States policymakers who ascribed decolonization as a cause of division between small 
states and major powers may have failed to recognize that decolonization was actually the effect 
of this division which was continuing to manifest itself after independence through voting at the 
UN.49  
Regardless of the reasons for the division among the delegations, the primary opportunity 
(challenge?) presented at UNCLOS negotiations was to reach an agreement that increased the 
claim to valuable resources of the territorial sea by extended the limit to 12 miles while 
protecting the freedom of vital activities of the industrial powers’ navies, commercial and fishing 
fleets, and mining and exploration firms.  Given that there were over 150 nations and between 3-
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5,000 delegates participating in 11 rounds of negotiations, the negotiation challenge was not 
insignificant.   
For the powerful minority, the anticipated deal would achieve their highest priority—
concession of guaranteed movement and access.  But this goal came at a price—profit from, and 
control of, a wider territorial sea.  However, policymakers in both camps viewed any 
compromise on a 12-mile limit to be contingent upon agreement on two other related issues.  
First, industrialized states demanded unobstructed transit through straits for commercial and 
military vessels, because a 12-mile territorial sea would fully enclose more than a dozen 
important straits (e.g. Gibraltar, Hormuz, and Malacca).  Indeed, according to John Norton 
Moore, the proposed 12-mile sea overlapped a total of 116 major and minor straits used for 
international navigation.50  Second, most of the less developed countries demanded jurisdiction 
(not sovereignty) over more resources in a contiguous zone beyond the proposed 12-mile limit as 
a non-negotiable requirement for the deal. 51 
Negotiating these two divergent priorities—the demand for increased jurisdiction over 
ocean resources while preserving freedoms of navigation—required creative diplomacy.  Among 
the most significant innovations of the third conference on the Law of the Sea was the creation of 
an exclusive economic zone (EEZ) extending beyond and adjacent to the territorial sea.52  
According to UNCLOS, an EEZ may extend no farther than 200nm from the same baseline from 
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which a coastal state’s determine the territorial sea.  This legal innovation recognized potentially 
vast claims of a coastal state up to 38 million square nautical miles of ocean space and extended 
the rights of coastal states to exploit, develop, manage and conserve all resources – fish, 
petroleum and minerals – in the sea or the seabed.  Unlike the territorial sea, however, the claims 
to the EEZ do not convey state sovereignty.  A coastal state does not exercise control over all 
activities in an EEZ.  Rather, a state may exercise jurisdiction or “sovereign rights for the 
purpose of exploring and exploiting, conserving and managing the natural resources […] and 
with regard to other activities for the economic exploitation and exploration of the zone.”53  The 
resources at stake in the EEZ have enormous potential for extraction wealth.  According to the 
UN, extension of the EEZ waterspace now accounts for approximately 87% of known and 
estimated hydrocarbon reserves under the sea—the presently attainable and readily exploitable 
wealth.54  Under the 200nm-EEZ regime, archipelagic states and nations endowed with long 
coastlines obtain the greatest areas and thus the larger share of the resources.  These states 
include the United States, France, Indonesia, New Zealand, Australia and the Russian 
Federation. Although these states are naturally endowed with vast resources, UNCLOS 
encourages responsible stewardship of these resources by limiting overfishing of fish stocks and 
responsible extraction of oil and minerals in accordance with the conservation measures 
established in the laws and regulations of the coastal state. 55  In South East Asia for instance, 
both petroleum and fisheries policy may be critical for peaceful resolutions of the many maritime 
territorial disputes.  But, as stated in a 2012 testimony before the United States Senate during a 
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hearing on China’s increasing need for resources to sustain economic growth, the appetite for 
resources may be swallowing up states’ respect for rights of navigation, too.56   
If such expansive reach of the coastal state previously may have appeared to threaten 
navigation, the UNCLOS negotiations concluded three important assurances in the treaty.  First, 
UNCLOS further codified the customary law on the right of innocent passage in the territorial 
sea by updating the provisions and definitions of innocent passage that had been agreed to in the 
1958 Geneva Convention on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone.  Second, the 1982 treaty 
affirmed the right of transit passage through international straits, including those straits full 
subsumed in a coastal state’s territorial sea.  Finally, the treaty ensured the unrestrained activity 
of warships in the EEZ.  The purpose of the Freedom of Navigation program is to preserve these 
freedoms and to demonstrate American refusal to acquiesce to claims that limit those freedoms. 
2.2  The Freedom of Navigation Program 
The preservation and enhancement of worldwide navigational freedom is a strategic 
priority of the United States and is rooted in its core national goals.  Freedom of Navigation has 
been established in customary international law for centuries and reflected in international 
treaties such as the Geneva Convention on the Law of the Sea in 1958 and the United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) in 1982.57  The United States ratified the 1958 
Geneva Convention, but has not ratified UNCLOS as of 2016.  Ratification of UNCLOS has 
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garnered the support of much of the Executive branch of government including the United States 
Navy and Department of Defense.  Clear statements from the Chief of Naval Operations, the 
Secretary of the Navy, and the President of the United States call attention to the benefits of 
signing.58  The 2015 Department of Defense Asia-Pacific Maritime Security Strategy echoes 
these endorsements and contextualizes the importance of the Convention in terms of institutional 
measures to address challenges in the South China Sea and East China Sea: 
Adherence to a rules-based system has been critical to furthering peace, stability, 
and prosperity in the Asia-Pacific region. This system provides the basis for 
shared use of maritime waterways and resources, and ensures safe operations 
within the maritime domain. This is why the United States operates consistent 
with – even though the U.S. Senate has yet to provide its advice and consent – the 
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (Law of the Sea Convention), 
which reflects customary international law with respect to traditional uses of the 
ocean.59 
 
Yet, despite this commitment to international law and navigational freedom, ratification of the 
treaty has stalled in the United States Senate for reasons pertaining mostly to rights and 
responsibilities related to the provisions on deep seabed mining of resources articulated in Part 
XI of UNCLOS and the anticipated relationship between the United States and the International 
Seabed Authority created by UNCLOS to regulate resource extraction from the seabed.60  
Meanwhile, the United States policy on Freedom of Navigation reflects customary international 
law as reflected in UNCLOS.  
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The United States attempts to preserve and extend these freedoms in at least three ways.  
First, the United States conducts bilateral consultations stressing the importance of navigational 
freedoms and adherence to international law.61  Second, the United States delivers formal 
diplomatic protests to address claims considered inconsistent with international law.  Third, the 
United States conducts naval and air operations to emphasize and assert international 
navigational rights.  These operational assertions “tangibly exhibit the United States’ 
determination not to acquiesce in excessive claims to maritime jurisdiction by other states.”62  
This concern stems from the practice of acquisitive prescription in international law.63  Although 
the United States has not ratified UNCLOS for domestic political reasons, the United States 
continues to demonstrate its commitment to the navigation principles the treaty embodies.64  
According to the Judge Advocate General of the United States Navy, “the Convention is in the 
national interest of the United States because it establishes stable maritime zones, including a 
maximum outer limit for territorial seas; codifies innocent passage, transit passage, and 
archipelagic sea lanes passage rights; works against "jurisdictional creep" by preventing coastal 
nations from expanding their own maritime zones; and reaffirms sovereign immunity of 
warships, auxiliaries and government aircraft.”65  Of particular concern to the United States are 
disputed straight baseline claims, claims of territorial seas exceeding 12 nautical miles (nm), and 
other claims that unlawfully impede freedom of navigation and overflight.   
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This study does not attempt to analyze the bilateral consultations or formal diplomatic 
protests of the United States.  Rather, this study focuses on the more observable instances when 
the United States commits its operational resources to challenge claims assert the freedom of 
navigation.  First, under what conditions does the United States devote limited operational 
resources to conduct assertions of navigational freedom?  Indeed, apparently less costly options 
exist through bilateral consultations and formal diplomatic protests.  Second, what accounts for 
the variation in operational assertions?   
Since 2001, the United States has conducted operational assertions of freedom of 
navigation against 35 countries, with some states receiving more attention than others.  The 
United States has challenged countries like Iran and China at least twice yearly in the last five 
years, but did not challenge Saudi Arabia, Somalia, or Sudan during the same period.  The 
United States challenged Indonesia more frequently than any other country (18 times since 
2001), but has not challenged Denmark, Cuba, or Pakistan in over a decade. 
The United States has disputed claims of some 140 states dating back to 1948, long 
before the Freedom of Navigation Program formally existed.  Since the official creation of the 
Freedom of Navigation program in 1979, the United States has conducted operational assertions 
via the FON program to protest 110 disputed claims, and the program attributes to these efforts a 
number of successful outcomes.  To wit, many of the states challenged by the United States have 
rolled back their disputed claims and now conform to the rules of delimitation as stated in the 
Law of the Sea convention.66  Whether the FON program is directly responsible for these 
rollbacks falls outside the scope of this dissertation.  
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In light of recently declassified presidential directives, slight variations in the FON 
program have occurred over time.  Much of the content in the documents is redacted, obscuring 
the most politically sensitive aspects of the FON Program.  Nevertheless, there are some useful 
details that emerge from a close reading of the two directives from the Reagan Administration 
and the directive signed by George H. W. Bush.  National Security Decision Directive Number 
72 (NSDD-72) written on the occasion of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, emphasizes 
the importance of navigation.  This directive underscores the United States commitment to 
asserting its rights given the “uncertainty in the law of the sea” and the United States decision 
not to become a party to the Law of the Sea Convention.”  According to this directive, United 
States interests are threatened by six categories of disputed maritime claims.  The position of the 
United States is that these categories of claims lack consistency with either the 1958 Geneva 
Convention on the Law of the Sea, the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, or customary 
law.   These categories of disputed maritime claims include 1) historic waters not recognized by 
the United States; 2) unlawful baseline claims; 3) territorial sea claims that overlap international 
straits and do not permit transit passage or contain requirements for advance notification, or 
apply special requirements such as notification for nuclear-powered vessels; 4) territorial sea 
claims in excess of 12 miles; 5) claims of jurisdiction over waters outside of 12 miles which 
affect high-seas related freedom; and 6) archipelagic claims that fail to conform to the LOS 
Convention or permit sea lanes for transit passage.67   
The importance of navigation to national security had been a priority long before the 
Reagan administration.  The importance of navigation as an issue of national security policy was 
apparent to President Nixon also.  In 1971, during the so-called Tuna War off the coast of 
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Ecuador, tensions that had been rising since 1952 and reached a moment of crisis when Ecuador 
seized 75 United States-owned tuna fishing boats.  These fishing vessels had been operating in 
waters off the coast of Ecuador. 68  Since 1966, Ecuador’s territorial-sea claim was disputed by 
its neighbors.  However, neighbors Peru and Chile had made similar claims.  Until Ecuador 
rescinded its 200-nm territorial sea claim in September of 2012, it had claimed not only the 
exclusive economic rights to extraction of resources existing in these waters, but also the 
sovereignty over navigation activities in these waters.69   
At the time of the dispute in 1971, the provision for a 200nm EEZ had not been created 
by UNCLOS (1982).  Additionally, the 1958 Geneva Convention on the Law of the Sea was 
unsuccessful in reaching consensus agreement on 12nm as the limit of territorial seas. 70  At first 
glance, it may appear that United States’ interest in the case may have been to protect or affirm 
the rights for 75 Americans to fish in international waters.  The priority, however, for the United 
States was the right of navigation—a globally transferrable principle, and one that had 
consequences, not just for fishermen, but for international trade and for the mobility of the 
United States Navy.   
These priorities were not only at the service level, but also at the highest levels of 
government.  When Kissinger explained to the situation to President Nixon during a taped 
conversation at the time of the Tuna War, the President responded with the clear priority for the 
United States government:    
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Kissinger:   “We’ve already agreed to negotiate, but we don’t have a formal position yet 
[...]  The State Department wants to negotiate now, but the Defense 
Department wants to have a showdown.  They’re not so concerned about 
fisheries, but they’re concerned about law of the seas.  [...] If we dig in on 
the fisheries, we’ll lose on navigation— 
 
Nixon:  “Navigation we want.  Let them fish if they want.  That’s my view.71  
 
The Reagan Administration later restated this primary national interest in freedom of navigation 
through NSDD-83, “United States Oceans Policy Law of the Sea and Exclusive Economic 
Zone,” which reiterates the United States’ commitment to the rights of navigation despite its not 
becoming party to the UNCLOS convention.  President Reagan committed the United States to 
follow the laws as established, and just as importantly, to ensure that no agency seek to establish 
new jurisdictions beyond 200 nautical miles.72   Later, during the second term of President 
Reagan, National Security Decision Directive 265 reviewed the United States’ refusal to sign the 
Law of the Sea Convention because of the provisions for deep seabed mining and the United 
States support for the provisions regarding “traditional uses of the oceans” consistent with 
existing maritime law.  The deep seabed issue has been the primary point of contention that has 
prevented United States ratification.  The directive repeats its commitment to the same 
navigational freedoms as stated in NSDD-72, but provides program guidance (most of which is 
redacted).   
Amid the specific guidance for the implementation of the Freedom of Navigation 
program, four specific orders warrant close attention.  First, the guidance calls for frequent 
challenging of international straits and archipelagic sea lanes.  This directive indicates the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
71 “Conversation Between President Nixon and His Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), Washington, 
May 29, 1971” (Office of the Historian, Department of State, May 29, 1971), White House Tapes, National 
Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76ve01/d395. 
 
72 National Security Decision Directive Number 83 (NSDD-83), “United State Oceans Policy Law of the Sea and 
Exclusive Economic Zone,” 10 March 1983. 
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importance of these categories to United States trade routes and military mobility.  Second, the 
guidance discusses the importance of diplomatic protests of disputed claims.  This emphasis 
underscores the importance of interagency coordination between the Departments of State and 
Defense.  Third, the guidance encourages balance.  It states that the United States will not pick 
on rogue states, but instead will contest “excessive claims of friendly states, inimical powers, and 
neutral states alike.”  Finally, the guidance directs “Special emphasis should be given to 
challenging claims which have no record of prior challenge.”  This offers some evidence of the 
importance of establishing legal precedent of our diplomatic and operational protests to disputed 
claims.  It recognizes the fact that the longer a state practice remains unchallenged, the more 
likely it is to be viewed as legal acquiescence and accepted as customary law.73 
President George H. W. Bush issued National Security Directive 49, which supersedes 
NSDD-265.  NSD-49 reiterates its commitment to upholding the Law of the Sea as contained in 
NSDD-83 and updates President Reagan’s policy.  The current policy document in effect is 
Presidential Decision Directive 32 (PDD-32) signed by President Clinton in 1995.  Nearly the 
entire current policy document is classified and redacted, but an available portion states, “the 
purpose of this policy is to preserve the global mobility of U.S. forces by avoiding acquiescence 
in excessive maritime claims of other nations.”74  
  Although most of the program policy and procedures are redacted, NSD-49 emphasizes 
more explicitly than preceding documents the importance of interagency coordination.  This 
interagency coordination appears to be most critical to American contestation of claims such as 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
73 National Security Decision Directive Number 265 (NSDD-265), “Freedom of Navigation Program,” 16 March 
1987. 
 
74 Presidential Decision Directive 32 (PDD-32) dtd January 23, 1995 in James Kraska and Raul Pedrozo, 
International Maritime Security Law (Netherlands: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2013), 213. 
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military activities in maritime zone such as contested territorial seas, historic bays, excessive 
strait baselines, and exclusive economic zones.  According to NSD-49, interagency coordination 
appears to be less critical to operations, which contest claims in international straits and 
archipelagic sea lanes.   
Specifically, the document offers program guidance and it lists procedures for the 
Department of Defense’s planning and administering of operational assertions and it offers 
criteria for “selection of an excessive maritime claim for the annual list” (redacted). The policy 
states coordination is required for action against historic claims, excessive straight baseline 
claims, and territorial sea claims (both territorial and restrictive).  However, assertion of 
navigational rights in international straits appears to be an international legal no-brainer.  The 
policy states, “Military ships and aircraft will use military straits freely and frequently.”75  
Everything else requires interdepartmental coordination and scrutiny.76  This exception 
reemphasizes a green light for operational forces to challenge these claims at will.  “Military 
ships and aircraft will routinely assert U.S. rights against territorial sea claims and other claims 
to jurisdiction over maritime areas in excess of twelve nautical miles that purport to restrict 
nonresource related high seas freedoms, and archipelagic claims not in conformance with the 
LOS convention.” 
One specific coordination requirement NSD-49 lists is the annual requirement for 
Department of Defense to “provide to the Department of State and National Security Advisor a 
semiannual list of operational assertions conducted under the FON program.”  The statement of 
this requirement is interesting because it suggest a requirement for coordination ex post, not ex 
ante.  Unfortunately, the redactions obscure the full extent of requirements for interagency 
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planning and coordination. But a close reading of the available documents indicates that 
coordination is required prior to operations as well as afterward. 
The redactions observed regarding coordination and other requirements of the Freedom 
of Navigation program in the declassified documents present a puzzle. Ostensibly, the activities 
conducted under the Freedom of Navigation program demonstrate the United States’ refusal to 
“acquiesce in unilateral acts of other states designed to restrict the rights and freedoms of the 
international community in navigation and overflight and other traditional uses of the high 
seas.”77  These operational activities assert rights, exercise freedoms, and demonstrate a 
persistent objection to the claims of others.  Operational assertions intend to be public acts; they 
are not covert missions and the results of the operations are published annually for legal 
precedent.  So there is no expectation that there should secretive or compartmentalized aspect to 
the program.  In fact, the reason that the operational assertions have any meaning or value with 
respect to customary international law is because they are public knowledge.  
Thus, this dissertation proceeds to explaining why the United States conducts operational 
assertions in some places and others.  In the next chapter, three theoretical models—a liberalism 
model, a security model, and an organizational model—offer ways of thinking about the 
variation.  
Today, among the 150 coastal states in the world, 80 states make maritime claims to 
which the US objects. The United States disputes maritime claims that are inconsistent with 
international law.  In most cases, the body of maritime law consists of the soft law of opinio juris 
and custom, or state practice.  Together, these comprise customary international law, which is 
reflected in treaties such as the 1958 Geneva Conventions on the Law of the Sea, which the 
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United States has ratified, or the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, which 
it has not.78  Through the Freedom of Navigation program, the United States issues protests and 
operational assertions each year at the rate approximately 10-20 per year.  The next section 
describes the different areas of dispute.  
2.3  Law of the Sea: Types of Maritime Claims and Passages  
This section introduces the various zones of the sea as described in the UN Convention 
on the Law of the Sea.  This section also introduces the category of straight baselines, which 
leads to contentious maritime claims.  Additionally, two regimes of transit, innocent passage and 
transit passage, are discussed.   
FIGURE 2-1 
 
NWP 1-14M, The Commander’s Handbook On The Law Of Naval Operations (JUL 2007), 1-4. 
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2.3.1 Territorial Seas refer to the near waters just offshore a landmass.  The territorial sea is an 
adjacent belt of ocean, measured from coastal baselines (i.e. the “low-water line along the coast 
as marked on large-scale charts officially recognized by the coastal State”) to a limit not 
exceeding 12 nautical miles (Article 5).  Prior to 1982, the measurement of the territorial sea 
varied from 2 to 200+ miles from shore.  For many years, a rough equilibrium for measuring 
territorial sea was determined by the distance a cannon could fire.  The maximum range of a 
shore battery approximated the distance over which the state could extend its military power and 
thus its sovereignty.  Today, the sovereignty of a coastal state extends to the breadth of the 
territorial sea, the airspace above it, and the seabed and subsoil below.  But not all land 
formations are entitled to a territorial sea.  According to the United Nations Convention on the 
Law of the Sea, land formations such as a sovereign continental territory and islands, which are 
naturally formed area[s] of land, surrounded by water, which is above water at high tide,” are 
entitled to territorial seas.  They also enjoy Exclusive Economic Zones (see below).   
   FIGURE 2-2 
    
Additionally, according to the “Regime of Islands in UNCLOS,” rocks, “which cannot 
sustain human habitation or economic life of their own shall have no exclusive economic zone or 
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continental shelf.”  Rocks are entitled to a territorial sea.  However, other land formations such 
as reefs, low-tide elevations, which are “surrounded by and above water at low tide but 
submerged at high tide,” are not entitled to territorial seas (Article 13, 60).79  Similarly, artificial 
islands are not entitled to claim a territorial sea, but they are permitted a 500-meter safety zone 
by Article 60. 
To demarcate the boundaries of the territorial sea, coastal states with adjacent coasts (e.g. 
Portugal and Spain, or Suriname and French Guyana) and states with opposite coasts (e.g. Iran 
and Oman, or Djibouti and Yemen) generally draw median lines between each other and divide 
evenly the water separating them.  According to the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, ships 
of all states are permitted to enter a state’s territorial seas under the regime of innocent passage 
(II.1.2-II.2.6, II.2.15). Artificial islands constructed by the state do not possess the legal status of 
islands and therefore are not entitled to claim a territorial sea or enlarge the coastal state’s claim 
on its Exclusive Economic Zone (V.60).80  A common dispute regarding territorial seas pertains 
to a claim that exceeds 12 nautical miles.  As of 2013, only seven coastal states claim territorial 
seas in excess of 12 nautical miles.81  Sometimes referred to as Patrimonial Seas or fishing zones, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
79 These categorical distinctions are the crux of the dispute between China and its regional neighbors and the United 
States in the Spratly Islands located in the South China Sea.  According to the Island Tracker hosted by CSIS’ Asia 
Maritime Transparency Initiative as of October 2015, China had artificially constructed seven artificial land 
formations from reclaimed sand piled atop reefs.  Ceteris paribus, there are lawful artificial islands, but these 
formations lie in disputed waters.  Moreover, there is confusion as to whether the Chinese are claiming a territorial 
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80 The dispute between China and Japan over the Diayou/Senkaku Islands is an important territorial-claim issue, but 
disputes over land features are not within the scope of this study.  As a matter of policy, the United States does not 
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81 As of 2013, the coastal states claiming territorial seas in excess of 12nm were Benin (200nm), Greece (airspace), 
Nicaragua (200), Peru (200nm), Philippines (varies, up to 285nm), Somalia (200nm), and Togo (30nm).   
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these claims extend in some cases to 285 nautical miles.82   
The delegates to the United Convention on the Law of the Sea negotiated the Exclusive 
Economic Zone as a compromise between parties who wanted to maintain the territorial sea from 
expanding beyond 12 nautical miles and the parties who sought to maintain rights to the living 
and non-living resources farther offshore.  The EEZ was a provided jurisdiction over 
management of resources in the ocean and the seabed below out to 200 nautical miles from 
shore, while limiting a coastal state’s sovereignty to the territorial sea out to 12 nautical miles.   
2.3.2 Internal Waters are not particularly germane to this study, but bear mentioning because of 
their distinction from territorial seas. Internal waters are located on the “landward side of the 
territorial sea” or landward of the mean low waterline.  Examples of internal waters include 
rivers, canals and some bays.  Foreign ships require expressed permission to enter internal 
waters. In internal waters, the right of innocent passage for foreign vessels does not apply.  
Inland waters are distinct from archipelagic waters. (II.2.8) 
2.3.3 Straight Baselines. Typically, the breadth of a territorial sea is measured from a coastal 
baseline that follows the contours of the coastline. However, when the coastal topography is 
“deeply indented and cut into” – or contains features such as shifting, silty river deltas -- straight 
baselines may be drawn to provide a smoother and more stable curve.  International law cautions 
against the tendency to draw these straight baselines too generously, and UNCLOS prohibits 
drawing straight baselines between most low-tide elevations.  When drawn too generously for 
the coastal state, excessive baselines may have two effects.  First, they may redefine portions of 
the territorial sea as internal water, through which passage may be denied to foreign ships. 
Second, they extend the coastal state’s claim on territorial seas and other zones. For example, 
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Iran’s baseline claims 21 straight baseline segments along the North Arabian Sea, Strait of 
Hormuz, and Persian Gulf.  Three of the northernmost baseline claims in the Persian Gulf 
“would increase Iran’s internal waters by nearly 2400 square nautical miles” and “increase its 
territorial sea by some 1650 nautical miles.”83  As of 2016, 41 coastal states make straight 
baseline claims that the United States disputes. (II.2.7) 
2.3.4 Contiguous Zone. This zone is literally contiguous to the territorial sea and extends 
beyond the territorial sea to a distance 24 nautical miles from shore (from 12nm to 24nm 
offshore). The purpose of the Contiguous Zone pertains to a state’s control of its territorial sea.  
The coastal state does not enjoy sovereignty in the Contiguous Zone as it does in the Territorial 
Sea.  Rather, the Contiguous Zone exists for preventing and punishing infringement of customs, 
laws and regulations in the Territorial Zone.  As of 2016, 21 coastal states impose some kind of 
restriction on activities in their contiguous zones.  Most often the coastal state seeks to securitize 
the contiguous zone, which is similar type of effort to territorialize the sea as mentioned above. 
(II.4.33) 
2.3.5 Archipelagic Waters.  Archipelagic states such as Indonesia or Philippines require unique 
considerations for the delimitation of their territorial seas and the transit of foreign ships through 
archipelagic sea lanes.  Constituted by groups of islands and their interconnected waters, 
archipelagos form “an intrinsic geographical, economic and political entity.”  Thus, archipelagic 
waters may be defined by straight baselines, which connect the outermost points of the outermost 
prominent land features.  However, the UNCLOS treaty prescribes a maximum length for each 
straight baseline and a maximum ratio of water-to-land (9:1).  For archipelagic states, the 
sovereignty extends over the waters, airspace, and seabed to a limit measured 12 nautical miles 
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measured from the archipelagic baselines (IV.46-47, 48-50).  All ships and aircraft are permitted 
by customary law and UNCLOS to conduct passage through archipelagic sea lanes (IV.53).  The 
right of innocent passage applies to “all ships and aircraft” through archipelagic sea lanes for the 
“continuous and expeditious passage of foreign ships and aircraft through or over archipelagic 





2.3.6 Exclusive Economic Zone. The Exclusive Economic Zone is a recent creation in 
international law to provide rights to coastal states for managing natural resources.  Land 
formations entitled to claim an EEZ include sovereign continental landmasses and islands.  
According to the Regime of Islands in the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, other land 
formations at sea, such as “low-tide elevations” and rocks “which cannot sustain human 
habitation or economic life of their own shall have no exclusive economic zone or continental 
shelf” (VIII, 121).  
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Defined as the area “beyond and adjacent to the territorial sea,” the EEZ may extend no 
farther than 200 nautical miles from the baseline (V.56). In the EEZ, the coastal state has three 
enumerated rights, jurisdictions, and duties.  First, the coastal state has “sovereign rights for the 
purpose of exploring and exploiting, conserving and managing the natural resources.”  These 
rights pertain to both living and non-living in the waters and seabed.  Second, the coastal state 
has jurisdiction for the “establishment and use of artificial islands, installations and structures; 
marine scientific research; and the protection and preservation of the marine environment.”  
Third, the coastal state “shall have due regard to the rights and duties of other States” (V.56).  In 
the EEZ, UNCLOS states that all states – “whether coastal or land-locked” enjoy “freedom of the 
high seas.”   This expression of freedom reflects a Grotian interpretation of the seas as open to all 
states to navigate.  These provisions are enumerated in Article 87 and include, inter alia: 
freedom of navigation and overflight, freedom of fishing and scientific research, etc.  As of 
2016, 22 coastal states maintain restrictions on permissible activities in their EEZs.  This 
tendency toward restriction and closure reflects the steady erosion of high seas freedoms by 
some coastal states seeking to close their near seas from international use.  These disappearing 
rights reflect a territorialization of the sea.84  (V.55-58)  Additionally, not all states benefit 
equally from an EEZ claim.  The total size of a coastal state’s claim depends on physical factors 
such as total linear distance of coastline and the coastal state’s geographic situation relative to 
neighboring states.  Coastal states sitting on opposite sides of body of water or in close quarters 
(e.g. Eastern Mediterranean, Persian Gulf, Gulf of Guinea, or South China Sea) may have 
overlapping EEZ claims that must be mediated. 
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2.3.7 Innocent passage is a regime of transit that entitles “ships of all states” to conduct 
continuous and expeditious passage in another state’s territorial sea.  This regime of passage 
exists for the purposes of “traversing that sea” or “proceeding to or from internal waters” (Article 
17, 18).  The restricted regime of innocent passage applies only within the territorial sea, and 
does not apply to internal waters or other outer zones (e.g. Contiguous Zone and Exclusive 
Economic Zone).85 Innocent passage must not be “prejudicial to the peace, good order or security 
of the coastal state.”  Warships are entitled to innocent passage, but submarines shall pass while 
surfaced (not submerged) and showing their flag.   
Before UNCLOS, the 1958 Geneva Convention on the Territorial Sea articulated the 
same right of innocent passage.86  However, twenty-five years later, the UN Convention on the 
Law of the Sea had created three provisions that led to a further articulation of innocent passage.  
First, the UN Convention achieved consensus on the extension of the territorial sea.  Second, the 
regime of Transit Passage for navigating international straits emerged as a necessary creation in 
light of the newly extended territorial seas.87  Third, the meaning of innocent passage was further 
articulated in Article 19 of UNCLOS by a list twelve activities from which foreign ships must 
refrain in order to be considered innocent in their passage.88   
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86 The 1958 Geneva Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone entered into force on 10 September 
1964 with 41 signatories and 52 parties to the convention.  The United States signed the treaty in 1958 and ratified 
in 1961. More information on the status of the treaty is available at the United Nations Treaty Collection, 
https://treaties.un.org/pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=XXI-1&chapter=21&lang=en. 
 
87 Horace B. Jr Robertson, “Passage through International Straits: A Right Preserved in the Third United Nations 
Conference on the Law of the Sea,” Virginia Journal of International Law 20 (1980 1979): 803–806. 
 
88 Article 19 “Meaning of Innocent Passage,” prohibits the following activities: threat or use of force; exercise with 
weapons; intelligence collection; acts of propaganda; launch or recovery of aircraft or other military devices; loading 
or unloading of commodities, currency, or persons; willful pollution; fishing; research and survey; interference with 
communication systems; or other activities not required for passage.  See “United Nations Convention on the Law of 
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Innocent Passage is limited to movement through another coastal state’s territorial seas 
only.  As of 2016, approximately 47 coastal states make claims that aim to restrict innocent 
passage.  These restrictions vary by state; they often include requirements for prior notification, 
impositions of prescribed sea lanes for innocent passage, or limitations on the types of vessels 
permitted in the territorial sea (e.g. warships, nuclear-powered vessels, etc).  
The official policy of the United States is that the list in Article 19 of UNCLOS is an 
exhaustive elaboration of what constitutes non-innocent passage. According to Schachte (1992), 
“It is the United States’ view that the enumerations in Articles 19 and 21 are all-inclusive, i.e. a 
ship may engage in any activity while engaged in innocent passage if it is not prejudicial or 
proscribed in Article 19(2), and a coastal State can only enact those laws and regulations which 
are contained in Article 21.”  Schachte continues, “Perhaps the most important factor to be noted 
in this connection is the unwavering position of the United States and other major maritime 
powers that Article 21 does not permit a coastal State to require prior permission from, or 
notification to, a coastal State in order to exercise the right of innocent passage.  The travaux 
preparatoires of the Convention unequivocally indicates that such is not the case.”89 
2.3.8 Transit Passage pertains to movement through international straits for the purposes of 
international navigation. All ships and aircraft are entitled to “continuous and expeditious 
passage” through international straits, “used for navigation between one part of the high seas or 
an Exclusive Economic Zone” (III. 2.37-39).   In the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea 
(Article 37), the international strait is “used for international navigation between one part of the 
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high seas or an exclusive economic zone and another part of the high seas or an exclusive 
economic zone.”90 The Convention recognizes six categories of international straits and over 100 
international straits worldwide.91  The treaty also articulates exceptions and caveats due to 
maritime geography (e.g. Strait of Messina) and four long-standing international conventions.92  
In these international straits, the regime of Transit Passage applies to all ships and aircraft as 
defined in Articles 38 and 39. Major international straits around the world include: the Panama 
Canal, Strait of Magellan, Straits of Dover, Danish Straits, Strait of Gibraltar, Turkish Straits 
(Bosporus and Dardanelles), Suez Canal, Cape of Good Hope, Bab el-Mandeb, Strait of Hormuz, 
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CHAPTER 3. THEORY  
3.1 Customary International Law 
International law draws generally from three sources: custom, treaty, and opinio juris.93  
Custom reflects of state practice (what states do) and subjective beliefs that state behavior is 
law.94  The former mirrors the material interests of a state, while the latter reflects the normative 
values of a state.  Opinio juris is the normative belief that a state has a legal obligation to act in a 
certain way.    
Custom alleges credibility through an “aura of legitimacy” because custom, by definition, 
is not written down or codified.  This aura is problematic because of its ethereal nature; an aura 
of legitimacy is a fleeting phenomenon that may change as state practices change.  Moreover, 
how does one ascribe compliance to an aura?  A more concrete definition is preferred for 
inferring compliance with a particular custom.   
Secondly, custom reflects the “authentic expression of the needs and values of the 
community.”  Custom is necessarily a reflection of that community, but the international system 
is not a homogenous community.  The foreign-policy interests of individual members of the 
anarchic world community are highly varied, and thus their behaviors are varied, too.  A 
complete or comprehensive “reflection of that community” is going to reflect the heterogeneous 
needs and values of the many countries of the world.  In the case of international maritime law, 
the current community of 150 coastal states demonstrates variation in interest, and it is highly 
unlikely that any custom can satisfy the particular needs and values of each and every member 
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state.95  Although the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea earned accolades for 
achieving one of the greatest compromises in the history of treaty law by creating a so-called 
“Constitution of the Oceans,” coastal states were (and remained) divided on key issues.  As 
mentioned earlier, the limitation of the territorial sea to 12 nautical miles (a handful of states 
derogated from the treaty and maintained territorial-sea claims in excess of 12 nautical miles) 
and limitations on warships from conducting innocent passage in the territorial sea or conducting 
military operations in the exclusive economic zone posed obstacles to consensus. 
  As a result of the obstacles to consensus, “the authenticity of the expression” of custom is 
most likely to reflect the position of the majority of coastal states.  If custom reflects an 
“authentic expression of the needs and values of the community,” then this may reflect the most 
powerful or most vocal or majority representation of society.  Another measure of authenticity 
may be one of power, thus the prevailing custom is that behavior that is accepted (or promoted) 
by the most powerful.96  If the criterion for custom is acceptance or concurrence by the most 
powerful states, “a regulation regarding the breadth of the territorial seas is unlikely to be treated 
as law if the great maritime nations do not agree to or acquiesce in it, no matter how many 
landlocked states demand it.”97   
Shaw argues that custom (state practice) can only partially fulfill the necessary 
requirements for international law.  The other necessary condition is the reaction of other states 
in the international system.  How states respond to another state’s actions is a key determinate of 
international law.  Thus, three behaviors deserve attention: explicit acceptance, acquiescence or 
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implicit acceptances, and deliberate protest.  The normative belief obligating states to act in a 
certain way, opinio juris, may not be sufficient to establish that belief as international law.  
Rather, one must observe the reactions of other states.  For instance, as China claims the entire 
South China Sea within the Nine-dash Line in the belief that its claim is legal, how can the rule 
be changed in customary law since that cannot also be in accordance with prevailing law?  One 
has to treat the matter in terms of a process whereby states would behave in a certain way in the 
belief that such behavior is law or becoming law.  It would then depend on how other states react 
as to whether this process of legislation is accepted or rejected.98  The moral imperative is 
necessary, but not sufficient, for opinio juris to be considered law, according to Shaw’s 
interpretation of opinio juris.  The reaction of other states—acceptance, acquiescence, or 
protest—is fundamental to the law.  
State participation in international law reflects state preferences, values, and interests.  
Entry into treaties such as the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) is 
optional for states.  As Goldsmith and Posner argue, “international law is equilibrium behavior in 
which self-interested states are constrained only by their expectations about the strategies chosen 
by other self-interested states.”99
  
Therefore, if a state’s action deviates from the norm and that 
action occurs without protest from other states, acquiescence is considered tantamount to 
acceptance of that deviation. For example, some coastal states have claimed a 200nm territorial 
sea (far wider than the 12nm standard according to international law).100  The United States and 
other countries have assessed these claims as exceeding the territorial sea provision agreed to in 
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UNCLOS, and have taken diplomatic and operational action to contest these claims.  The 
premise for these actions is that uncontested claims may eventually alter the custom and become 
the accepted legal practice.  Although international law theoretically may foster coordination and 
cooperation, a less sanguine theory of international law suggests that states comply only when it 
suits them, and they look for ways to change the law gradually by salami-slicing. 
Efforts to assert a particular policy position regarding international law may be analogous 
to the basic legal concept of adverse possession. In domestic property law, adverse possession 
refers to a “doctrine under which a person in possession of land owned by someone else may 
acquire valid title to it.”101  For example, the neighbor who visibly mows more and more of his 
neighbor’s lawn, without any overt disagreement by the owner, may eventually claim ownership 
without compensation.  In this vein, the operational assertions organized, planned, and executed 
through the United States’ Freedom of Navigation program respond to the encroachment of 
coastal states upon the publically-held high seas and on the free navigation of all ships within 
rightfully claimed spaces.  Freedom of Navigation operations demonstrate a refusal to acquiesce 
to the salami-slicing of states that seek to incrementally increase their claim to international 
waters or limit behaviors in them.  
Active protest and demonstrated refusal to acquiesce are the essence of the Freedom of 
Navigation program.  But do inconsistencies in protest imply that there may be pockets of 
compliance or that there may be regionally determined rules?  Evidence indicates that custom is 
law in some places and not others because of the selective pushback and that there exceptions to 
the rule that some enjoy and not others.  This also implies a wherewithal to push back—that a 
state has the capacity or powers to protest. 
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For example, in 2001 China asserted its sovereignty over (and efforts to control activities 
in) a maritime zone far beyond its territorial sea during two aggressive intercepts in the EEZ.  
Within one week in 2001, on 23 March and 1 April, a Chinese frigate intercepted USNS 
Bowditch, which was conducting lawful hydrographic research in the Chinese EEZ 
approximately 70 nautical miles south of Hainan Island.102  USNS Bowditch was not conducting 
innocent passage, because it was outside of the 12-nm territorial sea.  Rather she was conducing 
hydrographic research, which is necessary for drawing accurate maritime charts used in 
navigation, construction, and exploration and is consistent with the provision of the Exclusive 
Economic Zone in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea.  International legal 
expert, Raul Pedrozo summarizes the essence of the legal disagreement in the Bowditch case: 
The EEZ is a creature of UNCLOS, which created it for the purpose of giving 
coastal states greater control over the resources adjacent to their coasts out to two 
hundred nautical miles (articles 56 and 57). Coastal states were also granted 
jurisdiction in the EEZ over artificial islands and structures, MSR, and protection 
and preservation of the environment (article 56). Unfortunately, over the years 
some coastal states like China have sought to expand their jurisdiction in the EEZ 
by attempting to exercise control over non-resource-related activities, including 
many military activities. These illegal coastal-state restrictions in the EEZ take 
many forms, including prohibitions on military marine data collection (military 
surveys and hydrographic surveys), requirements of prior notice or consent to 
conduct military activities, environmental constraints on sovereign immune 
vessels and aircraft, and national-security restrictions. These excessive claims 
have no basis in customary international law or in UNCLOS, and they have been 
diplomatically protested by the U.S. government and operationally challenged by 
the U.S. Navy.103   
  
Then, a Chinese F-8 jet intercepted and collided with American EP-3 aircraft killing the 
Chinese air force pilot and leading to the destruction of the EP-3 and the detention of the crew 
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for 11 days.104  Many more events have occurred since 2001, such as the USNS Impeccable 
incident in 2009, which transpired similarly to the USS Bowditch incident in 2001. In each of 
these incidents, China has sought to restrict military activities in its EEZ based on its 
interpretation of international law.  Yet, the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea had created 
the Exclusive Economic Zone for the purpose of resource management, not for securitization. In 
each case, the United States has asserted its right to conduct such activities based on its 
interpretation of international law.    
This case highlights the dynamic nature of international law, which is reinforced 
“through the process of disputing.”  “Actors collectively discover the meaning and scope of 
application of social rules, and disputes between states are to be expected regardless of the 
specificity or vagueness of the law.”105  The empirical data on maritime disputes confirms this 
notion.  According to Sandholtz, “rules cannot cover every contingency, and because conflicts 
among rules are commonplace, actions regularly trigger disputes.”106 
3.2 Understanding State Motivation in Shaping International Law 
At first glance, this struggle over activities in the South China Sea appears to be merely a 
local contest for control of rocks, reefs, resources, and rights of sovereignty.  For the United 
States and many regional neighbors, the fundamental legal concern regarding China’s disputed 
resource claim relates to its creeping jurisdiction in maritime zones.  Such efforts to expand 
jurisdiction are not unique to China, but China’s behavior exemplifies this trend among coastal 
states, which is also known as “territorialization.”  Creeping jurisdiction, or territorialization of 
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the sea, is the behavior whereby a coastal state progressively extends its sovereignty offshore, 
and asserting claim to—and restricting behaviors in—maritime spaces otherwise governed by 
international law.107   
Seen in a wider context, the controversy over Chinese claims offers evidence of a contest 
for regional hegemony – or worse, a showdown between a revisionist, rising power and a status-
quo power.  In its full expanse, this dispute suggests the limits of international law and fragility 
of international institutions that undergird the Western liberal order. Samuel Huntington 
presaged the gravity of the situation in civilizational terms:  
What is most plausible and hence most disturbing about this [global civilizational 
war], however, is the cause of war: intervention by the core state of one 
civilization (the United States) in a dispute between the core state of another 
civilization (China) and a member state of that civilization (Vietnam). To the 
United States, such intervention was necessary to uphold international law, repel 
aggression, protect freedom of the seas, maintain its access to South China Sea 
oil, and prevent the domination of East Asia by a single power. To China, that 
intervention was a totally intolerable but typically arrogant attempt by the leading 
Western state to humiliate and browbeat China, provoke opposition to China 
within its legitimate sphere of influence, and deny China its appropriate role in 
world affairs108  
Depending on the distribution of power in the international system, balancing against a status-
quo power may manifest itself in the strategic manipulation of international law. 109  The 
preparatory conferences for the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea witnessed a 
coalition of smaller states forming a negotiation bloc to demand not only a territorial sea, but 
also a restriction on warships within coastal waters.  
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The condition of the international system is such that no power is appointed above all 
others to enforce the law—unlike the domestic-law context within a sovereign state, where the 
state maintains “the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force.”110  In addition to matters 
of enforcement, international law differs from domestic law insofar as it is largely comprised of 
either treaty law or customary law, and it lacks much positive case law as precedent.  In a world 
where international law reflects custom, what states do is the law.  In an international system 
conditioned by anarchy, or the absence of a supreme government, a demonstrable refusal to 
acquiesce to another state’s practice is vital to the maintenance of customary law.   
As international law lacks stringent mechanisms for enforcement, questions about state 
compliance deserve attention.  States may comply with international law because the law reflects 
their preferences and is thus “an epiphenomenon of interests” reflecting the balance of power.  
Thus, when there is an asymmetry of power between states, weaker states will more likely to 
comply with customs established by stronger states.111  Another approach to compliance suggests 
that states comply with the law occurs when it aligns with the state’s incentives.  The perceived 
benefits of adhering to the rules of the system guide state behavior.  Thus, states will more likely 
deviate when noncompliance exceeds the costs of participating in the system designed for 
collective good.112  Alternatively, a theory of regime type may explain state compliance—
especially among democracies.  Democracies have a greater affinity for international legal 
processes for the resolution of disputes because democracies rely on legal processes for domestic 
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governance.113  Finally, democratic norms may influence states to comply with international law 
in the presence of an interdependent social system.  The law can influence behavior, but it 
requires the influence of international, transnational, and nongovernmental organizations to 
narrow the range of equilibrium outcomes available to states. Institutions can create instrumental 
incentives and increase a state’s sense of obligation to act in a prescribed manner.
 
 
The premise of non-acquiescence forms the raison d’etre of the Freedom of Navigation 
program.  Given the variation in compliance with international law generally, and the challenge 
in maintaining the equilibrium of the maritime legal norms, the United States has focused on the 
importance of customary international law.  When the United States interprets a coastal state’s 
maritime claim as a challenge to the status quo, it must act diplomatically or operationally to 
demonstrate its refusal to acquiesce to that claim.  Thus, the persistent objection aims to counter 
the claims of that state seeking to alter the status quo.  The United States’ actions under the 
Freedom of Navigation program are its demonstrable refusal to acquiesce to other states’ 
deviation from customary international law.   
3.3 Theoretical Paradigms of Action 
Of the 150 coastal states in the world, 80 states currently make maritime claims that the 
United States disputes.  When the United States actively contests a disputed claim, it has at least 
two mechanisms for protesting these disputed claims.114  First, the United States may issue a 
diplomatic protest, usually in the form of some diplomatic communication such as a note 
verbale, aide de memoir, or demarche. Second, the United States may dispatch warships or 
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military aircraft to drive through contested areas in order to demonstrate both the freedom to 
navigate freely and its refusal to acquiesce to a coastal state’s claim.  However, diplomatic 
protests and operational assertions occur infrequently in disputes over freedom of the seas.  In 
the period 1958-2013, the United State used diplomatic channels to communicate protests 197 
times or in 7.1% of disputes (where the unit of analysis is the country-year-dispute).  During the 
same period, the United States conducted operational assertions 535 times 19.3% of dispute 
(average of 15 countries each year).  
This empirical variation is puzzling and prompts theoretical questions.  First, the 
observed variation belies power-based explanations that the United States simply picks on weak 
states not strong states.  Second, it suggests that the United States’ commitment to liberal 
institutions is not so universal that it protests all disputed claims, everywhere, all the time.  Third, 
it suggests that despite geographical proximity or contiguity of some coastal states, some specific 
policy may dictate when the United States asserts against some claims and not others.  For 
example, the United States has asserted its freedom of navigation against Peru and Columbia, but 
not Chile or Costa Rica; against Finland and Sweden, but not Estonia or Lithuania; against the 
Soviet Union, but not the Russian Federation; against Liberia repeatedly but not against Nigeria 
during a twenty-year period, and against India but not Pakistan since 2001.  Meanwhile, the 
United States has consistently conducted an operational assertion against the Philippines every 
year since 1979, against Oman every year since 1983, against Iran every year since 1989, and 
against Bangladesh’s every year since 2001. 
Thus, despite the American commitment in principle to freedom of the sea and the United 
States’ implied commitment to a universal defense of freedom of navigation, the United States 
appears to be inconsistent in its diplomatic and operational behavior.  Empirical evidence shows 
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that the United States does not issue diplomatic protests or conduct operational assertions each 
year against every state with which it has a maritime claims dispute.  Neither universal nor 
ubiquitous in its protests and demonstrations, the United States has neglected some countries and 
concentrated on others during different periods of time.  
The observed behavior of the United States since the 1958 Geneva Convention on the 
Law of the Sea, the 1979 establishment of the Freedom of Navigation Program, and the 1983 UN 
Convention on the Law of the Sea demonstrate that the United States’ policy approach to 
Freedom of Navigation does not comport fully with any dominant explanation in international 
relations.  Protests and assertions vary over time and space.  Available evidence indicates the 
United States does not consistently contest the claims of any one state or group of states, but 
rather varies when and where it chooses to protest and assert.  This dissertation seeks to 
understand this variation and explain why the United States acts against some maritime claims 
and not others. Specifically, this chapter considers three theoretical approaches for explaining the 
variation of American operational assertions against the maritime claims of some coastal states 
but not others.   
This chapter considers three theoretical approaches for identifying the conditions under 
which the United States implemented a particular policy to pursue its national interests.   
Specifically, this chapter draws on liberalism, neorealism, and organizational theory to explain 
whether and how the United States actively protested the maritime claims of other states during a 
55-year period from 1958 to 2013.  These theoretical approaches are called the Liberal Model, 
the Security Model, and the Organizational Model.115  The time period permits analysis of 
behavior by a great power across multiple levels of analysis.  Specifically, this permits variation 
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in the distribution of power in the international system, foreign domestic political regime types, 
and variation in United States military bureaucratic organization.116  These three models may be 
considered ideal types as no one of these models explains perfectly the variation in state 
behavior.  Rather, they provide explanations that may provide great, but incomplete explanatory 
power, and which seek complement from additional models to complete the explanation of 
behavior.  Although parsimony is a preferred virtue of theory, this dissertation follows the 
counsel of King, Keohane, and Verba who note that “theory should be just as complicated as all 
our evidence suggests.”117 
3.3.1 Liberal Model.  
American commitment to the institutionalization of liberal ideals is a natural starting 
point for explaining the United States’ activity in the Freedom of Navigation program.  A leading 
explanation for the United States’ conduct of naval operational assertions is its commitment to 
international institutionalism.   This commitment is rooted in the earliest days of the Republic 
and later articulated in the second of President Woodrow Wilson’s Fourteen Points, “Absolute 
freedom of navigation upon the seas, outside territorial waters, alike in peace and in war, except 
as the seas may be closed in whole or in part by international action for the enforcement of 
international covenants.”118  
The Freedom of Navigation program offers the United States mechanisms for legal 
dispute and demonstration to pursue this absolute freedom. The very fact that the United States 
disputes anywhere is a reflection of its commitment to international law and the institutions that 
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uphold it.  The Freedom of Navigation program is motivated by a liberal notion of liberty and 
commitment to the institutions, laws and norms that preserve this liberty.   
According to the paradigm of Liberalism, any variation in the Freedom of Navigation 
program results from a recognition that the states’ interests are inextricably tied to a free sea. Its 
essential logic lies in wealth, growth, and ideas, not only in security.  To a trading state, the sea is 
its source of wealth or commercial power—not just for one state to exploit, but for all to enjoy.  
This idea of liberty has deep roots in Western thought, particularly in positive theories of 
individual and collective liberty, commercial trade, and social interdependence (Grotius, Mill, 
Smith, et al).  Defense of the global commons reveals a fundamentally commercial approach to 
the seas, which values the ocean as the primary conduit for liberalized trade.   
Consistent with this view of international politics is the theory of a commercial peace, 
which is manifest in Great Britain’s adaptation of its role from protector to provider.  In the spirit 
of Adam Smith and Jeremy Bentham, the idea that free commerce, not force, would enrich 
England led to a shift away from a protectionist, mercantile approach to state security.119  
According to this view of international politics, capital, not conquest, is the route to state 
power.120  The pursuit of the benefits of free commerce fostered a security strategy that 
conceived of security as a public good.  Great Britain pursued a naval strategy dedicated to 
protecting sea lanes of communication for and ensuring freedom of navigation.  In doing so, 
Great Britain adapted its role from protector of national commerce to provider of maritime 
security as a global public good for all states to enjoy.  Whereas the mercantilist strategy aims to 
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deny access and halt trade of the enemy or a competitor, a capitalist strategy built on the 
foundation of free-trade offers a different concept of maritime security.  Open access to the 
ocean ensures all can navigate the global commons as a global public good.  Some states may 
(and do) free-ride on this provision of security, but the underlying liberal assumption is that an 
objective harmony of interests may be achieved in society and international relations, because “a 
purely capitalist world can offer no fertile soil to imperialist impulses.”121  Like a rising tide that 
floats all boats, an open maritime commons is a public good that benefits all states.  According to 
Schumpeter, capitalism is by nature anti-imperialist, and war in capitalist countries always leads 
to a domestic political struggle because of the domestic opposition to war.  No people can afford 
to regard war as normal state of affairs.  Moreover, conquering is costly; trade benefits all (Kant, 
Marx, Wilson).  According to Schumpeter, “When free trade prevails no class has an interest in 
forcible expansion” because free trade creates a situation where goods and people flow freely.  In 
this situation, “dominion of the seas […] means little more than a maritime traffic police.”122 
If freedom of the sea is an unalloyed good that benefits all states, it is a relatively fragile 
one.  Participation in an open system of free, liberal trade holds the promise of economic growth 
through commerce, while failure to abide by the system or to actively threaten it risks sanction 
from the international community.  The foundation of today’s open maritime system resulted 
from a mixture of hard power and soft power.123  In the case of maritime law, the country with 
the most powerful Navy, the United States, has been the self-appointed manager of the system, 
as was the Royal Navy one century before it. This system, the post-World War II liberal order 
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has been maintained through international institutions and underwritten by the power of the 
United States and its allies.  This mixture of coercion and consent has fostered a harmonious and 
prosperous international order.   
A broader look at the international institutions created in the post-World War II decades 
offers a better understanding of why maritime security may be considered a public good.  The 
reconstruction of post-war Europe demanded massive development efforts to alleviate poverty in 
war-torn countries and to construct a new international economic order that would provide for 
economic stability, promote economic growth, and facilitate development. But just as this 
challenge required unprecedented international collective action through institutions like GATT 
and Bretton Woods for trade and finance, this challenge also required substantive efforts for 
providing security.124  In order for new regimes of international free trade and finance to operate, 
a secure environment is necessary.  International trade depends on freedom of navigation and 
security at sea. 
As manifest in the maritime laws and norms of freedom of navigation, the Western-led 
order has been unusually accessible, legitimate, and durable.  An open sea where ships of all 
states, regardless of their influence and power, may navigate freely is the ideal result of the 
Liberal Model.  The Liberal Model explains why the United States uses the Freedom of 
Navigation program to maintain the maritime legal aspect of the international system.  As a 
foundational principle of American foreign policy, it suggests that the United States will contest 
any and all efforts to enclose the open seas or restrict activities at sea.   
With some minor exceptions, this ideal has been reality for the greater part of the 
twentieth and early twenty-first centuries.  But the ideal of complete and open access to the 
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ocean has not always been realized.  Freedom of the seas historically has been undermined by 
threats to neutral shipping, such as privateers and commerce raiders, enemy navies, and other 
efforts to deny the full use of the seas to other states.  Efforts to constrain navigation freedoms or 
to reduce the free and open high seas are antithetical to the American interpretation of liberty.125   
For the United States, freedom of commerce and navigation has been articulated not only as a 
national birthright of independence, but as a global public good which American efforts extend 
to all states in the international system.  The Liberal Model reflects a state’s pursuit of absolute 
gains through the establishment and preservation of ordering principles such as the rule of law 
and international institutions, not the pursuit of relative gains through accumulation of material 
power.  
Such a system is “difficult to overturn and easy to join,” but it is not self-sustaining.126  
Indeed, the efforts and investments necessary for maintaining the institutions that undergird the 
contemporary international system are substantial and cannot be ignored.  Today, the United 
State Navy works with partner navies and coast guards around the world to maintain security.  
The U.S. Navy maintains approximately 100 ships underway around the world each day and 
maintains maritime headquarters in four geographically deployed locations around the world to 
ensure the command and control of forces and the coordination and cooperation with regional 
partners for theater security.  This global presence is at the heart of the maritime strategy titled, A 
Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower.  The Liberal model suggests that states should 
– and actually do – contribute to the provision of public goods.  In this example, the costs of 
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maintaining a navy represent a type of enforcement cost required by a hegemon for maintaining 
the stability of an international system.127 
Of course, willingness to pay these costs is not entirely altruistic.  The concept of 
maritime security as a global public good overlooks the disproportionate benefits derived by the 
UNCLOS provisions for freedom of the seas.  Moreover, the United States has such interest in 
maintaining maritime freedom and security on behalf of the international system because it 
benefits disproportionately from the freedom of navigation it supports.  By definition a public 
good is both non-excludable and non-rivalrous (non-exhaustible), then security cannot be 
considered a public good.128  
Adam Smith recognized the challenges in promoting free trade, “Commerce, which ought 
naturally to be, among nations, as among individuals, a bond of union and friendship, has 
become the most fertile source of discord and animosity.”129  Two centuries later, Waltz echoed 
the uncomfortable truth about interdependence that states experience in international trade:  
“Interdependence means that the parties are mutually dependent upon,” not merely sensitive to, 
economic conditions.  The interdependence of nations varies depending on their capabilities.  
Politics is comprised greatly of these inequalities in capabilities between states, which are 
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potential causes of conflict.130  Interdependence means greater contact between people, which 
according to Waltz, actually increases the likelihood of conflict.   
Thus a rationalist explanation for American policy seems to be most convincing.  Insofar 
as the United States has led the provision or defense of this public good of maritime freedom, its 
efforts may not have been motivated out of altruism but self-interest. The United States bears the 
cost of securing the global commons, but it derives a significant benefit from this good as well.   
Democracy and capitalism have reinforced the very rules and institutions they are rooted in and 
benefiting from.  By widening the array of participants and stakeholders in the system, the 
United States has fostered economic growth for all while also restraining the use of its power and 
ensuring sustained benefit at reduced costs.  
Without vigilance and institutional maintenance that threatens sanction, the tide can shift.  
Contemporary maritime jurists like John Norton Moore warn of the dangers of taking for granted 
the open seas.  The threats to the maritime commons may not be obvious and the immediate 
costs of a closing sea may not be immediately discernable.  Initial challenges may be subtle, 
plausible, and limited.  But Moore warns, “Through time, however, the common interest will be 
eroded by unwarranted restrictions on transit, discrimination among users, uncertainty of transit 
rights, inefficient and inconsistent regulations, efforts at political or economic gain in return for 
passage, increased political tensions, and perhaps even an occasional military confrontation.”131  
 Threats to freedom of the seas are often less obvious than pirates or enemy navies; 
freedoms at sea may be threatened in seemingly ordinary or inconspicuous ways.  For centuries, 
states have asserted claim to so-called territorial waters.  The accepted definition of territorial 
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water had been those adjacent seas that states could control from the shore. This sentiment was 
perhaps best captured in Cornelius van Bynkershoek’s 17th century maxim, “Imperium terrae 
finiri ubi finitur armorum potestas,”132 which later became interpreted as the “cannon-shot rule.”  
Waters within the range of cannon-shot were considered de facto territorial waters.  The custom 
of cannon-shot rule became the international norm, determined by a state’s ability to control its 
adjacent seas with cannons that ranged a short distance offshore.  This became accepted state 
practice until the mid-20th century.133  As late as 1958, a majority of states adhered to this norm 
as 45 coastal states claimed a territorial sea of three nautical miles, and the four Nordic states 
claimed four nautical miles.134  However, a movement to claim more ocean and further 
territorialize the seas gained traction, resulting in the establishment of a 12-nautical-mile 
territorial sea which states agreed to in the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, but which 
more states violate than ever before.   Today, nine states claim territorial seas exceeding 12 
nautical miles, and 47 coastal states have set some type of restriction regarding the conditions 
under which foreign vessels may enter these territorial seas.   
Centuries earlier, Grotius’ argued that the oceans are a public good and all states enjoy 
the right to use the sea freely.  His challenge to the Treaty of Tordesillas in the 15th century 
fought against the notion of enclosed waters.  Grotius opposed political and economic claims that 
intended to exclude some states from full access to the seas.  At the time, Grotius argued on 
behalf of his client, the Dutch East India Company, whose business interests suffered from the 
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Portuguese efforts to close the sea and monopolize trade to the East Indies.  Grotius gave voice 
to the idea that the world’s oceans are a global commons over which no one state or international 
body has dominion, which became the basis for the Declaration of Paris (1856) and subsequent 
doctrine on the freedom the sea.135   For Grotius this doctrine is based in the “most specific and 
unimpeachable axiom of the Law of Nations, called a primary rule or first principle, the spirit of 
which is self-evident and immutable, to wit: Every nation is free to travel to every other nation, 
and to trade with it.136 
Today, the Grotian perspective on freedom of navigation is represented in the United 
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, which codifies the shared responsibility of all states 
to respond to threats to the public good on the high sea.  Despite Grotius’ prominent concept of 
the “freedom of the seas,” the behavior of states with respect to the oceans has tended towards 
enclosure.  Today, the open commons are challenged by the desire of coastal states to control 
more offshore space despite international coordination under what is arguably the most 
successful international treaty, the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea.  Whether for security 
purposes or for gain of economic resources, the extension of state control over the seas has 
created an increasingly territorialized sea that threatens open access. 
  Testable hypotheses derived from the Liberal Model include: 
  
H1a. Because maximum participation in and adherence to customary international law 
and the UNCLOS treaty is the desired outcome, the United States will conduct operational 
assertions against as many states as possible regardless of geographic situation. 
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H1b. The United States will use operational assertions as outward expressions promoting 
its domestic political order and will be more likely to conduct operational assertions to 
contest the claims of autocratic states than institutionalized democracies. 
 
3.3.2 Security Model. 
According to the Security Model, one expects the United States to deploy its naval 
vessels to conduct operational assertions when there is a likely security payoff.  The primary 
concerns here are those of relative security gains and the likelihood of conflict. But how does the 
simple act of an operational assertion achieve a state’s security goals?  As a peacetime use of the 
Navy for political purposes, Freedom of Navigation operations resemble “gunboat 
diplomacy.”137  To some observes the use of a naval vessel to assert navigational freedoms 
resembles a threatened use of force reassure allies or send a coercive message to foreign states 
within their waters.138  As such, this definition implies the existence of a dispute, which 
conforms to Cable’s expansive definition that includes any threat committed in furtherance of an 
international dispute.139 
 There exists a tension between the Realist view of the seas and a Liberal view of the seas 
that has persisted for over four centuries. In many ways these two theoretical approaches offer 
conflicting imperatives for the United States in the modern international system. However, this 
conflict is nothing new, as Grotius observed in the early 17th century, “There are times when 
maritime powers want freedom of navigation, and there are times when coastal states wish to 
claim exclusive ownership over parts or the whole of the oceans.  The legal outcome depends 
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upon who dominates whom.”140  On one hand, Security Model expects the use or threat of force 
to ensure security and achieve national goals.  On the other hand, promotion of an international 
regime of rules and institutions that provides stability and greater opportunities for cooperation 
seems most likely according to the Liberal Model. 
A foundational tenet of Realism maintains that a state will pursue its interests, and the 
state’s interest is defined in terms of power and security.  To this end, this dissertation assumes a 
state’s national objectives in the following prioritized way.141  First, as a matter of primary 
importance, states seek core national objectives (sometimes referred to as “vital interests”), 
which relate to the security of the state.  These objectives include the maintenance of national 
sovereignty; protection of the homeland, territories, and resources; and the defense of treaty 
allies.  Some states, particularly authoritarian regimes, may also include the preservation of the 
regime as a core national objective.  Second, states pursue middle-range goals such as welfare 
objectives to increase their wealth and standard of living, whether through international trade, 
institutions, regimes, and other international organizations, etc.  Third, states pursue long-range 
objectives such as broader milieu goals which seek to establish long-term, ideational objectives 
like as the pursuit of broader human rights, rule-based exchanges, democratization, and the 
like.142 
Whether explicit or implicit in the pursuit of these objectives, the pursuit of power 
governs the sphere of action of states and “infuses a rational order into the subject matter of 
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politics.”143  This reflects the underlying condition of the international system, anarchy.  States 
exist in a so-called state of nature, where states are like-units, uniform in function, and 
differentiated in capability, struggling to survive.  In this ungoverned, anarchic world, no 
supranational entity or international organization provides order or security.  States must provide 
for their own security; states can count only on themselves for survival.  Those states that fail to 
provide for their own security discover the Hobbesian truth that life is “nasty, brutish, and 
short.”144  
These hypotheses contribute to theories of international relations and foreign policy.  
First, in terms of the Security Model, the dataset covers a long period during which the 
distribution of power in the international system varied.  From 1958 to 2013, the distribution of 
power arguably transitioned from a bipolar to a unipolar to a multipolar world.145  Second, the 
Freedom of Navigation program offers a gauge to measure whether the foreign policy of the 
United States has become more militarized over time.  One expectation of balance of power 
theory is that an unchecked, unipolar state is more likely to use or threaten force than a state that 
is balanced in a bipolar or multipolar distribution of power.146  In a period when the United 
States enjoyed naval mastery, one would expect the United States to exercise its advantage in 
military power.  With an ability to exert itself far beyond its home waters, the United States 
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Navy has possessed a command of the commons since the fall of the Soviet Union, and arguably 
for most of the second half of the twentieth century.  Paul Kennedy describes naval mastery as: 
A situation in which a country has so developed its maritime strength that it is superior to 
any rival power, and that its predominance is or could be exerted far outside its home 
waters, with the result that it is extremely difficult for other, lesser states to undertake 
maritime operations or trade without at least its tacit consent. It does not necessarily 
imply a superiority over all other navies combined, nor does it mean that this country 
could not temporarily lose local command of the sea; but it does assume the possession of 
an overall maritime power such that small-scale defeats overseas would soon be reversed 
by the dispatch of naval forces sufficient to eradicate the enemy's challenge.147 
 
During the 1970s and 1980s, the Soviet Navy emerged as the sole challenger to American Naval 
mastery as submarine technology and, later, aircraft carriers contested the U.S. naval dominance. 
Similarly, in the early 2000s, the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) has rapidly 
modernized its fleet and enabled China to challenge American dominance in East Asia.   
The Security Model leads us to expect that the United States will use the Freedom of 
Navigation program first to increase national security close to home, to preserve or increase its 
sovereignty and claim over resources, and to increase its security abroad among treaty allies.  
Whatever the absolute advantages to be gained from international trade, the Security Model is 
sensitive to the fungibility of power.  As Adam Smith observed, “The wealth of a neighboring 
nation, however, though dangerous in war and politicks, is certainly advantageous in trade.  In a 
state of hostility it may enable our enemies to maintain fleets and armies superior to our own; but 
in a state of peace and commerce it must likewise enable them to exchange with us to a greater 
value and to afford a better market[…]”148  Wealth, and the commercial system that begets it, is 
thus a double-edged sword.  Recognizing that relative power, not absolute power, is the measure 
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of security and that increasing power increases likelihood of state survival, the Security Model 
predicts the following behavior:149  
 Testable hypotheses derived from the Security Model include: 
 
H2a. The United States will conduct operational assertions to challenge claims, which 
restrict freedom of movement in areas most vital to American military security or 
commercial security. The strategic chokepoints are the highest priority transit zones. 
 
H2b. The United States will conduct operational assertions to challenge the emergence of 
a regional hegemon. 
 
3.3.3 Organization Model 
Although the Security Model and Liberal Model provide much explanatory power for the 
conditions under which the United States conducts operational assertions, many cases elude 
these explanations. Jervis argues if state behavior cannot be explained by either internal policies 
or the external environment, then the bureaucracy may determine policy.  Accordingly, positions 
in government determine policy positions, such that “where you sit is where you stand.”150  To 
gain a finer understanding of the variation, some consideration must be given to the 
organizations that are responsible at for implementing policy.  A bureaucratic level of analysis 
offers an explanation of the variation of this program’s implementation that may account for the 
relatively low severity or acute nature of ocean policy issues.   
The security challenges and opportunities for gain that the state faces vary over time and 
by issue area.  However, ocean policy is simply not at the top of the list of priorities for most 
states.  Thus, the behaviors of a state on issues of maritime claims are not likely to be largely 
determined by heads of state or decisionmakers at the highest echelons of government.  
Moreover, matters of ocean policy because of their relatively lower importance vis-à-vis other 
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policies of national importance may be used as focal points for cooperation on other high 
political issues or as they may be used as linkages or levers on more contentious issues.  Thus, it 
is unlikely that the theories of either the Liberal Model or the Security Model will have complete 
explanatory power. These models may be useful in understanding many cases, but there are 
likely to be special cases that fail to conform to the theory.  The exceptional cases may be 
explained at the margins by bureaucratic and organizational factors. Within the bureaucracy, 
career-professionals, not politicians, actuate the levers of power.  Within the bureaucracy, the 
government’s expertise resides; political leaders often delegate authorities for decisionmaking on 
discrete issues down to these organizations.  The organization of these bureaucracies, their 
prioritized objectives, and the limited availability of resources affect their decisions just as much 
as the larger theoretical concerns or dominant political climate of the day.   
The bureaucratic level of analysis is particularly useful in situations when national 
survival is not at stake, and thus is helpful for thinking about Freedom of Navigation.  The 
burning-house metaphor helps to illuminate this fact.  When a house is on fire, Wolfers tells us 
that one expects to observe a uniform response—occupants will race for the exits.   Through this 
metaphor, one thus expects to observe states acting uniformly to dire security threats.  Under 
more ordinary conditions, however, we expect more variation in state behaviors.  Wolfers 
acknowledges that in international politics “the house is not always, nor everywhere on fire.”151  
Oceans policy and disputed maritime claims rarely rise to levels of “dire and unmistakable threat 
to national survival.”152  Thus, by examining variation at the bureaucratic level, we can move 
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from a state-as-actor theory and delve inside the black-box of the state to examine sources of 
state conduct closer to the individual decisionmakers.  
This theory assumes two basic principles.  First, it assumes that the policy preferences of 
bureaucrats are determined largely by their position in government, and their interests are 
affected by structural incentives operating on them, workload and resource constraints, 
expectations of peers and seniors, and the clients of the organization.153 Second, this theory 
assumes that states’ policies are determined by bureaucratic bargains and routines, which affect 
the statesman’s decision or policy implementation in such a way as to render the decision itself 
irrelevant.154  Jervis argues that we have no way to explore the extent to which bureaucratic 
factors affect the outcome of behavior, because we have no grounds to claim that a different 
bureaucratic constellation would have produced a different result.155  However, by varying the 
bureaucratic structure while maintaining a constant policy, this study should illustrate how a 
bureaucracy matters to outcomes.  Additionally, the bureaucratic model must consider the 
resources available to it for implementation of prioritized policy objectives.   
Thus, the Organization Model proceeds in two stages by explaining why an organization 
is selected and then by explaining how that chosen organization’s attributes affect its execution.  
First, the Organization Model considers what organization the government charges with the 
mission of executing an operational assertion to protest a disputed maritime claim.  The 
Organization Model helps to explain the reason that the U.S. Navy is the organization selected to 
implement the policy in the first place.  That is, why does the United States government dispatch 
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warships to conduct Freedom of Navigation assertions and not some other type of vessel?  It is 
worth noting that the United States Navy is most regularly chosen to demonstrate the United 
States’ refusal to acquiesce to maritime claims.  On one hand, this choice may be explained by a 
theory of signaling which argues that messaging within the same domain leads to most effective 
communication.156  So, an objection over a maritime dispute would be best communicated in the 
same mode or medium by sending a maritime message with ships.  But cannot a commercial 
tanker ship fulfill the role?  Would a rowboat be as effective in demonstrating the United States’ 
refusal to acquiesce to a disputed maritime claim? 
Whether a warship is an appropriate communication instrument depends in part on one’s 
beliefs about the type of organization being tasked to execute the mission.  In the typology of 
James Q. Wilson, the armed forces during peacetime exemplify procedural organizations, whose 
“managers can observe what their subordinates are doing but not the outcome if any that results 
from those efforts.” (Wilson 163).   Without war to test its mettle, a military in peacetime can 
only estimate, but not gauge with certainty, its readiness for combat.  According to Wilson, a 
procedural organization differs from a craft organization whose output and effectiveness are 
readily apparent.  A craft organization consists of operators whose activities are hard to observe 
(e.g. ships dispersed across the Pacific Ocean157) but whose outcomes are relatively easy to 
evaluate (e.g. destruction of enemy ships in battle).”  If the navy were a procedural organization, 
then policymakers would likely select it because of its ability to be observed procedurally – in 
addition to its relative ease of movement or operational agility. However, if the navy were a craft 
organization then it would be likely be selected because of its ability to defeat other naval vessels 
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in combat.   
For the purposes of the Freedom of Navigation program, the warfighting capabilities and 
attributes of a craft organization may not seem necessary.  After all, a ship that is innocently 
conducting a legal demonstration of its freedom and which intends no disruption that is 
prejudicial to the peace of the coastal state should not need to be combat-ready.  Thus, any ship 
(even a rowboat) should be sufficient for conducting a simple innocent transit from point A to 
point B.  Indeed, an operational assertion would seem to be the stuff of procedural organizations.   
However, any vessel conducting an assertion under the Freedom of Navigation program 
may be denied by force the right to navigate by the coastal state.  Anticipating a worst-case 
response from a state that seeks to deny navigational freedom, a ship must be prepared to fight if 
engaged by hostile forces, even though the intended character of an operational assertion may 
have been procedural, innocent, legal, and non-combative.  As a procedural organization, the 
United States Navy offers a level of assurance and reliability to policymakers that it will function 
as desired not as a combat platform for warfare but as a communication tool for “lawfare.”  
However, only those warships that are deemed operationally combat-ready will be employed to 
conduct FONOPS lest operation require the capability to fight. 
This typology, with its clear distinction between procedural and craft organizations, poses 
a challenge for classifying the U.S. Navy for the purposes of this study.  Although Wilson 
argues, “The largest procedural organization in the government is the United States Armed 
Forces during peacetime,” the U.S. Navy is not a garrisoned force.158  The navy is an 
expeditionary service—constantly deployed and ever-ready.159  This attribute of sustained 
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readiness and constant operational deployment is relatively unique among the services during 
peacetime.  The peacetime Navy remains operationally active and deployed worldwide during 
periods of peace and crisis.  Moreover, the materiel readiness of the navy during the post-WW2 
era, in terms of warships and auxiliary ships, has remained roughly the same in times of peace 
and war due to the very large capital investments and long lead-times for ship construction. This 
behavior is inherently different to that of the army which tends to remain garrisoned during 
peacetime and which may expand and contract with greater agility in preparation for war. 160   
Nevertheless, Wilson’s general distinction is well taken.  A navy cannot receive a 
complete test of its fighting ability except against a live, interactive enemy.  The minutia of 
training and deployment may be observed carefully by ship captains and fleet admirals—with 
great attention placed on the observable readiness of weapons systems, the personnel operating 
them, and their equipment.  But, the U.S. Navy has not experienced conventional, fleet-on-fleet 
engagements since World War II.  The Navy has engaged in limited naval skirmishes and uses of 
warships for projection of power ashore from uncontested waters suggest, but these operations 
pale in comparison to Leyte Gulf in 1944 when the ships and aircraft of the U.S. Navy’s 3rd and 
7th Fleets destroyed what remained of the Imperial Japanese Navy.   
And yet throughout the period of this study, the U.S. Navy has remained deployed world-
wide and ready for combat – even if on a lower scale, as the total number of available warships 
in current American inventory is less than the number of American ships that fought in the four 
days at Leyte Gulf.161   But ready for what?  For when?  With What?162 These questions formed 
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the crux of an existential crisis experienced by the Navy in the decade after its victory of WW2, 
and they provide a guide for considering exactly what type of organization is the U.S. Navy 
during the period 1958-2013    
Possessing the largest fleet in its history, the U.S. Navy appeared to have little reason to 
maintain such a fleet.  As Samuel Huntington observed in 1954, “It appeared impossible, if not 
ridiculous, for the Navy still to claim the title of the Nation’s ‘first line of defense’ when there 
was nothing for the Navy to defend the nation against.”163 During the Cold War and post-Cold 
War era then, the distinction between craft and procedural organization may be less salient in 
understanding the role of an organization like the U.S. Navy.   
The Navy seems to function as an index of American power for communication purposes.  
Its carefully calibrated weapon systems communicate a technical ability to inflict damage from 
specific distances and with measured likelihoods.164  Second, the organization model explains 
how the tasked organization’s capabilities, interests, and perspectives affect how it carries it out 
the mission. At the risk of absurdity, this question draws attention to two concerns: quality and 
reliability of the policy instrument selected and ability to command and control that instrument.  
Both of these concerns are active for the diplomatic-defense bureaucracy.    
The United States Navy is the organization selected to implement policy because it is 
perceived by decisionmakers to be operationally ready and reliable.165  To assess readiness, In 
order to implement a delicate policy that may potentially be misperceived and escalate into a 
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more severe crisis situation, political leaders delegate mission to a specific organizations for 
implementation.  These missions require a level of assurance that the operations will be 
accomplished professionally and without likelihood of operational mishap or political escalation.  
By their nature, routine procedures are practiced more frequently.  This seemingly banal 
observation leads us to a testable hypothesis for empirical research.166  The frequent practice of 
routine operations leads to organizational learning and the development of the standard 
procedures and repertoires leaders may rely on in sensitive situations, in cases when escalation is 
possible or likely, and in periods of crisis. Provided there is adequate feedback, routinized 
decisionmaking lends itself to organizational learning in most environments. 
In addition to the explanation of quality, the Organization Model helps us understand the 
importance of a tool the government can control.  Finely calibrated legal operations that are not 
intended to provoke hostile responses require a trusted agent over whom the government has 
complete command-and-control.  Defense contractors or private entities cannot fulfill this 
requirement without requisite legal protocols.  The tool selected must be one that has observable 
readiness and proficiency; it must be an organization that spends time training and operating.  
But to communicate a very finely calibrated message with confidence that it will be conveyed as 
intended, the United States needs a robust, calibrated, trustworthy tool to conduct operations.  
Occasionally even well routinized processes lead to unexpected outcomes.  Highly complex 
organizations often perform in accordance with expectation, but occasionally fail spectacularly 
due to “practical drift”167 and decoupling of tactical actions from strategic objectives.168  
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According to the Organization Model, we expect the United States to deploy its naval 
assets to conduct operations when it has the organizational capacity and interest in doing so.  The 
Freedom of Navigation program requires an integration of agents within the bureaucracies of 
State and Defense who have their individual and organizational interests and priorities that do 
not always align.169  This problem may stem from a virtue of bureaucracies.  The common, 
internal imperatives of bureaucracies are to ensure abundant options for their principals; 
bureaucracies rarely seek to burn bridges.170  However, the current organizational structures of 
the Departments of State and Defense differ, and delegation to the military bureaucracy may 
actually cause or exacerbate the very political problems it was supposed to forestall unless there 
is sufficient coordination. 
 In complex organizations, principals delegate the planning and execution of routine 
tasks and operations where little confrontation is expected.  Freedom of Navigation operations 
are relatively mundane—a class of operations that are explicitly designed to avoid confrontation.  
These operations are delegated to relatively low levels of the Departments of Defense and State 
where career professionals with high levels of regional and functional expertise plan and execute 
routine operations. Such decentralization in an organization is common and creates 
organizational efficiencies in terms of expertise, opportunity cost (time and money), and 
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information.171  However, decentralization can result in decisions being made by many agents 
throughout the hierarchy with different beliefs, varying perspectives on the problem at hand, and 
occasionally overlapping goals.172 Within the bureaucracy of the Department of Defense, tactical 
units, regional fleet headquarters, and theater commanders must coordinate to implement policy. 
Combatant Commands within the Department of Defense have statutory responsibility to 
maintain ready operational options for the President to execute.173  At these levels, defense 
strategy is crafted and implemented.  Serving as a bridge between national policy and operational 
action, strategy is a plan that balances political ends and military means.174  Within the 
bureaucracy, a wide spectrum of policy aims must be prioritized for action, and the limited 
means available must be applied to the most important objectives.   
H3a. The United States will conduct Freedom of Navigation operations when an 
operational headquarters exists to plan and execute them.   
 
H3b.  The United States will not conduct Freedom of Navigation assertions when 
political sensitivities dictate—as expressed by Department of State or National Security 
Council.  
 
H3c.  The United States will conduct Freedom of Navigation operations when diplomatic 
relations are in tact.  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
171 Herbert A Simon, Administrative Behavior: A Study of Decision-Making Processes in Administrative 
Organizations, 4th ed. (New York: Free Press, 1997), 317. 
 
172 Philip Zelikow and Graham Allison, Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis, 2nd ed. (New 
York: Pearson, 2009). 
 
173 There are 6 geographic Combatant Commands: U.S. Africa Command, U.S. Central Command, U.S. European 
Command, U.S. Northern Command, U.S. Pacific Command, and U.S. Southern Command.  Additionally, there are 
3 functional Combatant Commands: U.S. Special Operations Command, U.S. Strategic Command, and U.S. 
Transportation Command. The 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Act updated the roles and responsibilities of Combatant 
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Section 163, “Commanders of Combatant Commands: Assignment; Powers and Duties.” 
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174 Richard K. Betts, American Force: Dangers, Delusions, and Dilemmas in National Security (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 2012), 233. 
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In Chapter 4, I present a dataset designed to help test these hypotheses.  Spanning 55 
years from 1958 to 2013, the Freedom of Navigation (FON) dataset contains information on the 
maritime claims of coastal states, disputes over various states’ compliance with international law, 
and the actions taken by United States to demonstrate its refusal to acquiesce to claims it 
interprets as unlawful.  The data include both diplomatic protests and physical assertions, which 
are backed by the threat of military force.  The variation observed will not likely conform 
perfectly to any one of the models introduced above.  There is not likely to be any clear, perfect 
explanation.  However, I anticipate that the Liberal Model and Security Model will explain a 
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CHAPTER 4. DATASET INTRO AND DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
 
4.1 Introduction 
This Freedom of Navigation (FON) dataset, which spans the years 1958–2013, contains 
three important categories of information.  First, the dataset records information on each type of 
maritime claims of every coastal state in the world (e.g. specific claims to Territorial Seas, 
Exclusive Economic Zones, etc.).  Second, the dataset records whether the United States disputes 
one or many of a coastal state’s maritime claims.  Third, the dataset records whether the United 
States took action—either a diplomatic protest, or an operational assertion, or both—to 
demonstrate its refusal to acquiesce to claims it interprets as unlawful.  The unit of analysis is the 
coastal state-year.  The dependent variable is whether the United States issues a diplomatic 
protest (0/1) or conducts an operational assertion (0/1) to contest a disputed maritime claim of a 
coastal state. This dataset is a pooled dataset, meaning the data have the attributes of both time-
series data and cross-section data.175  The dataset contains a cross-section of every coastal state 
in a given year, and the number of coastal states varies over time.  It contains approximately 
7,412 observations and the data comprise over 30 variables for every coastal state in the world 
during a 55-year period.   
The FON dataset records each of the various maritime claims of every coastal state in the 
world and what action, if any, the United States takes when it disputes those claims..  When a 
coastal state makes a maritime claim that conflicts with the United States’ interpretation of 
international law, there are two primary tools available to challenge those claims.  The coastal 
state’s claim is a necessary precursor for American action and for entry into the dataset as a 
dispute.  These claims are elements of each state’s domestic law and they are recorded in two 
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important source: the United Nations Division for Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea and the 
United States Navy’s Judge Advocate General Maritime Claims Reference Manual.  When a 
disputed claim exists, the United States may respond by issuing a diplomatic protest with a 
demarche, or by conducting an operational assertion with a warship of the United States Navy.176  
The former may be accomplished with a formal note, aide memoir, or other communiqué 
delivered through diplomatic channels.  To conduct the latter, a warship sails through a contested 
area to its assert freedom of navigation.  Both measures are intended to contest claims assessed 
by the United States to be unlawfully “territorial” or “restrictive of usage.”  Each measure 
constitutes an American refusal to acquiesce to the claims of the particular coastal state.  This 
chapter introduces a dataset designed to help test hypotheses related to one application of 
military force to achieve political outcomes in peacetime.  This dataset will contribute to 
hypothesis testing and theory building on the utility of force and international law in 
international politics. 
A demonstrable refusal to acquiesce to another state’s practice is vital to the maintenance 
of customary law. International law is largely comprised of either treaty law or customary law, 
and it lacks much positive case law as precedent.  Rather, the law relies heavily on custom and 
normative sense of obligation to act, opinio juris.  Thus, “what states do” comprises much of  
international law.  As Goldsmith and Posner argue, “international law is equilibrium behavior in 
which self-interested states are constrained only by their expectations about the strategies chosen 
by other self-interested states.”177
  
Positive law, such as treaty law is also fundamental, but entry 
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The focus of this study is on the use of naval forces in the Freedom of Navigation program. 
 
177 Jack L. Goldsmith and Eric A. Posner, “A Theory of Customary International Law,” The University of Chicago 
Law Review 66, no. 4 (October 1, 1999): 1113–77. 
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into treaties such as the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) is optional 
for states.   Therefore, if a state’s action deviates from the norm and that action occurs without 
protest, acquiescence is considered tantamount to acceptance if that behavior is visible to other 
states, is purposeful in its deviation from the norm, and is part of a pattern of similarly 
intentioned action.  For example, some coastal states have claimed a 200nm territorial sea (far 
wider than the 12nm standard according to international law).  The United States and other 
countries have assessed these claims as exceeding the territorial sea provision agreed to in 
UNCLOS, and have taken diplomatic and operational action to contest these claims.  The 
premise for these actions is that uncontested claims may eventually alter the custom and become 
the accepted legal practice. Although international law can theoretically foster coordination and 
cooperation, a less sanguine theory of international law suggests that the law states comply only 
when it suits them and look for ways to gradually change the law by salami-slicing. 
Efforts to assert a particular policy position regarding international law may be analogous 
to the basic legal concept of adverse possession.178  In property law, adverse possession refers to 
a “doctrine under which a person in possession of land owned by someone else may acquire 
valid title to it.”179 The demonstrations conducted by the United States reveal a particular legal 
stance on the maritime claims. They respond to the salami slicing of states who seek to 
incrementally increase their claim to international waters.  These activities are organized, 
planned, and executed through the United States Freedom of Navigation program, a bifurcated 
program administered by the Departments of State and Defense. 
The following pages discuss the rationale for constructing this dataset and describe the 
characteristics of the dataset itself. First, I describe coding rules and procedures for the FON 
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dataset, including coding choices made during its assembly. Second, I present basic descriptive 
statistics about key items of interest in the data and evaluate several bivariate relationships. 
Third, I compare the FON dataset with several other relevant datasets. The chapter concludes 
with a discussion of possible applications and extensions of the FON dataset for academic 
research and policy execution. 
4.2  Data Coding Procedures 
4.2.1 Time Series 
There are two primary reasons to begin data collection in 1958—one legal and one 
operational.  The first reason is that 1958 represents a milestone in the history of international 
maritime law.  From 24 February to 27 April of that year, the first United Nations Conference on 
the Law of the Sea convened in Geneva under Resolution 1105 (XI) of 21 February 1957.  This 
conference was the culmination of seven years of work by the International Law Commission, 
which sought to codify the regime of the high seas and the territorial sea.  Previously, maritime 
demarcation adhered to the legal principle of state practice, but variation in coastal state practice 
occasionally led to dispute. The 1958 conference produced the Conventions and Protocol which 
follow earlier efforts of international jurists at of the Hague Conference for the Codification of 
International Law in 1930, but the 1958 conference was unable to produce consensus on the 
breadth of territorial seas.  
By beginning the data collection in 1958, three important phases in international 
maritime history are captured.  First, the period begins at the conclusion of the landmark 1958 
Conference on the Law of the Sea and the implementation of those conventions.  Second, the 
period continues through the diplomatic efforts of the subsequent convention, which met from 
1973-1982 and produced the current treaty, UNCLOS.  Third, the period continues through the 
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years of ratification and implementation of UNCLOS from 1983 onward during which arguably 
the most ambitious multilateral treaty of its time was implemented.  
The second reason the dataset begins in 1958 is that the year marks a major reform of the 
Department of Defense.  In 1958, the United States Congress enacted the Department of Defense 
Reorganization Act.  This legislation amended the National Security Act of 1947 and responded 
to President Eisenhower’s desire for a more unified and streamlined chain-of-command.180  At 
least three factors contributed to the call for reform. First, Eisenhower experienced during World 
War II the efficiency and effectiveness of unified command.  Second, increased rivalry between 
the services following the DOD reforms of 1947 required organizational adjustment.181  Finally, 
rapid technological modernization of United States weapons systems and Soviet systems 
prompted a call for new organizations to command and control a modern force.  The legislation 
provided to military commanders the legal codification of Operational Command (OPCON).182  
The reform also streamlined command structure by eliminating service chiefs as executive 
agents.183  The time series also captures the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense 
Reorganization Act of 1986, which is widely considered the most significant restructuring of the 
Department of Defense since 1947.   
The effect of Goldwater-Nichols on naval operations, among other activities, was significant.  
Until 1986, the Chief of Naval Operations performed duties as his title implied: this four-star 
admiral literally commanded operations of the navy around the globe.  After the 1986 legislation, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
180 Edward J. Drea et al., The History of the Unified Command Plan, 1946-2012 (Washington, DC: Joint History 
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history/ucp_2013.pdf. 
 
181 Walter J. Boyne, Beyond the Wild Blue: A History of the U.S. Air Force, 1947-1997 (Macmillan, 1998), 124. 
 
182 “Joint Publication 1-02: Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms” (Joint Chiefs of 
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the Chief of Naval Operations and the other service chiefs became so-called service providers.  
Their responsibilities were curtailed to the programming and management of forces.  The post-
Goldwater-Nichols Chiefs of Naval Operations focuses on “manning, training, and equipping” 
the navy which they subsequently provide to the geographic combatant commanders around the 
world who maintain operational control of the forces.   
4.2.2 State Entry to Dataset.  
In 1958, the number of coastal states in the international system was 85.  That number nearly 
doubles from 1958 to 2013 when the total number of coastal states in the international system is 
150.  No observation is recorded for a state until it formally declares independence.  For 
instance, Cameroon enters the dataset in 1960 when it gained independence from France, and 
Latvia enters the dataset in 1991 following its declaration of independence after the dissolution 
of the Soviet Union. Similarly, states that dissolve are terminated from the dataset in the year of 
their disestablishment, and no observation is recorded for a dead or fragmented state. For 
instance, neither the Soviet Union nor Yugoslavia appears in the dataset after 1991.  In the case 
that two states unify, they are recorded separately through the year of their unification, then they 
are recorded as a new state with a new Correlates of War country code for the remaining years.  
For example, the Yemen Arab Republic (Sanaa) and the People’s Democratic Republic of 
Yemen (Aden) appear in the data as separate states with distinct COW country codes from the 
dates of their inception (1961 and 1967 respectively) until the year of their unification, 1990.  In 
1990, the dataset records a new state, Yemen, with a unique COW country code.  States that 
change names are also recorded.  For instance, Cape Verde becomes Cabo Verde after its 
domestic legislation in 2013 to change its name.  Similarly, after the fall of the Soviet Union, the 
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Russian Federation replaces USSR for COW Country code 365. These minor details have no 





4.2.3  Exclusion of Landlocked States 
Landlocked states, defined as those states without a coastal access to the sea, fall outside 
the scope of this study, both theoretically and operationally.  The data do not include landlocked 
states for three reasons.  First, only a coastal state possesses a territorial sea and can make claims 
to other maritime zones.  UNCLOS does make important provisions in Part X for landlocked 
states, such as “right of access” to the sea via “transit states.” However, landlocked states may 
not make physical claim of sovereignty to the coastal seas.184  Second, this study examines 
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United States responses to disputed claims and the United States does not conduct operational 
assertions under the Freedom of Navigation program against landlocked states. Finally, to 
include landlocked states would risk skewing statistical results. 
4.3  Data-reliability and Concerns about Missing Data 
  The dataset created for this study, which is detailed in the following chapter, records 
the reports published by the United States government of operational assertions and diplomatic 
protests from 1958-2013.  However, one concern remains about completeness of data reporting 
that necessitate scope conditions for this study.  The secretive nature of diplomatic 
communications undermines confidence that this dataset contains every diplomatic protest issued 
by the United States over maritime disputes in 55 years.  Diplomats value discretion or secrecy 
in communications with representatives of other states, and even the most fastidious efforts to 
collect openly available, unclassified data from multiple sources may not be able to assemble a 
complete body of reporting on diplomatic communications.  There are likely to be some 
secretive aspects to diplomatic protests because sometimes, in the communication between 
states, diplomats will refrain from public remarks that might be politically constraining or 
diplomatically embarrassing.  Thus, due to the problem of secretive diplomacy, this study can 
only claim to draw conclusions about public acts of diplomacy.  
  In contrast to diplomatic communications, which may occasionally privilege secrecy, 
operational assertions conducted under the Freedom of Navigation program are public in nature.  
All Freedom of Navigation assertions are intended to be observable operations (not covert or 
clandestine), and the United States government publishes the results each year as a matter of 
annual legal record.  Moreover, these operations are intended to be not only non-confrontational, 
but also public demonstrations and overt communications of the United States’ legal positions on 
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a particular maritime claim of a costal state.  There is no expectation that the conduct of these 
operations belongs to any secret or compartmentalized program.   
  Due to the concern about completeness of data resulting from the difficulty in 
observing all diplomatic communications, this study focuses on the latter category of activities, 
operational assertions.  However, the data on diplomatic protests may provide some contextual 
evidence for understanding the United States’ policy position on disputes regarding particular 
claims by certain coastal states, and these data may suggest some cases that require greater 
scrutiny.  For instance, closer analytical attention may be appropriate in cases when both 
diplomatic and operational efforts coincide in a given year.  Also of interest are those cases when 
diplomatic communication efforts have not been observed but operational assertions have been 
reported.   
  These two instances, the following concerns about introducing error shall be 
considered.  First, in the former case when both diplomatic and operational efforts coincide, 
Type 1 errors (false positives) present a relatively low risk, because the concern over diplomatic 
protests is their (occasionally) secretive nature.  Reports that are publically available do not risk 
this type of error.  Second, the contrasting cases in which no diplomatic protests have been 
observed but operational assertions have been attempted deserve somewhat greater caution.  To 
neglect these cases would be to risk Type 2 errors (false negatives) and to underweight the 
possibility that diplomatic communications did actually occur in secret.  In these cases, because 
secret diplomatic communications may have occurred (but not observed), the observation of an 
operational assertion alone should not disqualify such cases from closer qualitative scrutiny.   
Any academic study of the implementation of policies pertaining to statecraft and 
military operations is likely to encounter obstacles of classification. However, most information 
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about the Freedom of Navigation program is unclassified.  Reports about the occurrence of 
operational assertions by naval vessels are made public and intended to be openly 
communicated.  This policy was promulgated in NSDD-72 and it fulfills an important legal 
purpose of announcing to the other states the completion of a freedom of navigation transit, 
which achieves the desired intent under customary international law.   
One concern to this dataset is the availability of information regarding diplomatic 
communications. The exchange of diplomatic communications is generally considered a 
sensitive activity, and classification protocols exist to protect their classified contents.  
Thankfully, the annual Digest of the United States Practice in International Law provides annual 
listings of exchanged notes and other diplomatic protests over maritime claims. Unfortunately 
there is no way to confirm whether this information is complete. Most likely, the digest omits 
sensitive and classified communications for two reasons.  First, the State Department’s classified 
repository containing all diplomatic cables sent is not accessible. As with intelligence message 
traffic, diplomatic cables are classified according to tiers of sensitivity.185  Cables that are 
unclassified are most likely to be transmitted in the State Department’s communication system to 
“All Diplomatic and Consular” officers, or ALDACs.  When messages are too sensitive to be 
sent in common distribution channels, they may be sent discretely to only a named embassy and, 
still more discretely, to named individuals. Therefore, the data regarding diplomatic protests may 
be incomplete.  Second, underreporting of diplomatic protests is possible because of the 
considerations diplomats make before issuing sensitive communiqués.  This selection effect 
occurs because diplomats are most likely to make demarches in cases when a greater return on 
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investment is anticipated and diplomatic outreach is most likely to be received favorably.186  
Diplomats assess carefully the likelihood of “getting to yes” and will be more formal and public 
in those cases.  When resistance is anticipated, communications may be indirect or delayed.187 
Diplomats understand that when efforts are too forward or too aggressive, foreign counterparts 
are likely to demur.  So communications are made in private, and diplomatic records are 
classified at higher levels to protect the sensitivity of the relationship.  The data of unclassified 
communiqués is likely complete.  These demarches are available in the public record because 
they were either unclassified or because they have recently been declassified due having reached 
their declassification date.  
4.4  Sources  
4.4.1 Coding the Dependent Variable: Diplomatic Protests and Operational Assertions 
This dataset contains information from a variety of sources, but there are six primary 
sources of information for this data set that deserve special attention.  First, I draw from a 
collection of diplomatic records published by the United States Department of State to code 
diplomatic protests.  Each year since 1973, the State Department’s Office of the Legal Adviser 
has published the annual Digest of United States Practice in International Law.  This 
compendium document provides “a historical record of the views and practice of the 
Government of the United States in public and private international law.”188  Of interest to this 
research is the regularly recurring chapter titled, “Territorial Regimes and Related Issues” in 
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187 This point is not unlike the argument made by Page Fortna in her book, Does Peacekeeping Work?  She argues 
that in order to understand whether and peacekeeping operations work, a two-step approach is necessary.  First, one 
must account for the variation in the crises to which peacekeeping forces are assigned. Why do we send PKO to 
some places and not others?  Then, one can address why some are successful and others are not. 
 
188 Bureau of Public Affairs Department Of State. The Office of Website Management, “Digest of United States 
Practice in International Law,” July 12, 2012, http://www.state.gov/s/l/c8183.htm. 
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which records and commentary related to the Law of the Sea and Freedom of Navigation are 
published.  This resource provides an authoritative compilation of diplomatic activities and 
correspondence related to the Freedom of Navigation program.  However, the publication of this 
document is inconsistent.  The State Department did not produce the Digest from prior to 1963 
or during the years 1981 to 1988.  Also, for the period from 1963 through 1973, the State 
Department published a similar digest under a slightly different title, Digest of International 
Law, which includes similar content as the later digest. 
Second, to code operational assertions since 1991, I reference annual reports by the 
Department of the Navy regarding operational assertions conducted under the Freedom of 
Navigation program.  Published annually, these reports on Freedom of Navigation operations 
have appeared in two formats since 1991.  From 1991-2001, information about Freedom of 
Navigation activities appeared in the Department of Defense Annual Report to the President and 
Congress.189  (Incidentally, the title of this annual report changed in 1991 to include the 
President.  Prior to Secretary of Defense Richard Cheney, the title of this document was the 
Annual Report to Congress).  Since 2001, annual reports on the Freedom of Navigation program 
have been published directly on a Department of Defense website.190  These documents list the 
countries against which the United States conduct operational assertion and the specific maritime 
claims disputed.   
In the years prior to 1991, the Annual Report to the Congress did not include any 
information regarding activities conducted under the Freedom of Navigation program because 
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190 Under Secretary for Policy Department of Defense, “DoD Annual Freedom of Navigation (FON) Reports,” 
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there was no requirement to do so.  In Oct 1990, President George H. W. Bush signed National 
Security Directive 49 (NSD-49) requiring an annual report on Freedom of Navigation activities: 
On an annual basis, the department of defense will incorporate into an already 
existing report an unclassified listing of fun operational assertions conducted 
during the previous year. The listing will specify the country and excessive claim, 
but not the date or frequency of the assertion. Assertions specified in the annual 
list will become unclassified upon incorporation into the report. 
 
Prior to 1991, no reporting requirement existed and Annual Report to Congress contains no 
mention of “freedom of navigation” except for the 1988 report from Secretary of Defense Caspar 
Weinberger191 and in 1989 by Secretary Frank Carlucci.192  These two reports reference the 
highly publicized operations in the Libya’s Gulf of Sidra and reflagging of Kuwaiti oil tankers in 
the Persian Gulf, but they do not list other operational assertions that occurred in those years.  
This silence is particularly surprising for at least three reasons.  First, there is evidence of 
consistent high-level attention to United States ocean policy throughout the 1960s, 1970s, and 
1980s, which implies that organizational reporting and feedback on activities pertaining to ocean 
policy would have been required or desired.  Somewhere in the Defense bureaucracy there was 
likely an appetite for information reported on these topics.  Additionally, in 1979 the Carter 
administration formalized the Freedom of Navigation program as a two-pronged effort between 
the Departments of Defense and State, yet appears to have received no public reporting on it.  
Finally, the Reagan administration expressed its renewed commitment to these earlier policy 
positions through executive memoranda on United States ocean policy and the Freedom of 
Navigation programs, yet received so public information either. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
191 Caspar W. Weinberger Secretary of Defense, Annual Report to the Congress, Fiscal Year 1988 (Washington, 
DC: Government Printing Office, 1987), 169, 262, http://history.defense.gov/resources/1988_DoD_AR.pdf. 
 
192 Annual Report to Congress and the President, Fiscal Year 1989 (Washington, DC: US Government Printing 
Office, 1989), 66, 82, http://history.defense.gov/resources/1989_DoD_AR.pdf. 
	  
	   95 
Third, I rely on the excellent Maritime Claims Reference Manual produced by the United 
States Navy Judge Advocate General (JAG) Corps. This source helps to corroborate annual 
reports to Congress, but it also provides crucial information for activity prior to 1991 and it 
offers a greater fidelity of information about precisely which disputed claims were protested or 
asserted against. This document lists each coastal state in the world from A to Z and compiles 
information about the various maritime claims of each coastal state by category.  Where 
applicable, the Maritime Claims Reference Manual lists each state’s claims and related territorial 
seas, straight baselines, historic bays, contiguous zone, environmental and fishing restrictions, 
and exclusive economic zones.  The manual also includes references to the pertinent domestic 
laws and legal decrees that establish each state’s claim.  The manual further specifies whether the 
a) United States contests a specific claim, and b) it itemizes any diplomatic protests or 
operational assertions the United States has conducted against specific claims of each coastal 
state. Within the Navy JAG Corps, the International and Operational Law Department (Code 10) 
bears responsibility for International Agreements, Operational Law, and the Law of the Sea.  As 
the Department of Defense’s Representative for Oceans Policy Affairs, the Navy JAG Corps’ 
Law of the Sea division maintains the Maritime Claims Reference Manual.  The Operational 
Law Department’s “provide[s] advice across the spectrum of law of the sea issues to assist policy 
makers throughout the Department of the Navy, JCS and DoD; interact with other agencies 
including State, Commerce, Justice and Interior; advise on international environmental matters; 
represents DoD at the International Maritime Organization; and support the DoD Representative 
for Ocean Policy Affairs.”193  This organization describes the Maritime Claims Reference 
Manual as a “general reference concerning the maritime claims of all coastal nations […] to 
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facilitate the DoD Freedom of Navigation Program.”194  It is published in accordance with the 
Department of Defense (DoD) Instruction C-2005.1, titled  “U.S. Program for the Exercise of 
Navigation and Overflight Rights at Sea” June 21, 1983.  The most recent complete publication 
of the Maritime Claims Reference Manual was 2005, however, updates for each coastal country 
have been completed and made available in 2013-2014.195 
Fourth, I draw upon Limits in the Sea, a series published by the United States Department 
of State. This series of publications dedicates individual volumes to the detailed explication of 
maritime claims by individual states, and it offers historical details about American activity vis-
à-vis foreign maritime legal claims.  Among these, I extensively consulted Volume 112, which 
discusses U.S. activity in response to maritime claims around the world.196  Written in 1992, this 
specific volume documents American diplomatic protests by category of claim, highlights 
rollbacks or those maritime claims that drew disputes but were later changed to conform with 
international law, and it provides some tabular data and descriptive statistics regarding various 
types of claims. The volume includes useful citations to diplomatic documents and serves as a 
helpful cross-reference to fill gaps in the Maritime Claims Reference Manual and Annual Report 
to Congress.  Additional volumes in the Limits in the Sea series address the maritime claims of 
individual coastal states specifically and are useful for cross-referencing data found elsewhere. 
Fifth, I referred to the Law of the Sea Bulletin to ensure completeness of collection of 
data on diplomatic protests.  Published three times annually by the United Nations Division for 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
194 “Maritime Claims Reference Manual,” U. S. Navy Judge Advocate General’s Corps, accessed July 31, 2014, 
http://www.jag.navy.mil/organization/code_10_mcrm.htm. 
 
195 I am grateful for the assistance of Commander Joe Carilli US Navy JAGC who provided advanced copies of the 
2013-14 update prior to their publication online. 
 
196 Bureau of Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs Department of State, J. Ashley Roach, 
and Robert W. Smith, United States Responses to Excessive National Maritime Claims 1992, Limit in the Seas 112 
(Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office), accessed August 1, 2014, http://www.state.gov/documents/ 
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Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea, the Bulletin chronicles a wide range of topics including 
the status of, and legal developments related to, the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea.  
These topics include ratifications and declarations; treaties and national legislations; new claims, 
protests and responses; and rulings from the International Court of Justice.197  The Bulletin is 
most useful as a cross-reference to the Digest of United States Practice in International Law and 
Limits in the Sea to ensure the accurate and complete recording of unclassified protest data 
throughout the entire time series.  
4.4.2 Coding the Independent Variables 
4.4.2.1  Liberalism Model 
First, I use the POLITY2 variable from the Polity IV dataset created by the Center for 
Systemic Peace measure levels of democracy or autocracy.  This information is coded in two 
ways.  First, this variable is appears as an interval measurement on a scale from -10 (full 
autocracy) to +10 (full democracy).  This value is derived by subtracting the AUTOC value from 
the DEMOC value, which are each based on an eleven-point scale constructed from the 
competitiveness of political participation (variable 2.6), the openness and competitiveness of 
executive recruitment, and constraints on the chief executive. 198 Second, I collapsed the data into 
categories Autocracy (-10 to -7) Anocracy (-6 to +6) and Democracy (+7 to +10) to reflect the 
terminology used in the democratic peace literature (Doyle, Snyder and Mansfield). 
Second, I code whether each state signed and/or ratified UNCLOS and whether the state 
made a declaration at the time of signing.  These declarations and statements are catalogued by 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
197 For a listing of state activities by category (e.g.  Declarations; Objections to Declarations;  Notes, Statements and 
Communications; General Assembly Resolutions) http://www.un.org/depts/los/doalos_publications/LOSBulletins/ 
Bulletin_repertory.pdf 
 
198 Monty G. Marshall and Ted Robert Gurr, “Polity IV Individual Country Regime Trends, 1946-2013” (Center for 
Systemic Peace, 2014), http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm. 
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the Treaty Section of the Office of Legal Affairs of the United Nations and published on line by 
the Division for Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea.  These are important because, in many 
cases, the declarations articulate the ways in which the ratifying state refuses to participate fully 
in the treaty.  These derogations sometimes initiate a dispute when the state declares a maritime 
claim at odds with the treaty it is signing. The declarations and statements appear in 
chronological order of signature and ratification with hyperlinks to text from each declaration or 
statement by the state from 10 December 1982 to 27 December 2013.199 
Third, in the cases when the United States disputes a particular maritime claim of a 
coastal state, I code two categorical variables, each dichotomous (0/1), indicating the whether the 
claim is expansive or restrictive claims. Discussion of these claims appears below. 
Fourth, I measure economic interdependence to consider the pacifying effect of trade.200  
Data come from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators dataset, which compiles time-
series data from international sources from 1960-2013.  I select one factor to operationalize 
economic interdependence: trade as measured by import and export.  Different factors could be 
capital or trade.  Goods (and services) are ultimately the product of capital and labor (either as a 
net measure of trade balances that subtract import from export) where negative trade balances 
suggest a weaker position, or as a sum measure reflecting the absolute value of the relationship 
between the two trade partners.  For this study I omit services.201  
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4.4.2.2  Security Model 
First, I reference military expenditure data published by the Stockholm (SIPRI) in three 
formats: total military expenditure in constant 2011 U.S. dollars, military expenditure as a 
percentage of GDP, and military expenditure per capita according to the calendar year.  The 
period of the data includes 1988-2013.202  This is intended as a rough proxy of military 
capability. In a later study, a measure of naval capacity may be appropriate, whether in terms of 
number of warships or tonnage. 
Second, I reference economic wealth data published in the databank of World 
Development Indicators at the World Bank.203 Recognizing the fungibility of economic and 
financial power into military power and the vast influence that an economic giant may have 
regardless of its military readiness, I include this variable to as an attribute of state power. 
Third, I code whether the coastal states possesses a nuclear weapons program. This is a 
dichotomous variable, and the source of this information is the World Nuclear Forces at the 
Stockholm International Peace and Research Institute. 204  As the period of the entire study 
ranges from 1958 to 2013, there is variation on this measure and it offers a glimpse at perhaps 
the sine qua non of power in the international system for the majority of the Cold War. 
4.4.2.3  Organization Model 
First, I code the total number of operational warships ships in the United States Navy.  
This number includes the following ship classes:  battleship, carrier, cruiser, destroyer, frigate, 
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203 “World Development Indicators | Data.” 
 
204 Shannon Kile and Phillip Schell, “Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI): World Nuclear 
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submarines (SS, SSN), SSG/SSBNs, command ship, mine warfare, patrol, amphibious, auxiliary, 
and other surface warships.  The source of the data is the Naval History Heritage and Heritage 
Command.  They compiled the data from various sources Comptroller of the Navy 
(NAVCOMPT) compilations; Department of the Navy (DON) 5-Year Program, Ships & Aircraft 
Supplemental Data Tables (SASDT); and records and compilations of the Office of the Chief of 
Naval Operations (OP-802K, now N804J1D) Ship Management Information System (now Ship 
Management System), refined and edited with the assistance of the annual Naval Vessel 
Register.  The notes in the source observe, “the dramatic fall in ship numbers after 1968-1969 is 
due to the decision to limit the use of American military force in Vietnam and the 
decommissioning of many WWII-era ships.  Rapid decline in force level is evident after the 
anticommunist revolutions in Eastern Europe and the collapse of the Soviet Union, 1989-1991.  
End of the Cold War 'peace dividend' leads to decommissioning of many older ships, especially 
cruisers and auxiliaries, in a manner similar to downsizing at the end of the Vietnam war. Post-
1999 data provided by OPNAV N8F.”205 
Second, I merge the Diplomatic Exchange data set from the Correlates of War project.  
This variable measures diplomatic representation at the level of increasing levels of seniority and 
significance from chargé d'affaires to minister and ambassador.  Information is available for 
states in the Correlates of War interstate system on five-year periodicity from 1950 to 2005, and 
it is based on the Europa World Year Book series. For the missing years, I impute missing data 
by a process of interpolation and cross-reference with listings of diplomatic postings by embassy.  
The assumption for missing data imputation is that if there is no change in the status of 
diplomatic exchange between five-year entries, then the interim years are unchanged as well. 
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However, I cross-reference listings of U.S. diplomats to foreign postings to confirm. I include 
only three variables from this dataset.  First, the dataset includes an ordinal variable (0-3) for 
United States diplomatic representation in another country (DR_at_2).  Second, the dataset 
includes an ordinal variable (0-3) for other state representation in the United States (DR_at_US).  
Finally, the dataset includes a dichotomous variable for existence of any diplomatic exchange 
between the United States and the other side (DE).  These variables are necessary for considering 
whether the existence or absence of a diplomatic relationship affects the likelihood of either 
issuing a diplomatic protest or conducting an operational assertion.206 
Third, I code the geographic defense organization, or Geographic Combatant Command, 
into which the coastal state falls according to the Unified Command Plan. I reference a history of 
the Department of Defense’s Joint Chiefs of Staff written by the Chairman’s Historian in the 
Joint History Office.207  This document was fundamental to coding the often-shifting 
geographical assignments of United States military commanders.  I cross-referenced this with 
individual histories of each of the geographic combatant commands.  Each of the Unified 
Commanders bears responsibility for an assigned geographic area of operations in which United 
States forces operate.  However, the geographic and operational responsibilities of the Unified 
Commanders have changed frequently as the Department of Defense reorganized the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff 13 times and updated its Unified Command Plan 22 times from 1958 to 2012.208 
For example, Commander, United States Central Command (CENTCOM) currently bears 
responsibility for an area of operations comprising 20 countries in the Middle East and Central 
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and South Asia. The area of responsibilities stretches from Egypt in the west to Pakistan in the 
east.  This geographic theater also includes the waters of the Red Sea, Persian Gulf, and a portion 
of the Indian Ocean.  Prior to 2006, CENTCOM encompassed a larger area including the Horn of 
Africa (Somalia, Kenya, Ethiopia and Eritrea were reassigned from CENTCOM to the newly 
established United States Africa Command).  Prior to CENTCOM’s creation as a unified 
command in 1983, many of the countries in the Middle East had been assigned to other Unified 
Commanders, such as U.S. European Command.  Some were assigned to a portfolio maintained 
by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and still others were not assigned at all. 
Fourth and fifth, I created two simple categorical variables to sort coastal states by 
continent and coastal state-years by presidential administration.  The purpose of this coding is to 
allow sorting by geographic location and presidential administration. 
Sixth, I categorize coastal state-years by National Security Advisor to the President. The 
reason for this coding is due to the policy guidance offered in NSDD-265 and later documents 
which describe the interagency coordination process for conducting freedom of navigation 
operations in sensitive areas.  This variable offers the possibility to determine whether a 
difference in policy implementation exists between the President’s National Security Advisor 
who may be executing the policy and the President who signed a specific policy.209   
4.4.3 Law of the Sea Variables and Coding Rules  
This dataset records nine possible types of claims by coastal states over which the United 
States may have a difference of legal interpretation and active dispute.  The basis of these 
disputes is the categorizations of coastal claims observed in customary international law, 
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codified in UNCLOS, recorded in the Maritime Claims Reference Manual, and mentioned 
briefly in Chapter 1.   
Disputes reflect a difference in legal interpretation of two general types.  First, a dispute 
may be recorded over a difference of legal interpretation of treaty law.  Since 1982, UNCLOS 
has been the primary point of legal reference, with the 1958 Convention on the Law of the Sea 
prior to it.  However, international law also relies upon customary rules, which include both 
practice and opinio juris, and these international norms may change over time.  The coding rules 
for dispute focus on the former.  Thus, I code a dichotomous variable (0/1) when the coastal state 
issues a domestic law, decree, or other legal declaration that asserts a new maritime claim.  I 
draw on the United States Navy’s Maritime Claims Reference Manual which lists each of these 
by coastal state.  The text of many of these domestic legal decrees is available at the United 
Nations Division for Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea. 
For each country year, I code whether the United States disputes another coastal state’s 
claims such as 1) territorial sea, 2) straight baselines, 3) historic bay, 4) prior permission 
requirements, 5) contiguous zone restrictions, 6) exclusive economic zone restrictions, 7) nuclear 
vessel restrictions, and 8) environmental restrictions.  This dataset records whether the United 
States has an active dispute with another coastal state’s claim in a given year; the coding does 
not reflect this author’s independent legal judgment about the nature or validity of that dispute.   
4.4.3.1 Territorial Sea 
The territorial sea has experienced a significant shift in both treaty law and state practice 
over recent decades. For centuries, a state determined its territorial sea by the distance from 
shore that it could claim to defend.  The custom of claiming a three-mile belt of water adjacent to 
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the shoreline became known as the “cannon-shot rule.”210  During much of the 20th century, the 
majority of coastal states claimed 3nm (or so) based not only on custom, but the technological 
ability to effective control their adjacent seas through force.211  There was some variation in state 
practice, the magnitude of variation was minor.  Some states claimed 4nm, 6nm or 12nm, but 
only two states’ territorial sea claims exceeded 12nm.  That distribution changed significantly by 
the end of the 20th century.  After the conclusion of UNCLOS and its arguably clearer legal 
codification of what states can claim as a territorial sea, a much higher percentage of states 
coordinated around the new legal norm of 12nm. Yet, the number of states whose claims exceed 
12nm increased nearly tenfold.212  The United States has acted against all claims exceeding 12 
nm by communicating a diplomatic protest or conducting an operational assertion.213 
FIGURE 4-2 
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211  I do not attempt to resolve whether the dominant military technology or custom was the primary cause of this 
equilibrium. 
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The peak was in 1976, when the United States disputed the territorial sea claims of 29 states.  
Today, the United States disputes only 7 states’ territorial sea claims (Benin, Greece, India, 
Nicaragua, Philippines, Somalia and Togo).  Most states adjusted their claims to comply with the 
territorial sea provisions in the UNCLOS treaty.  The 1982 agreement extended the territorial sea 
to 12nm, but it also created a new provision, the Exclusive Economic Zone, which permitted 
coastal states to extend their management of resources out to 200nm offshore. 
4.4.3.2 Straight Baseline Claims.   
Coastal states may claim straight baselines for at least two legitimate reasons.  First, 
coastal states may claim straight baselines to enclose those waters, which have the character of 
internal waters due to their close interrelationship with the land.  Second, straight baselines may 
reduce eliminate complex patterns in its territorial sea that would otherwise result from the use of 
normal baselines.  If drawn in accordance with international law, properly drawn straight 
baselines do not extend the limits of the territorial sea.214  However, the United States argues that 
the straight baselines drawn by many states seek to unlawfully extend the coastal states share of 
the sea.   
By drawing straight lines between prominent points along the contours of a coast rather 
than tracing a 12 nm belt more closely along the contours, a coastal state may claim a baseline 
farther offshore or claim “enclosed seas” and thus increase the total area of its territorial sea 
claim with excessive baselines. Occasionally, straight baseline claims have led to cases at the 
International Court of Justice such as in the cases of the delimitation of territorial seas between 
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Qatar and Bahrain or Honduras and Nicaragua.215  These assessments are made on geometric 
standards of cartography.  According to UNCLOS, the normal baseline for measuring the 
breadth of a territorial sea is the  “low-water line along the coast as marked on large-scale charts 
official recognized by the coastal state.”216  However, straight baselines are permitted “in 
localities where the coastline is deeply indented and cut into or if there is a fringe of islands 
along the coast in its immediate vicinity.”217 These exceptional circumstances are detailed two 
sources:  first, the 1958 Geneva Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, 
which the United States has signed and ratified; and second, the UN Convention on the Law of 
the Sea which the United States has not.  The International Court of Justice states, however, that 
the straight baselines are an exception to the normal rules for the determination of baselines.218 
Yet, coastal states occasionally claim straight baseline claims as a legal tactic to expand 
territorial sea claims.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
215 For a complete listing of cases before the International Court of Justice, see http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/ 
index.php?p1=3&p2=2 
 
216 “Normal Baseline,” Part II, Section 2, Article 5, UNCLOS. 
 
217 “Straight Baselines,” Part II, Section 2, Article 7, UNCLOS. 
 
218 Maritime Delimitation and Territorial Question between Qatar and Bahrain, Merits, 2001 I.C.J. 40, at 67, ¶ 212, 
available at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/87/7027.pdf. 
	  




In 1958, two coastal states made excessive straight baseline claims. In 2013, 41 states make 
straight baseline claims disputed by the United States.   
4.4.3.3 Historic Bay 
In 1958, the historic bay claims of 6 states were disputed by the United States.  In 2013, 
the United States disputed 20 such claims. For example, Libya claims the Gulf of Sidra as 
Libyan internal waters. The claimed closure line drawn horizontally across the opening of the 
Gulf measures approx. 300nm along 32° 30' N lat.219  Other historic bay claims the United States 
has protested or disputed include the Russian Federation’s claim to Peter the Great Bay, 
Cambodia's claim to part of the Gulf of Thailand, Vietnam's claim to part of the Gulf of Tonkin, 
and Panama's claim to the Gulf of Panama. 
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 FIGURE 4-4  
 
4.4.3.4 Prior Notification 
Many states require prior notification (48 hours to 30 days) from foreign warships before 
transiting its territorial seas. Some states also claim the right to restrict various types of activity 
such as military surveillance or oceanographic surveys within Contiguous Zones (the area 12-
24nm offshore) and Exclusive Economic Zones (the area 24-200nm offshore).  The United States 
and other states interpret such claims to be not only inconsistent with UNCLOS, but also 
inconsistent with customary law and thus impermissible, because they aim to limit freedom of 
access to a coastal state’s coastal waters (territorial sea, contiguous zone, or exclusive economic 


































































































































Total Historic Bay Claims Disputed: 1958-2013
	  





4.5 Descriptive Statistics  
The FON dataset contains 7,412 observations representing between 85 and 150 coastal 
states in a given year from 1958 to 2013. As this time series progresses from 1958 to 2013, new 
states enter the dataset in the year of their establishment, such as in cases of post-colonial states 
declaring independence.  Over the 55-year period of this study, the number of coastal state in the 
world nearly doubled.  In 1958, there were 85 states bordering the ocean. The number of coastal 
states peaked in 2002 at 150 where it has remained ever since. As the total number of states has 
increased, the number of states whose claims the United States disputed has also increased at 
nearly the same rate. The percentage of states whose claims the United States disputed in 1958 



































































































































States with Prior Permission Requirements: 1958-2013
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claims of 55.9% of coastal states (80 of 143).  By 2013, the total number of disputes remained at 
80 while the total number of coastal states had increased to 150 (53.3%). 





A casual glance at Figure 2 suggests that new coastal states (states declaring independence after 
1958) may be responsible for the increase in disputes each year.  However, a closer look reveals 
that this is not the case. Only 26 of 71 new disputes involved new coastal states whose maritime 
claims drew dispute from the United States.  The remaining 45 disputes after 1958 were 
regarding maritime claims by “old states” that existed pre-1958.  However, the large increase in 
coastal state disputes was not the result of new states or whether existing states changed claims 


































































































































Total Coastal States & Disputes per Year: 1958-2013
coastal states in world coastal states w/ disputed claims
	  







Table 4-1.  States whose maritime claims the United States disputed in 1958 and 2013 
Albania Canada Ecuador India Mauritania Samoa Taiwan 
Algeria Cabo Verde Egypt  Indonesia Mexico Saudi Arabia Thailand 
Antigua & 
Barbuda 
Chile El Salvador* Iran Montenegro Seychelles Togo 
Argentina China Ethiopia/Eritrea Italy Nicaragua Sierra Leone Tunisia 
Australia Columbia Estonia Japan Oman Slovenia UAE 
Bangladesh Costa Rica Finland Kenya Pakistan Somalia Uruguay 
Barbados Croatia Gabon Latvia Panama South Korea Vanuatu 
Benin Cuba Greece Libya Peru Russian Fed. Venezuela 
Brazil DPRK Guinea-Bissau Lithuania Philippines Spain Vietnam 
Bulgaria* Denmark Guyana Malaysia Portugal Sri Lanka Yemen 
Burma Djibouti Haiti Maldives Romania Sudan  
Cambodia Dominican 
Rep 
Honduras Malta St.Vincent & 
Gren. 
Syria  
1. The 13 underlined states are the only states with maritime claims disputed by the US in 1958.   
2. 80 claims are disputed in 2013. 
3. Among the disputes from 1958, only Bulgaria’s and El Salvador’s disputes have been resolved.  These are 
denoted with an asterisk (*) above. The rest remain active. 
4. New states (declaring independence after 1958) are differentiated in red. 
 
 
The total number of diplomatic protests and operational assertions conducted each year by the 
United States from 1958-2013 are depicted in Figure 2 (totals by decade are represented in 
Figure 3).  Diplomatic protests begin in 1958 and reach their peak in 1982 during the year of the 
final meeting for the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, which produced the treaty in 
December of that year.  Operational assertions begin 1979 and reach their peak in 1998.  After 





















        










protests assertions both 
1958-2013 7,412 3,473 (46.9%) 693 (9.4%) 228 (3.1%) 535 (7.2%) 70 (0.9%) 
1958-1978 2,316 704 (30.4%) 31 (1.3%) 31 (1.3%) 0 0 

































































































































Annual Protests and Assertions: 1958-2013
diplomatic protests operational assertions
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In a frequency distribution for protests and assertions for the time period 1958 to 2013, 
there are a total of 7,412 coastal-state-claims from 1958-2013 (where the unit of analysis is 
country-year).  This number represents the total number of maritime claims by existing coastal 
states in a given year over 55 years.  During this 55-year span, the United States disputed claims 
3,473 times (46.9%).  To have disputed a claim does not necessarily imply that the United States 
took action. Rather, the United States simply had legal disagreements with 46.9% of maritime 
claims; the American interpretation of maritime law conflicted with the interpretation of the 
other state.   
In response to these 3,473 disputes (unit of analysis is country-year), the United States 
acted 693 times (9.4%).   For the purposes of this study, there are effectively two types of action 
possible under the freedom of navigation program: diplomatic protest and operational 
assertion.220  The United States issued a diplomatic protest 228 times (3.1%) and conducted an 
operational assertion 535 times (7.2%).  In 70 cases (0.9%), the United States exercised both 
measures – issuing a diplomatic protest and conducting an operational assertion in the same year 
against the coastal state with which it had a dispute.   
These rates of response may appear to be low for such a powerful state with considerable 
means available and a strongly stated commitment to freedom of navigation, but rates of 
response depend on the types or levels of discrepancy and the prior protests, too.  So, I consider 
how rates increase after the government created an institutional mechanism for action in 1979.  
This question is vital to the explanation of the Organizational Model, which argues that the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
220 A third option, diplomatic consultation, does exist, but it is extremely difficult to observe empirically. No records 
of consultations were discovered in the extensive research for this dissertation. It is possible, of course, that 
diplomatic consultations enable disputes to be handled at the lowest level, and these consultations may preclude the 
need for stronger diplomatic or operational measures. Further research is necessary to understand the frequency and 
importance of consultations. 
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balance of bureaucratic means and their prioritized aims of the organizations that are tasked to 
implement policy significantly influence the behavior.  
Over the three decades after the formal establishment of the Freedom of Navigation 
program (1979-2013), there were 2,768 disputes.  That is, the United States disputed 54.3% of 
coastal states’ claims. In response to these maritime legal disputes, the United States acted 662 
(13.0%) times.  The United States issued a diplomatic protest 197 times (3.9%) and conducted an 
operational assertion 535 times (10.5%).  In 70 cases (1.4%), the United States took both 
diplomatic and legal action.  These results prompt the following three notable observations: 
• First, the dataset contains no observations of operational assertions conducted prior to 
1979.  It is possible that operational assertions were conducted in the earlier period 
(1958-1978), but they are not reflected in any of the data sources listed in Chapter Three.  
However during the early period, the United States issued 31 diplomatic protests (1.3%).   
• Second, during the period 1979 to 2013, the United States was nearly three times as 
likely to conduct an operational assertion than to issue an open diplomatic protest. This 
finding is interesting because diplomatic action seems to be less costly and less likely to 
lead accidentally to destabilizing miscalculation or escalation of violence, yet diplomatic 
protests are more rare.  It may be the case that diplomatic protests are occurring more 
frequently, but are not observed because they are sensitive communications not 
announced publically. 
• Third, these results demonstrate how rare American action on active legal maritime 
disputes is.  Prior to 1979, the United States acted in only 1.3% of cases (all of these 
actions were diplomatic protests).  Although the FON program invigorated American 
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response in the period after 1979, the United States acted in a mere 13% of cases where it 
disputed a coastal state’s maritime claim.  
Given these results, we reject the hypothesis United States maintains a universal commitment to 
actively pushing back against disputed maritime claims everywhere, all the time. Indeed these 
data show that only in rare cases does the United States demonstrate its failure to acquiesce to 
such claims by protesting or asserting.  This dissertation will explain why the United States acts 
in some cases and not others.  
Is the level of operational activity a function of available warships in the United States 
Navy?  No, it does not appear as if the total number of ships affects the annual number of 
operational assertions in this time-series. As the number of warships has dropped from a 
Vietnam War era high of 932 ships, to a Reagan era peak (during SECNAV John Lehman’s 
tenure) of 594 ships, and then dropped again to the to the 2013 level of 289 ships, the number of 
















4.6 Frequency of combined protests and assertions 
 
Theoretically, one of the strongest possible signals to send via the FON program is to 
make both a diplomatic demarche and operational assertion against a coastal state in a near 
simultaneous coordination of foreign policy.  However, this coordination is rare due to 
organizational limitations and divergent priorities, thus it occurs relatively rarely.  Another way 
to underscore refusal to accept a specific claim is to conduct multiple assertions in a given year, 
however, the data available do not list the number of assertions conducted per country-year.   
Regarding the former, from 1958 to 2013, the coordination of both protest and assertion 
has only occurred 28 of 55 years (51%), and never before 1982.   Since 1982, the United States 
has coordinated both measures of the FON program to varying levels.  The maximum 
coordination of protests and assertions against a coastal state occurred in 1986 (9 times) and in 






































































































































Warships of US Navy per Year: 1958-2013
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assertions of 1-3 states.  The most coastal state which most frequently received both demarche 
and assertion is Yemen (8 times) followed by China (7 times). Other frequent recipients of 




4.7  Organizational Explanation: Regional Fleet / Theater Combatant Commands  
The operational Navy is apportioned into numbered fleets and navy component 
commands by geographic area.  The numbered fleets and navy component commands are 
typically combined into one staff, physically situated in the same headquarters, and responsible 
for the same geographic area. For example, the United States Navy’s 4th Fleet is responsible for 
the Pacific, Atlantic, and Caribbean maritime regions around Latin America; the 5th Fleet is 
responsible for the Red Sea, Persian Gulf, and Indian Ocean; the 6th Fleet is responsible for the 
oceans and seas around Europe and most of Africa221; the 7th Fleet maintains responsibility for 
the Western Pacific and South/Southeast Asian waters. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
221 U.S. Naval Forces Europe-Commander, U.S. Naval Forces Africa (NAVEUR-NAVAF) area of responsibility 
(AOR) covers approximately half of the Atlantic Ocean, from the North Pole to Antarctica; as well as the Adriatic, 
Baltic, Barents, Black, Caspian, Mediterranean and North Seas. The AOR covers more than 20 million square 
nautical miles of ocean, touches three continents and encompasses more than 67 percent of the Earth's coastline, 30 
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States Receiving BOTH Protests AND Assertions: 1958-2013
	  




In each of these geographic areas, the numbered fleet commander maintains operational 
responsibilities by the geographic combatant commanders.  Formerly known as theater 
commanders (or CINCs), the geographic combatant commanders are organized according to the 
Unified Command Plan.222  These geographic combatant commanders report to the Secretary of 
Defense via the Joint Staff.  Operational priorities and executed missions within each geographic 
combatant command reflect—to some extent—the product of three bureaucratic processes.  First, 
the operations are planned by the commander’s staff and reflect the standing missions and 
priorities of that geographic combatant command.  Second, tasking is received from the Joint 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
222 The Unified Command Plan is a key strategic document that establishes the missions, responsibilities, and 
geographic areas of responsibility for commanders of combatant commands. UCP 2011, signed by President Obama 
on April 6, 2011, assigns several new missions to the combatant commanders.  Every two years, the Chairman of the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff is required to review the missions, responsibilities, and geographical boundaries of each 



























No/Cent America & Carib. So. America Europe Africa Asia Austr. & Oceania
Total Protests and Assertions by Continent: 1958-2013
diplomatic protests operational assertions
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Staff, which reflects guidance and directives from the President of the United States and 
coordination with other departments and agencies.  For example, FON operations in politically 
sensitive areas require prior coordination with the Department of State via the Joint Staff.  
Finally, operations conducted within the geographic combatant command reflect the priorities of 
subordinate service component commanders.  In this case, a navy component commander such 
as 6th Fleet/ NAVEUR may have service-specific priorities for his available assets which reflect 
his security goals, relationships with partner nations, available forces, and specific threats.   
When the data were sorted by numbered fleet and by decade, the following results were 
obtained.  In each decade, approximately twice as many assertions occur in the 7th Fleet 
(WestPac and Indian Ocean) as in 4th Fleet (Americas). From decade to decade, FON operations 
appear to have maintained operational consistency by volume in 4th Fleet (Latin America) and 7th 
Fleet (Western Pacific and South/Southeast Asia), however the number of operational challenges 
have decreased by 55% in 5th Fleet (Mideast) and by 44% in 6th Fleet (Europe and Africa). 
 
Numbered Fleet 4th Fleet 5th Fleet 6th Fleet 7th Fleet 
1991-2000 8 11 16 14 
2001-2011 7 5 9 14 
 
 During the latter decade, the United States fought two wars in the CENTCOM theater.  
As a result commanders prioritized naval platforms for maritime security operations and close air 
support for those combat missions.  Simultaneously, the rise of Somali piracy and other missions 
required ships.  Finally, missions in the Horn of Africa and Yemen pursuit of Al Qaeda and other 
associated threats have demanded resources.  However, in addition to ship availability, these 
operational missions demanded partnerships.  None of these missions was conducted without 
vital support in terms of basis rights, law enforcement and military partnership, and other 
material support.  Thus, in 5th Fleet FON challenges of Djibouti, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, 
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Seychelles, and Somalia were not conducted during the GWOT decade.  However, the number of 
operational challenges of excessive claims by Egypt, Iran, Oman, and Sudan, and Yemen stayed 
level or increased.   
This continuity may be best explained by the guidance expressed in NSDD-265 which 
directs frequent challenging of international straits and archipelagic sea lanes.  If this directive 
reflects the highest priority FON missions due to the importance of geographic chokepoints and 
other straits to United States trade and military mobility, then these nations are priority 
candidates.  Egypt (Suez Canal), Sudan (Red Sea), Yemen (Bab el Mandeb), Oman and Iran 
(Strait of Hormuz) represent the gateways to the Middle East (its resources and battlefields) for 
the western world.  Even under the limiting conditions of war and low ship availability, these 
challenges represent non-negotiable cases.    
  
	  






Djibouti Saudi Arabia Egypt 
Egypt Seychelles Iran  
Iran Somalia Oman  
Oman Sudan Sudan  
Pakistan UAE Yemen 
Yemen  
 
While wars raged in the CENTCOM theater, the EUCOM and AFRICOM theaters 
experienced a decade of partnership-building from 2001-2011. The Freedom of Navigation 
program received little attention as the successive commanders placed a higher emphasis on 
theater cooperation.  Additionally, the planning and establishment of a new geographic 
combatant command for Africa led to operational restraints.   
During this decade, almost all of the West African nations in the vicinity of the Gulf of 
Guinea area that had been challenged between 1991-2000 were not challenged.  The Navy was 
also spread thin and ship availability was diminished for two reasons.  First, most ships were 
prioritized for CENTCOM or PACOM.  Second, Navy’s 6th Fleet held dual responsibilities as 
the navy component commander for both EUCOM and AFRICOM.  As such, the 6th fleet did not 
receive any additional ships, but was challenged to accomplish more with fixed or diminishing 
resource.  This force efficiency led to a change in operational behavior and fewer FON 
challenges.  Whereas, 5th Fleet conducted challenges during 2001-2011 against the excessive 
claims of the countries who infringed upon chokepoints and straits vital to international trade and 
security mobility, 6th Fleet had no such concerns in this decade.   
  
	  







Albania Libya Albania Libya 
Algeria Malta Algeria Malta 
Angola Mauritania Croatia Sweden 
Benin Nigeria Liberia Syria 
Cameroon Sierra Leone Togo 





4.8 Comparison to Existing Datasets:  ICOW Maritime Claims (v1.1). 
One other dataset related to maritime claims exists, but it has limitations inherent to its 
different purpose, which led to the creation of this new dataset. Anyone researching maritime 
claims more generally will want to review Sara McLaughlin Mitchell’s ICOW Maritime Claims 
(v1.1) dataset, which extends the research begun by Paul R. Hensel on Territorial Claims and is 
part of the Issue Correlates of War project.  Mitchell examines “explicit contention between two 
or more states over the access to or usage of a maritime area including riverine and offshore 
areas.”223  The unit of analysis in the ICOW Maritime Claim study is the dyadic claim. The 
current version of the dataset (v1.1, dtd 2007) is limited to dyadic maritime claims in the 
Western Hemisphere and Europe only from 1900-2001. To enter Mitchell’s dataset, two or more 
states must actively contest a space for access or usage. Mitchell records 86 total maritime claims 
disputes between two or more states in the Western Hemisphere and Europe, of which 15 involve 
the United States with 13 other states.224  According to these definitions and coding rules, many 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
223 Paul R. Hensel; Sara M. Mitchell, 2007, "The Issue Correlates of War (ICOW) Project Issue Data Sets: Maritime 
Claims Data", http://hdl.handle.net/1902.1/OFMUUPZGAT UNF:3:AT9Kx7uv+vzYYTZA9Fo35Q== IQSS 
Dataverse Network [Distributor] V2 [Version]. 
 
224 Mitchell records the following disputants in the Western Hemisphere: Argentina, Bahamas, Brazil, Canada, 
Chile, Ecuador, El Salvador, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Peru, St. Vincent and Grenada and Uruguay. The only 
maritime dispute recorded between the US and a European country is with Russia.   
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disputed maritime claims of interest in my study do not appear in Mitchell’s data.  In fact, 
disputes with 10 states in the Western Hemisphere are omitted.225  Fifteen disputes with 
European states do not appear in the dataset.226 Furthermore, disputes related to riverine claims 
and other claims related to internal waters are not germane to my research. 227  
 
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
225 Omitted disputants in the Western Hemisphere include: Antigua and Barbuda, Colombia, Costa Rica, Guyana, 
Cuba, Dominican Republic, Haiti, and Venezuela. 
 
226 Omitted disputants in Europe include:  Albania, Bulgaria, Croatia, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Greece, Italy, 
Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Portugal, Serbia and Montenegro, Slovenia, and Spain. 
 
227 Of the 10,041 recorded claims in Mitchell’s dataset, 3,226 or 32.1% are maritime claims. Terrestrial and riverine 
claims comprise 60.3% and 7.6% respectively. 
	  
	   124 
CHAPTER 5.  QUANTITATIVE DATA ANALYSIS: LARGE-N REGRESSION 
 
5.1 Introduction. 
The purpose of this chapter is to introduce and initiate a mixed-methods strategy for 
analysis through logit regression. This chapter follows a nested analysis proceeds in two parts.228 
First, it consists of a quantitative large-n analysis.  Then, the next chapter proceeds with a 
qualitative, case-study analysis depending on the quantitative findings.  Study of the Freedom of 
Navigation program and the variation of operations conducted under it require this analytical 
approach because of the difficulty in operationalizing key variables, questions about quantitative 
variable reliability, and because of the historical contingencies that affect outcomes. This 
integration of methodological approaches responds to the calls of many scholars lamenting the 
shortcomings of either type of analysis.229  It also responds to the need to combine both types of 
analysis and find the synergies between them.230  
The intent of this approach is to maximize analytical leverage by combining qualitative 
and quantitative analysis.  The combination of methods in this analysis does more than simply 
offer breadth and depth.  First, nested analysis increases both internal and external validity.  
Second, the quantitative analysis yields causal inferences that result from quantitative estimates 
of a multivariate model. The qualitative analysis yields causal inferences from case comparison 
and process tracing using historical resources interviews and the like.  This approach offers 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
228 Evan S. Lieberman, “Nested Analysis as a Mixed-Method Strategy for Comparative Research,” American 
Political Science Review 99, no. 03 (August 2005): 435–52. 
 
229 For examples, see Barbara Geddes, “How the Cases You Choose Affect the Answers You Get: Selection Bias in 
Comparative Politics,” Political Analysis 2 (1990): 131–50; King, Keohane, and Verba, Designing Social Inquiry. 
 
230 Christopher H. Achen and Duncan Snidal, “Rational Deterrence Theory and Comparative Case Studies,” World 
Politics 41, no. 2 (1989): 143–69; Sidney Tarrow, “Making Social Science Work Across Space and Time: A Critical 
Reflection on Robert Putnam’s Making Democracy Work,” The American Political Science Review 90, no. 2 
(1996): 389–97; Alexander L. George and Andrew Bennett, Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social 
Sciences (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2005); David Collier, Henry E. Brady, and Jason Seawright, “Outdated 
Views of Qualitative Methods: Time to Move On,” Political Analysis 18, no. 4 (2010): 506–13. 
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answers to both broad and specific questions.  Specifically, a nested analysis offers insights into 
not only the explanations for variation of protests and assertions within a program like the 
Freedom of Navigation program.   But also a nested analysis permits one to consider the likely 
outcomes under specific conditions. By isolating variables and controlling for different factors 
(e.g. Measures of military power, GDP, polity, organizational attributes), one can see how 
specific factors make outcomes more or less likely.  Rather than choosing between two perfect 
analytical approaches, the nested analysis approach seeks to leverage the strengths of each.  
The two types of analysis work in tandem complementing each other’s strengths. When a 
statistical analysis raises questions about the relationship between variables or a causal process, 
the qualitative analysis can address those questions.  Through a within-case study, qualitative 
analysis can provide the necessary information to understand exactly how a causal process 
worked in a particular case.  A general strength of large-n quantitative analysis is its ability to 
estimate simultaneously the effects of competing explanations and to control for the effect of 
particular variables on the outcome of interest.  However there are weaknesses to such 
observational studies, and often, has one delve into the particulars of an individual case to clarify 
important differences among statistically similar cases.  A general strength of qualitative analysis 
is its ability to explore and discuss the differences among “similar” cases.231   Large-n 
quantitative analysis offers the ability to rule out a hypothesis where no statistically significant 
relationship exists.  Likewise, quantitative analysis provides justification for isolating particular 
explanatory variables and focusing analytical attention on them, or for eliminating noisy 
variables.   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
231 Evan S. Lieberman, “Nested Analysis as a Mixed-Method Strategy for Comparative Research,” American 
Political Science Review 99, no. 03 (August 2005): 438–439. 
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Additionally, I intend to share these findings with a diverse audience of scholars and 
practitioners, therefore a diversity of methods should enable communication to a diverse 
audience.  I see this effort as part of a broader effort to bridge the gap between technical 
scholarly work and the work of practitioners and policymakers. 
5.2 Method. 
According to Lieberman 2005, there are a number of prerequisites for carrying out a 
nested analysis.  First, one must have a quantitative data set with a sufficient number of 
observations to yield statistically and substantively significant results.  For the purpose of this 
dissertation, I gathered data and assembled over 7,400 observations.  This far exceeds the 
number of cases required to produce statistically powerful analysis.  Even when the number of 
variables increases the number of degrees of freedom there is sufficient statistical power to 
produce meaningful results.  This assembly of data permits the complete and thorough evaluation 
of the universe of cases pertaining to the study of freedom of navigation.  It also allows one to 
evaluate whether and to what extent there exist correlations between the variables.  A second 
requirement is that one must approach these data with testable hypotheses.232  The theory 
presented in Chapter 3 offered testable hypotheses derived from a carefully considered 
theoretical framework.  Each variable included in the data set attempts to capture, or 
operationalize, a theoretically relevant measure. At first, the regression analysis groups the 
variables according to each of three discrete theories: a theory of Liberalism, a Realism-based 
theory of security, and an organizational theory.  Then the analysis proceeds to combine all three 
theories into one model to observe their combined power.  Finally interactive terms are 
introduced into the regression analysis. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
232 Evan S. Lieberman, “Nested Analysis as a Mixed-Method Strategy for Comparative Research,” American 
Political Science Review 99, no. 03 (August 2005): 438. 
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Ultimately, the goal of a nested analysis is “to make inferences about the unit of analysis 
that is shared between two types of analysis”—especially when the unit of analysis is a country-
year as in this study.233  By operationalizing the factors that are believe to matter in the conduct 
of diplomatic protest and operational assertions under the freedom of navigation program, we 
can assess our prior assumptions and determine whether assumed valuables have any statistical 
significance.  On these grounds, we can select cases for closer inspection with confidence that 
the selection of qualitative case studies for comparative analysis is justified and not just a result 
of prior assumptions and biases. 
As described in the earlier chapter, the large-n analysis examines pooled data or panel 
data consisting of n sets of observations on individuals coastal states to be denoted i = 1, . . ., n. 
This panel dataset is considered unbalanced because individual coastal states may be observed a 
different numbers of times depending upon the year in which a state declared its independence.  
So, Canada appears in the dataset from 1958-2013, and “newer” states such as Senegal, which 
declared independence in 1960, appears in the dataset from 1960-2013.   
These types of data present some challenges.  Interdependencies among the observations 
are likely making unbiased inference problematic.  Endogeneity abounds, and so this analysis 
estimates the relationships using robust standard errors.  Next, observational data, no matter how 
complete, cannot account for all possible explanations and unobserved confounding variables.  
Thus, this quantitative analysis may produce robust correlations, but it does not attempt to 
identify causal relationships.234  The correlations proposed would be consistent with a causal 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
233 Ibid., 440. 
 
234 The only way to eliminate such bias would be to assign treatment at random to ensure there were no systematic 
reasons for the differences between countries receiving assertions and those that don’t. A randomized field 
experiment, however, is not a feasible method for this problem.  Even if it were, the tradeoff between causal 
identification and the substantive importance of the subject would not be worth the trouble.  What may be sacrificed 
here in precision of identification is gained in addressing a big, policy-relevant question.  For more on field 
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story, because the actions conducted under the Freedom of Navigation program (diplomatic 
protests and operational assertions) are not randomly assigned.  There is bound to be bias 
because the Freedom of Navigation program operates under the pressures and conditions of 
political, economic, military, legal, and other institutional priorities.235 
5.3 Correlations 
Under what conditions does the United States act?  This section investigates whether a 
correlation exists between type of disputed claim and action (by type of action).  Then, I proceed 
to examine the relationship between types of claims and the three theoretical models.  The data 
in Table 1 (below) pertain to the period after the formal establishment of the Freedom of 
Navigation program in 1979.  The independent variables include prior permission, restrictions on 
nuclear vessels, excessive territorial sea claims, excessive straight baselines, historic claims, 
contiguous zone restrictions, EEZ restrictions, and environmental restrictions.   
Of interest in this section are the relationships between type of action and type of claim 
that have substantive significance that deserve further analytical attention.236  Eight types of 
maritime claims are coded in the Freedom of Navigation data set.  These claims include:  
1) Territorial sea claims that exceed 12 nautical miles (tsexcess) 
• e.g. Libya, Nicaragua, Somalia  
 
2) Baseline claims drawn with excessively straight lines not conforming to the contours of 
the coast (straightbase) 
• e.g. Guinea-Bissau, Honduras, Japan  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
experiments, see Alan S. Gerber and Donald P. Green, Field Experiments: Design, Analysis, and Interpretation 
(New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2012), 4. 
 
235 Ibid., 6. 
 
236 I obtain a listwise correlation in Stata, which completes a listwise deletion of missing data by default.  If a case 
has a missing value for any of the variables listed, that case is eliminated from all correlations, even if there are valid 
values for the two variables in the current correlation.  For instance, if there were a missing value for the 
variable tsexcess, the case would still be excluded from the calculation of the correlation between protest 
and priorperm.  This process of case elimination explains why the number of observations is (n=2,769) for all 
correlations.  However, in this dataset, there are no missing values for the period 1979-2013. 
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3) Expansive historic claims, often historic bays or waters, in dispute directly with another 
coastal state (historic) 
• e.g. India, Panama, Portugal  
 
4) Restrictions on activities (usually military activities) in a coastal state’s contiguous zone, 
which extends from the outer edge of the territorial sea to 24 nautical miles (czrestrict) 
• e.g. Haiti, Saudi Arabia, North Korea  
 
5) Restrictions on activities (usually military activities) in a coastal state’s exclusive 
economic zone, which extends from the outer edge of the contiguous zone to 200 nautical 
miles (eezrestrict)  
• e.g. China, Iran, Kenya   
 
6) Environmental restrictions the United States interprets as being inconsistent with 
international law (often because too vague/all-encompassing or restrictive of navigation) 
(enviro) 
• e.g. Canada, Italy, Seychelles  
 
7) Restrictions on nuclear-powered vessels or nuclear cargo from entering coastal waters or 
requiring prior permission (nuclear) 
• e.g. Guyana, Mexico, Oman 
 
8) Requirement for permission to enter a coastal state’s territorial seas (priorperm)  
• e.g. Indonesia, Lithuania, South Korea  
 
Table 1 displays the correlation between each type of disputed maritime claims (columns) 
and the actions taken by the United States (rows) during the period 1979-2013.  This table 
addresses the questions, which type of claim is more highly correlated with disputative response 
by the United States?  And which type of response?  Across the first row, the table presents 
correlations between each type of maritime claim and some kind of action (either diplomatic 
protest or operational assertion).237  During this period, there are 5,094 observations (unit of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
237 Correlations measure the strength and direction of the linear relationship between two variables. The coefficient 
can range from -1 to +1.  A perfect one-to-one correlation receives a +1 for positive correlation, denoting that a one-
unit increase in one variable corresponds to a one-unit increase in the other variable.  As one increases, the other 
increases.  If the correlation is negative, the increase in one variable corresponds to a decrease in the other. If the 
correlation coefficient equals 0, it indicates no correlation between the values.  While heeding the warning that 
correlation does not equal causation, correlations have utility because they can indicate a predictive relationship that 
may be exploited in subsequent analysis. 
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analysis is country-year, n=5,094).  In each column header, the number of disputes by type is 
listed in parentheses. For example during this 34-year period, here were 633 country-year 
instances when the United States disputed the disputed territorial sea claims of the coastal state.  
Similarly, there were 1,482 instances when the United States disputed the requirements issued by 
a coastal state for obtaining prior permission before entering a territorial sea.  In each row, the 
strongest correlation has been bolded.  An asterisk (*) indicates statistical significance at the 
99.9% confidence level.238 
TABLE 5-1 
Correlations between action taken and types of disputed maritime claims, 1979-2013 





































Protest 0.03 0.12* 0.09* 0.07* 0.11* 0.09* 0.11* 0.09* 
Assertion 0.16* 0.21* 0.16* 0.03 0.27* 0.23* 0.31* 0.25* 
Action 0.15* 0.24* 0.18* 0.05* 0.29* 0.23* 0.31* 0.25* 
Both 0.05* 0.07* 0.03 0.04 0.07* 0.08* 0.10* 0.09* 
* p<0.001 
 
The results in the correlation table indicate a positive correlation between all types of 
maritime claims and the various actions taken under the Freedom of Navigation program.  
Nearly all correlations are statistically significant at the 99.9% confidence level, but some types 
of claims are correlated more substantively strongly than others.  The dependent variable, 
assertion, has the strongest correlations in the table.   
Among the possible relationships, the relationship between operational assertions and 
prior-permission restrictions is the strongest, positive correlation at 0.31.   A moderately positive 
relationship exist between operational assertions and excessive straight baseline claims, 
contiguous zone restrictions, EEZ restrictions, and nuclear restrictions.   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
238 A 99.9% confidence level means that if the same population were sampled numerous times, 99.9% of all possible 
samples would include the true population parameter. 
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Shifting focus to the other dependent variable, diplomatic protests, the correlations 
between diplomatic protests and any type of claim are substantively weak, even though they are 
statistically significant.  The correlations are weak, but positive.  Similarly, correlations between 
the incidence of combined American action (protest and assertion) and any type of claim are 
substantively negligible, although statistically significant.239  
So, the correlations in Table 1 indicate action is correlated more strongly with maritime 
claims that seek to infringe upon the usage of the sea (by restricting activities, requiring 
permission for entering the territorial sea, and restricting the types of vessels that may enter).  
United States assertion activity is less strongly correlated with territorializing efforts by coastal 
states to enlarge their territorial sea through claims that exceed 12 nautical miles or straight 
baselines.  Conversely, protests are more strongly correlated with the historic and baseline 
claims, environmental restrictions, and contested continental shelf claims. In short, operational 
assertions appear to be focused on maritime claims that inhibit usage or navigation, while 
protests appear to be focused on maritime claims that seek greater territory by enlarging 
the states claim to the ocean and its resources.   
In Table 2, disputed maritime claims are grouped into two simple categories:  territorial 
claims and usage claims.  These categorizations contrast two different legal behaviors by coastal 
states.  Territorial claims are those claims by which a state may seek to enlarge its share of the 
ocean and expand its share.  The data set includes 1,959 country-year-disputes where the coastal 
state’s claims are territorially expansive.  A coastal state may include three specific claims, such 
as:  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
239 Relationships are estimated using the following rule of thumb:  If r ≥ .70, very strong relationship. If .40 ≤ r ≤ 
.69, strong relationship, if .20 ≤ r ≤ .39, moderate relationship.  If .01 ≤ r ≤ .19, weak or negligible relationship. For 
interpretations of Pearson’s R coefficients, see http://faculty.quinnipiac.edu/ libarts/polsci/ Statistics.html 
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1) claiming a broader territorial sea, beyond 12 nautical miles as permitted by 
UNCLOS;  
 
2)  enlarging its claim to the sea by drawing straight baselines instead of following the 
shore’s contours; and  
 
3)  claiming waters through historic rights that otherwise fail to comply with UNCLOS 
(such claims, usually a bay, are often disputed directly by another state).  
 
Usage claims are those by which a coastal state seeks to prohibit or limit specified 
maritime activities in a zone that are otherwise permitted by UNCLOS and custom.  The data set 
includes 1,867 country-year-disputes where the coastal state’s claims seek to restrict usage.  
These usage claims include five specific claims, such as:  
1) environmental restrictions on discharge of shipboard waste;  
 
2)  prohibitions on nuclear-powered vessels or ships carrying nuclear cargo;  
 
3)  notification requirements or requirements for expressed permission prior to entry of 
territorial seas, and  
 
4)  restrictions on activities (usually military-related, surveying, or surveillance) in the 
contiguous zone; 
 
5)  restrictions on activities (usually military-related, surveying, or surveillance) in the 
exclusive economic zone.240   
 
Of all 2,769 disputed country-years, there are 1,100 cases in which the United States 
disputes a coastal state making both a territorial and a usage claim.  The data in Table 2 indicate 
that territorial claims and usage claims are almost equally correlated with the various responses 
through the Freedom of Navigation program (operational assertions, diplomatic protests, either 
action, or both actions).  Moreover, all correlations are positive.  Neither category of maritime 
claims appears to elicit a specific response more often than the other.  However, looking across 
the rows, there are four additional insights that the data in Table 2 provides. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
240 These categories of claims, expansive and restrictive, are my own and are employed here for analytical purposes.  
They do not reflect any official categories in international law or defense policy. 
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  TABLE 5-2 
Correlations between action taken and 







“Usage” claims  
(1,867) 
Both 
Territorial &  
Usage Claims  
(1,100) 
Protest 0.13* 0.12* 0.10* 
Assertion 0.27* 0.29* 0.29* 
Action  0.29* 0.31* 0.30* 
Both 0.08* 0.08* 0.07* 
* p<0.001 
 
First, diplomatic protests are weakly, but positively correlated with disputed claims of 
either type. Territorial claims (0.13)  and usage claims (0.12) are nearly equally correlated with 
diplomatic protests. This finding suggests not only the rarity of diplomatic protests, but also that 
they are not the favored response for one type of claim over another.  These correlations are 
statistically significant at the 99.9% confidence level.    
 Second, operational assertions are positively and moderately correlated with disputed 
claims of either type.  Operational assertions are more than twice as strongly correlated with 
territorial and usage claims than diplomatic protests are.  This finding suggests that operational 
assertions are the more common form of action when disputes exist.  However, it must be noted 
that inaction – doing nothing – is by far the most common response when a dispute exists.  
Usage claims (0.29) are slightly more highly correlated with operational assertions than 
territorial claims (0.29) and are correlated equally with cases when a coastal state makes a usage 
claim as when it makes both territorial and usage claims (0.29).  These correlations are 
statistically significant at the 99.9% confidence level.    
 Third, action of either type is nearly equally correlated with either territorial claims or 
usage claims – and with cases in which the coastal state makes both territorial and usage claims.  
This finding is surprising because one might expect the United States to take a harder line against 
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more “flagrant offenders” of international law who seek to expand their territorial reach offshore 
by claiming more sea than legally permitted while also seeking to restrict the usage activities of 
foreign states in those waters.  However, as the data in the far-right column indicate, the cases 
elicit no more or no less response than either purely expansive or purely restrictive cases.  These 
correlations are statistically significant at the 99.9% confidence level.    
 Finally, the final row of Table 3 indicates there is nearly no correlation between the 
employment of both measures—a diplomatic protest and operational assertion—in the same year 
against a state making either territorial, usage, or both types of claims.   
The types of disputed claims (either specific claims or general category) appear to have 
some influence on whether and how the United States responds to disputed claim of various 
types.  However, the character of a legal dispute alone does not fully explain when and how the 
United States acts to contest maritime claims. More information than just the type of maritime 
claim is necessary to understand why the United States acts in dispute of maritime claims; other 
omitted variables likely explain the outcomes.  In this next section, I explore three sets of 
explanations to explain the observed variation. 
5.4 Regressions 
The remainder of this chapter expands the analysis to include other independent variables 
as potential explanations of United States activity. Initially the regression analysis groups the 
independent variables according to each of the three discrete theories. The purpose of separately 
running regressions for Liberalism Model, the Security Model, and the Organizational Model is 
to determine how much independent explanatory power one model has.  Then, the analysis 
incorporates interactions between the models. Because, as noted in the previous chapter, the 
observable outcomes of the Freedom of Navigation program – diplomatic protests and 
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operational assertions – do not result from any one theoretical explanation alone, the variation 
observed results from a combination of factors that interact with one another under different 
conditions. 
Initially, I regressed the four outcomes from the Freedom of Navigation program on 
variables from each model using Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) and Weighted Least Squares 
(WLS).241  This initial effort intended to estimate how much explanatory power one theoretical 
model has on its own.  The benefit of using OLS and WLS is that they provide easily 
interpretable results, even if these methods are most often applied to interval or continuous, not 
dichotomous measures.242  They are also useful diagnostic tools for spotting a few problems that 
may suggest the hypothesized models are misspecified models.243  The results do not appear in 
this chapter.  
 The results of these OLS and WLS regressions are mentioned here because they indicated 
possible heteroskedasticity in the model.  Heteroskedasticity is a violation of one of the classical 
assumptions of OLS regression, that the error term has a constant variance or is homoscedastic.  
Heteroskedasticity, which is common in cross-sectional datasets, occurs when the variance or 
dispersion of an error term increases as a coefficient (Z) increases.  “The variance of the 
distribution of the error term changes for each observation or range of observations.”244  By 
plotting the residuals and running a Breusch-Pagan test, this heteroskedasticity is confirmed.  To 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
241 OLS and WLS are typically used with continuous variables and logistical regression is preferred for dichotomous 
variables. However, some scholars insist that OLS and WLS can provide useful insights into relationships.  I use 
OLS and WLS as a first-cut of analysis before proceeding to logit. 
 
242 These OLS and WLS tables and the .do files (Stata) are provided in the Appendix. 
 
243 Chris Auld, “The Intuition of Robust Standard Errors,” Economics, Econometrics, Etc., October 31, 2012, 
http://chrisauld.com/2012/10/31/the-intuition-of-robust-standard-errors/. 
 
244 A. H. Studenmund, Using Econometrics: A Practical Guide, 5th ed. (Boston: Addison Wesley, 2005), 89, 93-94. 
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mitigate the effects of heteroskedasticity, the regressions are estimated with robust standard 
errors, but even this precautionary measure had effects on the results.245 
 Second, the results of these OLS and WLS regressions indicate possible multicollinearity.  
Collinearity violates another classical assumptions when one explanatory variable is a perfect 
linear function of another.246 Multicollinearity, perfect linear function occurring in relationships 
of multiple variables, may result in the following major consequences that make it difficult to 
interpret a standard regression model:  
1) the variances and standard errors of the estimates will increase; 
2) thus, the computed t-scores will fall;  
3) estimates will become sensitive to changes in specification.247    
These consequences were apparent in preliminary results and led to the omission of some 
collinear variables.  Three diagnostics can determine the extent of the multicollinearity in the 
models.  First, I perform pairwise correlation to obtain correlation matrices with Pearson 
correlation coefficients, which may offer evidence of high correlations between the variables.  
Second, I perform a variance-inflation-factors (VIF) test, which indicates when the variance of 
the coefficient of interest has been inflated upwards (more than twice its size). For this project, 
the VIF results were kept under 10.0 as a rule-of-thumb.  Also, we can use Stata’s variance-
covariance matrix of the estimates of the coefficients in the model.  Finally, I run a collinearity 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
245 Typically, robust standard errors are used to estimate progressions when heteroskedasticity is likely. However, 
recent literature suggests that this common practice may have some associated problems. “At best their estimators 
are inefficient, but in all likelihood estimators from their model of at least some quantities are biased. The bigger the 
difference robust standard errors make, the stronger the evidence for misspecification” (King and Roberts, 177). 
 
246 Studenmund, Using Econometrics, 89, 94–95. 
 
247 Studenmund, Using Econometric, 250-253. 
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package, collin.ado, in Stata written by the UCLA Institute for Digital Research and Education 
(ATS).248 
 Finally, the OLS and WLS regressions have low adjusted R2, indicating a very low 
amount of variance explained by any one model. Methodologically, this in not necessarily a 
problem, but suggests that the hypotheses as currently operationalized are less valid than my 
prior assumptions suggested.  Theoretically, the low R2 is not surprising as the theory section 
noted earlier that these models are complementary; no one model is seeking to explain empirical 
variation by itself.  
One potential critique is that the regressions not control for cross-country heterogeneity.  There 
may be factors not controlled for (probably).  Fixed effects would control for all country-level 
characteristics that are constant in the regression, but the downside of fixed effects regression is 
that all identification is coming from within-country variation.  Therefore, we would see within-
country variation over time, but not between-country variation.  OLS and WLS allow us to take 
into account the between-country effects and permit comparison of different states.  However, 
between-country variation is important, and the variables are so slowly moving that the only 
variation is between countries.  The problem then is that there is unexplained heterogeneity 
between countries that is uncontrolled for.   
5.4.1 Logistical Regression. 
After completion of the OLS and WLS regressions for initial diagnostic purposes, the 
analysis proceeds to a more statistically appropriate method.  Binomial logit is an estimation 
technique for binary dependent variables.  The outcomes are coded in the dataset as either 0 or 1.  
For instance, for a given country-year, if the United States did not conduct an operational 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
248 “Institute for Digital Research and Education - UCLA,” Institute for Digital Research and Education, accessed 
November 10, 2015, https://idre.ucla.edu/. 
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assertion, a 0 is recorded.  If the United States did conduct an operational assertion, a 1 is 
recorded.  
Logit models estimate the probability of the dependent variable to be equal to 1.  In this 
case, the estimated outcome is the probability that the event such as a diplomatic protest or 
operational assertion occurs.  Thus, logit employs maximum-likelihood estimation, an iterative 
technique, which chooses coefficients that maximize the likelihood of the outcome being 
observed.249  Unlike OLS, logit regression assumes he relationship between the independent 
variables and the outcome (dependent variable) is nonlinear. The functional form of the 
relationship of the outcome to its explanatory variables is often described by an S-shaped pattern. 
 For the purposes of interpretation of logit results, the signs of the coefficients and the 
magnitude of the Student’s t-statistic maintain the same importance as in OLS.  However, 
interpretation of the magnitude of the logit coefficients differs from OLS because they are not 
linear relationships.  Instead, the logit analysis presented in this chapter will focus on the discrete 
changes in predicted probabilities.  
 First, I regress each of the dependent variables on the 13 base independent variables 
according to the following equation:  
 
Y  = β0 + β1sipri_gdp + β2sipri_percap +β3log_gdp +β4nucstate + β5expand + β6restrict + 
β7polity_scaled + β8ratunclos + β9declare + β10usship + β11fleet + β12DR_at_US 
+ β13DE + ϵ 
 
In this regression equation, ϵ is an error term assumed to be independently and identically 
distributed.  Then, after adjusting for heteroskedacticity and collinearity, I run two separate 
regression models—Y1 and Y2—for each of the dependent variables.  The primary difference is 
that the regression equation for Y2 contains most dichotomous variables, whereas the equation 
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for Y1 contains more continuous variables. The dichotomous variables ease the task of 
interpretation of marginal effects; continuous variables are difficult to interpret in logit 
regressions. For example, a variable such as military spending in Model 1 appears as a 
continuous variable (sipri_percap), whereas in Model 2 it appears as a dichotomous variable 
coding the top 50th percentile of military expenditure (sipri50).   Only the results of these two 
equations are posted in the regression table below. 
 
Y1  = β0 + β1sipri_percap + β2log_gdp + β3nucstate + β4expand + β5restrict + β6bothER + 
β7democ2 + β8ratunclos + β9usship + β10fleet + β11DR_at_US+ β12USDR_at_2  
+  ϵ 
 
Y2  = β0 + β1sipri50 + β2gdp50 +β3nucstate + β4expand + β5restrict + β6bothER + 
β7polity_scaled + β8declare + β9usship + β10fleet + β11usamb + β12foramb + ϵ 
 
The table contains coefficients from an analysis of marginal effects on the estimated 
outcome from toggling a binary value.250  This technique permits the calculation of the discrete 
changes in predicted probabilities.  By obtaining the mean values for all independent variables, 
we can examine the discrete change in the dependent variable for each independent variable 
while holding all others constant at their mean value.  For instance, we may ask how great an 
effect does a change in nuclear-power status have on the outcome when holding all other values 
constant at their mean. The marginal effects for continuous variables measure the instantaneous 
rate of change (defined shortly). They are popular in some disciplines (e.g. Economics) because 
they often provide a good approximation to the amount of change in Y that will be produced by a 
1-unit change in X (change in 1 standard deviation or change from 0 to 1). 
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TABLE 5-3 
Likelihood of US issuing diplomatic protests, conducting operational assertions, and taking both actions. 
-Two regression models (1) and (2) – with variables operationalized differently in each 
- Logistical regression estimating marginal effects (mfx) of variables from all three models 









Military spending (per 
capita) 
   sipri_percap, continuous 
-0.00002 -0.00002 -0.00001 --- --- --- 
Military spending (top 50%) 
   sipri50, dichotomous 
--- --- --- 0.022* 0.030 0.007 
GDP (log) 
   log_gdp continuous 
0.009** -0.002 0.003* --- --- --- 
GDP (top 50%) 
   gdp50, dichotomous 
--- --- --- 0.022* 0.025 0.011* 
Nuclear Weapons State 
   nucstate, dichotomous 











   expand, dichotomous 
0.023* 0.050* 0.010 0.008 0.088*** 0.0007 
Restrictive Claims 
   restrict, dichotomous 
-0.013 0.099*** 0.0002 0.006 0.093*** 0.003 
Size of Trade Rel. (|I|+|E|) 
   tradetotal, continous 
-1.44e-10 9.63e-10 -2.71e-11 4.6e-10 1.8e-09*** 2.99e-10* 
Polity Score 






--- --- --- 
Autocracy Regime Type 
   autoc2, dichotomous 
--- --- --- omit omit omit 
Anocracy Regime Type 
   anoc, dichotomous 
--- --- --- omit  omit omit 
Democracy Regime Type 
   democ2, dichotomous 
--- --- --- 0.001 -0.079*** -0.007 
Ratify UNCLOS 
  ratunclos, dichotomous 
0.004 -0.040 -0.006 --- --- --- 
UNCLOS Declaration 
  declare, dichotomous 












# US Warships 
  usship continuous 
0.0001* -0.00006 0.00001 0.0002*** 0.0002** 0.00008*** 
Operational Fleet HQ 
  fleet, dichotomous 
0.006 0.165*** 0.008 0.008 0.137*** 0.007 
Formal Diplo Exchange 
  DE, dichotomous 
-0.010 -0.060 -0.009 --- --- --- 
Foreign Ambassador in US 
  foramb, dichotomous 
--- --- --- -0.039* -0.010 0.005 
US Ambassador in For State 
  usamb, dichotomous 
--- --- --- 0.018 -0.0001 -0.004 
Pseudo R2 0.0620 0.0959 0.1139 0.0734 0.0872 0.0980 
N= 1487 1487 1487 2781 2781 2781 




90.03 (12) 201.2 (12) 63.66 (12) 
Log likelihood (iterations) -284.17 
(5) 
-669.7 (6) -133.5 (5) -640.8 (4) -1239.1(4) -294.8 (5) 
Notes:   Standard Errors in parentheses (drawn from mfx plot) * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001, two-tailed test 
omit  = omitted by regression output due to perfect collinearity  
--- indicates dropped terms to correct heteroskedasticity and multicollinearity 
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5.5 Interpretation  
Based on two regression models for each of the dependent variables (protest and assert), 
four variables held statistical significance at 95% confidence level or better when regressed on 
protest, and eight variables held statistical significance at 95% confidence level or better when 
regressed on assert.   
5.5.1  Dependent Variable: Protest 
This model uses 11 independent variables to estimate the likelihood of diplomatic 
protests. According to the pseudo-R2 in the first logit model (Y1, 0.0620) and the second logit 
model (Y2, 0.0734), these equations explain somewhere between 6.2-7.3% of the variation in 
diplomatic protests. This relatively low R2  indicates that the vast majority of variation in the 
dependent variable is explained by exogenous variables.  
In the regression analysis, four variables held statistical significance at 95% confidence 
level or better:  GDP (log_gdp and gdp50), expansive claims (expand), United States Warships 
(usship), and Foreign Ambassador in United States (foramb).  The marginal effects are positive 
for GDP (0.009), expansive claims (0.023), and U.S. warships (0.0001).  The marginal effects 
are negative for the presence of a foreign ambassador in the United States (0.039).  According to 
these findings, the United States is more likely to issue diplomatic protests to coastal states with 
higher levels of wealth per capita and those that make territorial claims, when the United States 
has more warships.  However, the United States is less likely to conduct an operational assertion 
when a foreign ambassador is present in the United States.  These results are statistically 
significant, but they lack substantive significance.  These coefficients (listed parenthetically in 
this paragraph) are very small and indicate a very small marginal effect for each variable when 
all others are held at their mean value.   They do encourage further analysis in the next chapter.  
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One of the most striking results is the apparent unimportance of variables such as military 
spending, size of trade relationship, or polity type.   
5.5.2  Dependent Variable: Assert 
This model uses 12 independent variables to estimate the likelihood of operational 
assertions. According to the pseudo-R2 in the first logit model (Y1, 0.0959) and the second logit 
model (Y2, 0.0872), these equations explain somewhere between 8.7-9.6% of the variation in 
operational assertions.  As above, this low R2  indicates that the vast majority of variation in the 
dependent variable is explained by exogenous variables.   
Eight variables held statistical significance at 95% confidence level or better: nuclear 
weapons state (nucstate), expansive claims (expand), usage claims (restrict), total size of the 
trade relationship (tradetotal), democratic regime type (democ2), UNCLOS declaration 
(declare), United States warships (usship), and Operational Fleet Headquarters (fleet).  The 
marginal effects are negative for democracies (-0.079), which shows that the United States is 
7.9% less likely to conduct operational assertions against coastal states with democratic 
governments with which it has a maritime dispute. 
 The marginal effects are positive for states with active nuclear programs (0.095, 0.161 for 
Y1 and Y2), expansive claims (0.050, 0.088), usage claims (0.099, 0.093), issued a declaration 
upon ratification of UNCLOS (0.062), in a region with an operational fleet headquarters (0.165, 
0.137).  Thus, the United States is more likely to conduct operational assertions against coastal 
states with active nuclear weapons programs, states that make either expansive or usage claims, 
issued a declaration at UNCLOS ratification, and in regions where it has an operational fleet 
headquarters.  
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 The marginal effects for military spending point in two directions, but neither is substantively 
significant.  When military expenditure is measured per capita, the results are positive, but 
extremely weak and not statistically significant. But when measured as a dichotomous variable 
as top 50th percentile of military expenditure 
 These statistics yield the following three insights.  First, expansive claims, such as 
territorial seas beyond 12 nautical miles or excessive straight baseline claims and historic claims, 
are less likely to prompt American response under the Freedom of Navigation program – all else 
held constant.  In 2013, the United States disputed the maritime claims of 80 coastal states, of 
which 19 disputes were due to expansive claims.251  The marginal effect of expansive claims on 
the likelihood of action – either diplomatic protest or operational assertion – is no more than 8%.   
And when the United States does respond to territorial claims, it is more likely to conduct an 
operational assertion than to issue a diplomatic protest.  These findings are consistent with stated 
U.S. policy since the Reagan administration and will be discussed in further detail in the next 
chapter.  
Second, a coastal state that possesses an active nuclear-weapons program and makes a 
declaration upon ratification of UNCLOS is likely to provoke an American response under the 
Freedom of Navigation program.  This interactive variable (discussion of statistics in next 
section) has a stronger effect than the base variable for a coastal state in possession a nuclear 
weapons program (nucstate).  Empirically, there are only four among the 48 coastal states that 
have issued declarations upon ratification of UNCLOS and possess nuclear-weapons programs: 
China, France, India, and Pakistan.  The United States contests the maritime claims of each these 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
251 Benin, Colombia, Cuba, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Eritrea, Gabon, Greece, Guinea-Bissau, 
Honduras, Japan, Mauritania, Panama, Peru, Philippines, Russian Federation, Togo, Tunisia. 
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states, except France.  Subsequent chapters discuss American action vis-à-vis these states in 
greater detail. 
5.6 Interactions 
Next, 31 interactive terms are included in the analysis to examine the interaction between 
variables across the security model, liberalism model, and organization model.  They are added 
to the base variables from the previous step.  Each of these terms and the .do file that created 
them are listed in the appendix, but 20 of 31 were eliminated from the regression model due to 
heteroskedasticity and multicollinearity. 11 interactive terms appear in Table 5.  These terms are: 
  
• strong_restrict - interaction of military spending per capita (sipri_percap) and whether 
the coastal state makes usage maritime claims (restrictive). 
• richlog_restrict – interaction of the natural log of GDP (log_gdp) and whether the 
coastal state makes usage maritime claims (restrictive). 
• nuc_declare – interaction of whether the coastal state has an active nuclear weapons 
program (nucstate) and whether it makes a declaration at UNCLOS ratification whether 
the coastal state makes a declaration upon ratification of UNCLOS (declare). 
• nuc_rat – interaction of whether the coastal state has an active nuclear weapons program 
and whether the coastal state has ratified UNCLOS (ratunclos). 
• polity_restrict – interaction of a coastal state’s polity score (polity_scaled) and whether 
the coastal state makes usage maritime claims (restrictive). 
• polity_rat – interaction of a coastal state’s polity score (polity_scaled) and whether the 
coastal state has ratified UNCLOS (ratunclos).  
• rat_declare – interaction of coastal state whether the coastal state has ratified UNCLOS 
(ratunclos) and whether the coastal state makes a declaration upon ratification of 
UNCLOS (declare). 
• wealth_autoc – interaction of the natural log of a coastal state’s GDP (log_gdp) and the 
coastal state’s polity score (polity). 
• wealth_rat – interaction of the natural log of a coastal state’s GDP (log_gdp) and 
whether the coastal state has ratified UNCLOS (ratunclos).  
• strong_autoc - interaction of military spending per capita (sipri_percap) and the coastal 
state’s polity score (polity_scaled). 
• fleet_dip – interaction of whether the United States Navy maintains an operational fleet 
headquarters in the region of the coastal state (fleet) and the level of diplomatic 
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TABLE 5-4 
 
 Protest Assert Action Both 
sipri_percap -0.003*** -0.008** -0.005** 0.001* 
nucstate 0.676 1.923*** 0.935*** 1.827* 
expansive 1.332*** 1.052*** 1.539*** 0.286 
restrictive --- 17.555*** 14.651*** 0.220 
polity_scaled --- -0.629*** -0.501*** -0.024 
ratunclos -7.422*** -10.326*** -8.247*** -2.422* 
DR_at_US --- --- -0.126 --- 
strong_restrict 0.003*** 0.009*** 0.006*** --- 
richlog_restrict --- -0.626*** -0.504*** --- 
nuc_declare 1.015 12.083*** --- 10.441*** 
nuc_rat --- -13.937*** --- -10.407*** 
polity_restrict --- -0.077* -0.072** --- 
polity_rat --- -0.056* --- --- 
rat_declare --- 1.439*** 0.993*** 2.713* 
wealth_autoc -0.001 0.029*** 0.022*** --- 
wealth_rat 0.286*** 0.403*** 0.301*** --- 
strong_autoc --- -0.0003*** -0.0002*** -0.0004*** 
fleet_dip 0.243*** 0.574*** 0.599*** 0.357*** 
_cons -3.981 -5.045*** -4.221*** -4.921*** 
Pseudo R2 0.1093 0.3291 0.2775 0.2167 
N= 2286 2286 2286 2326 




82.16(9) 2254.40(17) 294.24(15) 1393.13(13) 
Log likelihood 
(iterations) 
-287.92 -570.31(11) -674.018(7) -122.17 (10) 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
 
 
Generally speaking, the introduction of the interactive terms increases the explanatory 
power of the models, but at the expense of trading noise for higher statistical fit, let alone 
theoretical parsimoniousness.  Statistically, the amount of variance explained by the addition of 
these interactive terms increased by approximately 10%. (as expressed by Pseudo R2).  This 
result is a big increase, doubling the explanatory power of the base model.  Qualitatively, the 
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5.7 Evaluation of Hypotheses 
 
5.7.1 Liberal Model 
 
H1a. Because maximum compliance with customary international law and the UNCLOS 
treaty is the desired outcome, the United States will conduct operational assertions against 
as many states as possible regardless of geographic situation. 
 
On the surface, we must reject this hypothesis.  Not only does the United States not assert against 
all disputant coastal states each year (or even each decade), but in some cases, the United States 
has refrained from performing and announcing an operational assertion when it actually had a 
ship available in the area (e.g. Argentina, Strait of Magellan).  The United States tends to act 
more often when it disputes the coastal state’s usage claim.  This is a robust finding.  Changing 
this usage variable (restrictive) from a 0 to a 1 increases the likelihood by 99% that the United 
States will conduct an operational assertion.  This finding is far stronger than when the coastal 
state makes an expansive claim.  
The correlation tables (see Table 1 and 2) show statistically significant correlations 
between assertions and usage claims.  The data show that the United States response is correlated 
at a comparable rate when the disputed maritime claims are either territorially expansive or 
attempting to restrict usage.  However, the United States is more likely to act against usage 
claims, which would infringe upon economic liberties or military mobility.  The next chapter will 
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H1b. The United States will use operational assertions as outward expressions promoting 
its domestic political order and will be more likely to conduct operational assertions to 
contest the claims of autocratic states than institutionalized democracies. 
 
The empirical results appear to confirm Hypothesis 1b.  Polity score is negatively correlated with 
operational assertions, and it is statistically significant at 99.9%.  Thus, autocratic states are more 
likely than democratic states to receive operational assertions from the United States.  The 
regression results also show that democracies with which the United States has a dispute are less 
likely to receive an assertion than non-democracies with which the United States has a dispute.  
To be clear, this is not an endogeneity resulting from a correlation between democracies and 
compliance with international law.252  The statistical finding here focuses on the policy choice 
the United States makes to respond to noncompliance.  Given an existing dispute, the United 
States is more likely to assert against autocratic states than democratic states.  However, when 
we create dummy variables for each category of polity (autocracy = -10 to -6, anocracy= -5 to 
+5, and democracy +6 to +10) and test the marginal effects of toggling each dummy variable 
from 0 to 1 while holding all other values at their mean, then the results are substantively weak, 
but statistically significant nonetheless. 
5.7.2 Security Model 
 
H2a. The United States will conduct operational assertions to challenge claims, which 
restrict freedom of movement in areas most vital to American military security or 
commercial security. The strategic chokepoints are the highest priority transit zones. 
 
The empirical results confirm Hypothesis 2a, but this finding is very similar to H1a.  To 
differentiate these findings, we turn to the correlations in Table 2, which show the correlations 
by type of maritime claim.  The positive, statistically significant correlations between itemized 
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usage claims such as 1) Prior Permission claims (requiring permission for warships to enter a 
Territorial Sea), 2) Contiguous Zone claims, which state use to extend unlawfully their security 
jurisdiction, and 3) Exclusive Economic Zone claims, which seek to limit military operations in 
the EEZ – together build a body of evidence that the United States is likely to act to preserve its 
military freedom of movement.  More generally speaking, as seen earlier in the regression 
output, the marginal effects of toggling the usage variable (restrictive) from 0 to 1 while holding 
all other values at their mean, is 99.8%.  This means that the United States is 99.8% more likely 
to perform an operational assertion (all else held constant) when the disputed maritime claim 
aims to restrict usage in some way.  In contrast, the marginal effects of toggling the territorial 
claim variable (expansive) from 0 to 1 while holding all other values at their mean, is 1.9%. 
H2b. The United States will conduct operational assertions to challenge the emergence of 
a regional hegemon and rising regional powers. 
 
The data reject the hypothesis that the United States conducts operational assertions to 
challenge regional hegemons.  Insofar as regional hegemons are measured by higher levels of 
wealth or military spending, the regression results do not support this hypothesis.  This is a 
surprising finding which demands more analysis in the following chapter.  However, the 
marginal effects of being a nuclear-weapons state increase the likelihood of receiving an 
assertion by approximately 6-16%.  This likelihood increases to approximately 99% for nuclear-
weapons states that have made declarations upon ratification of UNCLOS (interaction term—
nuclear and declaration).  Only four countries fit into this latter category: China, North Korea, 
India, and Pakistan. This is a very strong finding which will receive more attention in the next 
chapter. 
In the meantime, it is important to call attention to three details.  First, in the regression 
output, not only is military spending (as a percentage of GDP) not statistically significant 
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(positive relationship), but also military spending (per capita) which is statistically significant at 
the 95% confidence level has a very small beta coefficient and a negative relationship.  In sum, 
the results are very small, insignificant, and pointing in different directions.  Additionally, the 
measure of state wealth – a proxy for state power based on the fungibility of wealth into hard 
power – has a negative coefficient, but is not statistically significant either.  These findings are 
surprising given the frequent arguments that the United States uses the Freedom of Navigation 
program as a stratagem for balancing rising powers and threats.  I will explore this further in the 
qualitative case studies. 
 
5.7.3 Organizational Model. 
 
H3a. The United States will conduct Freedom of Navigation operations when an 
operational headquarters exists to plan and execute them.   
 
The regression output provides statistically significant evidence to support this hypothesis.  The 
existence of an operational fleet headquarters increases the likelihood of conducting an 
operational assertion by 3.5%.  This finding is statistically significant at the 99.9% level. This 
marginal effect is not substantively large, though, and it likely reflects the fact that the Navy is 
more likely to place operational headquarters in places where they intend to conduct more 
operations anyway.  This endogeneity bias likely produces a higher result.   
But while the existence of a fleet headquarters predicts a small increase in the likelihood 
of FONOPS, the total number of ships in the Navy does not appear to have a significant effect on 
FONOPS.  From 1989 to 2013, the total number of warships declined steadily from nearly 597 
ships to 289.  Yet, the number of operational assertions does not decrease.  Instead, the frequency 
of operational assertions peaked during the Clinton administration in 1998, when 28 assertions 
were conducted.  In the logit regression results from the entire period 1979-2013, the number of 
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warships had a small and negative effect, but it was not statistically significant. Thus, counter to 
intuition, the total number of warships in the United States fleet has no significant relationship 
with observed operational assertions.  
H3b.  The United States will not conduct Freedom of Navigation assertions when 
political sensitivities dictate—as expressed by Department of State or National Security 
Council.  
 
The statistical results from this chapter do not address H3b.  These hypotheses are addressed in 
the next chapter. 
H3c.  The United States will conduct Freedom of Navigation operations when diplomatic 
relations are in tact. 
 
The regressions include three different measures for considering the effect of diplomatic 
relationships on the likelihood of either diplomatic protests or operational assertions, but  none of 
the variables is significant—substantively or statistically.  Neither the presence of a U.S. 
Ambassador in a coastal state nor the presence in the United States of a foreign ambassador 
changes the likelihood of either a diplomatic protest or an operational assertion.  Even the most 
basic dichotomous measure of formal diplomatic exchange (ambassadorial presence in either 
country) does not affect the outcomes.  The case study of Oman and Iran in Chapter 6 provides a 
closer look at this relationship. 
5.8 Conclusion. 
First, the quantitative results show that the variables of the Security Model as 
operationalized in terms of military expenditure and GDP have little to no effect on protests or 
assertions under the Freedom of Navigation program.  The only variable of the Security Model 
with any statistical significance is a nuclear weapons capability.  The marginal effect of a state’s 
possession of nuclear weapons is substantial, as much 16% greater likelihood of receiving an 
operational assertion (holding all other variables at their mean value), depending on the 
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regression equation.  This means that the United States is 8-16% more likely to protest or assert 
against the disputed claims of a state with nuclear weapons compared to a non-nuclear state 
(when holding all other values at their mean value).  This finding is important, and it underscores 
nuclear weapons as one of the top two strongest variables in predicting action by the United 
States.  This finding raises the question of whether the attention to nuclear states is due to an 
American response to rising (or risen) powers, or some other concern. 
Second, the quantitative results indicate that the effect of the Liberalism Model—
operationalized in terms of types of claims, domestic polity type, treaty activity, and value of 
trade relationship has little effect.  Both usage and territory claims have statistically significant 
effects on assertions, with usage claims having a slightly higher substantive effect than territory 
claims.  In other words, usage claims are more likely to provoke American assertions than 
territory claims, however the difference is slight. In terms of polity type, the United States is 
approximately 8% less likely to conduct a FON assertion against a democracy than a polity of an 
autocratic regime or weakly institutionalized anocracy.  States that issue a declaration upon 
ratification of UNCLOS are approximately 6% more likely to receive an assertion.  This seems 
intuitive because the declaration is like waiving a red flag in defiance of the treaty.  Finally, the 
effect of the total size of the bilateral trade relationship is statistically significant, but 
substantively near zero; so we can say with high level of certainty that it hardly matters.  
Third, the quantitative results indicate the effect of the Organization Model—as 
operationalized in terms of available resources (total warships in Navy), existence of an 
operational fleet headquarters, and diplomatic representation—is worthy of further study due to 
three surprising findings.  First among these is that the number of warships in the United States 
Navy has nearly no effect on whether it asserts its freedom of navigation with a FONOP.  The 
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demonstrated effect of warships is statistically significant, but the substantive effect is close to 
zero even though the number of ships declines by nearly half over the time period.  Another 
counterintuitive finding is the apparent insignificance of diplomatic representation on the United 
States’ conducts the Freedom of Navigation program.  Neither the existence of a diplomatic 
exchange nor the posting of a full ambassador is substantively or statistically significant in this 
study. Finally, by contrast, the existence of an operational fleet headquarters, often referred to as 
a Numbered Fleet or a Maritime Component Command increases the likelihood of assertions by 
13-16%.  The significance of a fleet headquarters indicates the importance of command-and-
control relationships and organizational capacity for coordinating policy with other departments 
and agencies.  This result also suggests an endogeneity or a bias for action in locations where the 
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6.1 Introduction  
 
Chapter 6 builds on the statistical work in Chapter 5 and selects a pair of cases for 
qualitative examination. The results from the large-n statistical analysis in the previous chapter 
offer some insight into the utility of explanations of liberalism, security, and organization for the 
United States’ behavior under the Freedom of Navigation program.  That quantitative analysis, 
however, yields weak and mixed results, and the statistical results suggest avenues for further 
analysis.   
These findings from Chapter 5 are summarized in the following flow diagrams, which 
indicate positive or negative relationships between the likelihood of operational assertions and 
the independent variable on the left.  The sign indicates the positive or negative effect of the 
independent variable.  The substantive effect or magnitude of the variables is not annotated. 
 
Nuclear weapons → + Power (Military, Wealth) → 0 
Territory < Usage Claims → + Economic Interdependence → 0 
Fleet HQs → + Warships in U.S. Navy → 0 
Democracy → - Diplomatic Representation → 0 
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In the cases of the variables in the right column, the relationships are either statistically or 
substantively insignificant.  Overall, these results may be due in part to the challenges of 
operationalizing particular variables.  Nevertheless, this quantitative analysis suggests both the 
limitations of the models presented and, in a few cases, the need for a closer, qualitative 
examination of selected relationships.   
The quantitative analysis demonstrated the importance of one variable from each model, 
which receive priority in this chapter.  First, the quantitative results showed the marginal effect 
of a state’s possession of nuclear weapons was the most significant (positive) of the security 
variables.  By contrast, the statistical operationalization of military power—with different 
measures of military expenditure and state wealth (GDP) as proxies—fails to capture the ways 
that coastal states field military capabilities to restrict or deny coastal waters in an asymmetric or 
relatively inexpensive way.  Historical intuition and operational experience suggest that these 
variables remain important, and this chapter attempts to account for the conditions under which 
that may be so.  
Second, the quantitative results showed that the regime type of a disputant coastal state 
had a marginal effect (negative) on the likelihood of an operational assertion.  This was the only 
variable from the Liberalism model that demonstrated significance.  Democracies with which the 
United States has a maritime dispute are less likely to receive operational assertions than non-
democracies.  Also, usage claims were slightly more likely to provoke American assertions than 
expansive claims.  A number of variables from the Liberalism model had no meaningful effect 
on the outcome according to the regression analysis.  The total size of the bilateral trade 
relationship had little substantive effect on the likelihood of assertions.  Yet, like the Security 
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model above, intuition and experience suggest that these variables have some explanatory value, 
and this chapter attempt to explain the conditions under which that may be so. 
In this chapter, organizational politics, in particular, comes to the fore as the strongest 
explanation for the variation in freedom of navigation assertions.  Specifically, I highlight the 
relationship between 1) organizational doctrine and standard operating procedures within the 
United States Navy, and 2) the Navy’s relationship to Presidential power (e.g. the National 
Security Council) that activates and/or constrain the Navy under various circumstances.  The 
selected cases in this chapter demonstrate not only the extent to which the Navy operates as a 
efficient and effective instrument for achieving the specialized goals assigned to it, but also how 
this organization’s goals may diverge from the desired objectives of its political masters.   
In the quantitative analysis of the Organization Model, the number of warships in the 
United States Navy produced no statistically significant effect on freedom of navigation 
assertions, nor did the existence of diplomatic exchange or levels of diplomatic representation.  
However, the existence of an operational fleet headquarters, often referred to as a Numbered 
Fleet or a Maritime Component Command, had a marginal effect approximately as strong as that 
of nuclear-weapons states.  Thus, this chapter pays close attention to the importance of this 
organizational feature and considers how, why, and under what conditions the politics of the 
organization may be significant.253 
The Liberalism and Security models provide some explanatory power, but these models 
are likely active under sensitive political situations.  More often than not, the organizational 
incentives of the Navy and the politics inside the organization entrusted with the exercise of the 
Freedom of Navigation program—where the planning, coordinating, and executing of the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
253 Due to the likely bias for action in locations where the United States’ security interests have prompted the 
establishment of these headquarters in the first place, this chapter selects cases to control for endogeneity. 
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operations occurs—explain the why the United States conducts operational assertions against 
some countries and not others.  Thus, the Navy’s organizational missions, its operational 
objectives and specialized abilities, its standard operating procedures, and its requirements of 
coordination and for command-and-control feature anticipate the majority of navy activity.254     
Under normal conditions, standing doctrine and standard operating procedures are likely 
to account for most activity under the freedom of navigation program.  However, when disputes 
arise or when disputed claims arise in politically sensitive areas, we should expect variables of 
the Liberalism or Security Models to have a greater role.  These expectations align closely with 
Posen’s theory about the relationship between organization theory and balance of power theory:  
Whereas organization theory leads one to expect a tendency toward stagnant (often offensive) 
military doctrines dislocated from politics, balance of power theory suggests a “greater 
heterogeneity in military doctrine dependent on reasonable appraisals by each state of its 
political technological economic and geographical problems and possibilities in the international 
political system.”255   
6.2 Delegation, Standard Operating Procedures, and Organizational Politics 
A 1982 policy document, providing guidance for the Freedom of Navigation program, 
was signed in the same week as the conclusion of the United Nations Convention on the Law of 
the Sea, which the United States did not sign.  The timing of this policy document is significant 
as it aimed to:  
[…] protect U.S. navigation, overflight, and related security interests in the seas 
through the vigorous exercise of its rights against excessive maritime claims. The 
current uncertainty in the law of the sea and the U.S. decision not to become a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
254 Graham Allison and Philip Zelikow, Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis, 2nd ed. (New 
York: Pearson, 2009), 143–196. 
 
255 Barry R. Posen, The Sources of Military Doctrine: France, Britain, and Germany Between the World Wars, 
Cornell Studies in Security Affairs (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1986), 59, 41–67. 
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party to the Law of the Sea (LOS) Convention make all the more necessary a 
clear assertion of our rights and a revitalized and more effective navigation and 
overflight program.256  
 
A prioritization scheme emerged from NSDD-72, and all subsequent directives (NSDD-83 
(1983), NSDD-265 (1987), NSD-49 (1990), NSD-62 (1991), and PSD-32 (1995)) reiterated the 
same commitment to freedom of navigation and prioritization for dealing with different types of 
claims.  
Levels of priority for action are expressed in terms of how little coordination is required 
before exercising navigational freedoms in international straits.  As a matter of organizational 
politics, the level of autonomy delegated to a service is an important consideration for explaining 
where and when the United States Navy is likely to exercise Freedom of Navigation.257  
International straits receive top priority as expressed by the autonomy authorized to the 
Department of Defense:   “International straits will be used by both naval ships and aircraft 
freely and frequently as directed by the Department of Defense.”258  Thus, one expects the navy 
to maintain its global presence and to operate forward conducting transit passage through these 
strategic chokepoints where the territorial seas of coastal states overlap in an international strait.  
According to the regime of transit passage, the policy authorizes “the submerged transit of 
submarines, overflight of military aircraft, and surface transit of warships/naval auxiliaries, 
without prior notification or authorization.”259  Only navigation in and over international straits is 
exempt from review for politically sensitive areas by Department of State and the Assistant to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
256 Ronald Reagan, “National Security Decision Directive 72 (NSDD-72)” (The White House, December 13, 1982), 
1, http://www.reagan.utexas.edu/archives/reference/Scanned%20NSDDS/NSDD72.pdf. 
 
257 Morton H Halperin, Priscilla Clapp, and Arnold Kanter, Bureaucratic Politics and Foreign Policy, 2nd ed. 
(Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2006), 51–56, 101–109. 
 
258 Reagan, “National Security Decision Directive 72 (NSDD-72),” 2. 
 
259 Ibid., 1. 
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the President for National Security Affairs.  
Expansive territorial sea claims that exceed 12 nautical miles receive the next level of 
priority.  NSDD-72 states, “The Department of Defense will routinely assert U.S. rights against 
territorial sea claims and other claims to jurisdiction over maritime areas in excess of twelve 
miles.”260 It is worth noting two details pertaining to this category of expansive territorial sea 
claims.  First, the majority coastal states claiming a territorial sea in excess of 12 nautical miles 
is in Central/South America or Africa; exceptions include Albania (until 1990), Germany (until 
1993), Greece (excessive airspace claim), Philippines, and Syria (until 2003).  These claims 
require no prior coordination or approval.  Second, the majority of coastal states claiming 
unlawful jurisdiction over a different class of maritime area beyond 12 nautical miles is in Asia.  
Most coastal states claim a Contiguous Zone (12-24nm offshore) for preventing and punishing 
infringement of customs, laws and regulations in the Territorial Zone.  The Contiguous Zone acts 
as sort of external buffer zone prior to entering the territorial sea.  However, some coastal states 
seeks to securitize the Contiguous Zone, meaning that they extend claims of sovereignty that 
apply only to the Territorial Sea to this outer region also.  Many Asian states attempt to securitize 
these Contiguous Zones, and 21 coastal states world wide currently impose some kind of 
unlawful restriction on activities in their Contiguous Zone.  Thus, in these areas, NSDD-72 and 
later documents authorize the Navy to operate according to doctrine and standard operating 
procedures, and the rest of the bureaucracy defers to the Navy’s organizational expertise to 
determine when and how to conduct these missions.261 
All other situations require review and approval.  NSDD-72 requires the Department of 
Defense to “submit in advance to the Department of State and the Assistant to the President for 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
260 Ibid., 2. 
 
261 Halperin, Clapp, and Kanter, Bureaucratic Politics and Foreign Policy, 151–155. 
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National Security Affairs a proposed schedule for asserting U.S. rights” against prior permission 
claims in for attention to “politically sensitive areas,” NSDD-72 tasks the Department of State 
with advising the Department of Defense when operations may be politically inadvisable for a 
limited time.  The National Security Advisor may also determine that assertions are no longer 
required against excessive claims “after a reasonable number of assertions” have been 
conducted. 
These articulated guidelines for the Freedom of Navigation program lead one to expect 
that the U.S. Navy will exercise liberally navigational freedom at will in the Strait of Hormuz 
without the need for much coordination with other organizations.  In the South China Sea, 
however, some interdepartmental review and coordination are necessary before exercising 
freedom of navigation against the claims of China and Vietnam.  The remainder of this chapter 
takes a closer look at the cases of Iran and Oman and the pattern of activity by the United States. 
6.3 Case Selection 
The cases selected for this chapter enable the study of the two variables which the 
quantitative analysis finds are most significant—nuclear weapons and existence of Fleet HQs.  
The nuclear variable and the democracy variable are constant across this pair of cases, as neither 
state possesses nuclear weapons during this period and both states remain non-democratic for the 
entire period (although Iran experienced intermittent periods of liberalization).  Variation occurs 
on the level of diplomatic representation as the United States had normal diplomatic relations 
with Oman, but no formal diplomatic ties with Iran during the period.  If diplomatic 
representation were to have a significant effect, this case selection should highlight it. In terms of 
military organization, both Iran and Oman fall within the same geographic region of organization 
for the United States military.  But this organization varies over the period of the case and offers 
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analytical opportunity for two reasons.  First, the formal establishment of U.S. Central Command 
occurs in 1983, which offers variation on an important organizational factor.  Moreover, the 
relationships between U.S. Central Command, and the maritime component responsible for 
action in the maritime theater also vary during this period.  Together, these changes provide an 
opportunity to understand to what extent freedom of navigation activities change due to these 
organizational factors.  If these particular factors have a meaningful impact, then we should 
expect to see both Iran and Oman affected by them; otherwise, some other explanation may be 
more salient. 
In these cases, nuclear powers do not provoke more or fewer assertions.  Democracies or 
democratization efforts do not appear to increase or decrease the likelihood of operational 
assertions.262  The presence or absence of formal diplomatic representation does not appear to 
factor strongly either.  The organizational alignment of fleet headquarters, their geographic 
combatant commands, and the higher coordination between agencies demonstrate an important 
effect across the cases.  
This chapter proceeds in three movements. First, I provide an overview of the importance 
of the Strait of Hormuz.  Second, I examine the United States’ operational behavior under the 
Freedom of Navigation program that presents a puzzle. Third, I consider variables from each of 
the three models outlined in Chapter 2, and then expand the Organizational variable. Finally, the 
chapter concludes with a return to the strategic context of the Strait of Hormuz and its place in 
the greater worldwide struggle for power between the United States and the Soviet Union.  
Pairing contiguous states offers offer analytical power through controlled comparison and by 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
262 In 2013, the United States disputed the claims of 40 coastal states coded as democracy. During the period 1979-
2013, the US Navy conducted FONOPS against 28 of 40. 
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doubling the set of cases.263  The paired selection assumes that ships available for FON 
operations against one coastal state are available for operations against its contiguous neighbor. 
These case selection selections also recognize the variation in legal claims disputed by the 
United States and the possibility that some claims are of higher priority than others. 
6.4 Disputed Claims in International Straits: Iran-Oman 
The Strait of Hormuz divides Iran and Oman—by 21 miles at its narrowest point as it 
connects the Gulf of Oman and the North Arabian Sea with the Persian Gulf. The Strait of 
Hormuz is the most vital of the maritime shipping routes.  Throughout the period from 1979 to 
2013, the secure transit of energy resources out of the Persian Gulf region has been a constant 
imperative, not only for the United States, but also for the rest of the industrialized world.  
According to the U.S. Energy Information Administration, the Strait of Hormuz is the world’s 
most important chokepoint.  Each day, approximately 17 million barrels of oil flow through the 
Strait of Hormuz (equivalent to 30% of all seaborne-traded oil).  The energy resources seem to 
dominate the American mind as the primary vital interest of the United States, however, in 
reality 85% of the crude oil that moves through the Strait of Hormuz is bound for Asia markets, 
especially Japan, India, South Korea, and China.264  This evidence suggests that American efforts 
may be more altruistic than many would first think.  This volume of oil and its transit locations 
are depicted in the graphics below (Figures 1, 2). The Strait of Hormuz is a case where national 
interests of the United States—preservation of a liberal order for international trade and the 
security interests—are at stake.   
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
263 Stephen Van Evera, Guide to Methods for Students of Political Science (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 
1997), 56–58. 
 
264 “World Oil Transit Chokepoints” (U.S. Energy Information Administration, November 10, 2014), 
http://www.eia.gov/beta/international/analysis_includes/special_topics/World_Oil_Transit_Chokepoints/wotc.pdf. 
	  









American leaders in the 1970s anticipated a growing interest in the Indian Ocean region, and the 
Persian Gulf area more specifically.  Declassified documents from the Nixon administration 
clearly articulate energy interests not only as the primary interest in the Indian Ocean region, but 
the only vital national interests in the area at the time.  Over the course of the next three decades, 
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however, the direct military activity of the United States increased in the region: the Fall of the 
Shah and the Iranian hostage crisis, Praying Mantis and the Tanker Wars, Desert Storm, 
Southern Watch and period of Iraqi containment, and the 2003 Iraq War represent just a handful 
of the flashpoints which required American attention and resources.  Nevertheless, the purpose 
of the engagement remained primarily about unfettered access to energy resources, the 
maintenance of a Westphalian system and defense of state sovereignty, and defense of a free 
international strait for the movement of oil that our allies and we depend upon. 
Indeed, upon the outbreak of the Iran-Iraq War in 1980, freedom of navigation and the 
unimpeded flow of resources from the Persian Gulf was the top strategic priority for the United 
States in the region.  Secretary of State Muskie advised President Carter in 1980 (emphasis 
mine):  
With regard to the sea lanes in the Persian Gulf and elsewhere, our only concern 
was that they be left open. In the first days of the war we were concerned that the 
Iranians were going to seek to ‘regulate’ shipping in the Straits of Hormuz […]  If 
shipping and the flow of oil were to be seriously disrupted, our vital interests 
would be so seriously affected that we would need to consider what steps to take 
[…] The Iranians have stated that they too want to protect the open sea lanes; in 
fact much of their normal shipping flows through the Persian Gulf. Nonetheless, 
we continued to discuss possible options that would be available to us because of 
the serious consequences of a disruption of shipping.265 
 
For the Carter Administration, even in the early days after the 1979 Iranian Revolution and 
the hostage crisis, the policy was not “to take sides in the conflict and that it was important that 
we not be perceived by either of the combatants to be taking sides.”266  The Reagan 
administration echoed this imperative two years later in specific policy terms.  The formulation 
of the Freedom of Navigation program, created in 1979 and articulated in National Security 
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Decision Directive Number 72 (13 December 1982) frees the Navy to assert navigation freedoms 
liberally in international straits.  This document requires coordination with the State Department 
and approval from the Assistant to the President of National Security Affairs before conducting 
most Freedom of Navigation operations “to ensure that the execution of the program gives 
appropriate consideration to the possibility of damage to bilateral or other relations” (NSDD-72).  
International straits, however, are exempt from this requirement: “International straits will be 
used by both naval ships and aircraft freely and frequently as directed by the Department of 
Defense” (NSDD-72).  Empirical evidence shows that the United States has indeed exercised its 
navigational freedoms routinely.  In fact, annual reports on the Freedom of Navigation program 
reflect the implementation of this guidance.  For instance, the DOD 1998 Annual Report to the 
President and the Congress states (emphasis below is mine): 
In FY 1998, U.S. armed forces conducted operational assertions challenging the 
excessive maritime claims listed in the accompanying table. In addition, military 
vessels and aircraft frequently conducted routine transits through international 
straits, such as the Straits of Gibraltar, Hormuz, and Malacca. Air and surface 
units also transited the Indonesian Archipelago in archipelagic sea lanes passage 
on 20 occasions and transited the Philippine Archipelago by exercising high seas 
freedoms, transit passage, and innocent passage, as applicable, on 32 occasions.  
Combined with robust and highly visible routine operations by U.S. forces on, 
over, and under the world's oceans, and scrupulous adherence by the United 
States to the navigational provisions of the UN Law of the Sea Convention, 
Freedom of Navigation operations have continued to underscore the U.S. 
commitment to a stable legal regime for the world's oceans (Appendix I-1).267 
 
Thus, given the American presence in the region and the strategic importance placed on the Strait 
of Hormuz, one expects the United States to conduct assertions often and consistently against 
both Iran and Oman who border either side of the strait. 
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6.4.1 Dependent Variables: Diplomatic Protests and Operational Assertions 
The United States has been relatively active in demonstrating its refusal to acquiesce to 
the maritime claims of Iran and Oman.  Compared to other coastal states whose maritime claims 
the United States disputes, Iran and Oman are among the most frequently challenged states.  
Since 1979, the United States has conducted operational assertions to demonstrate its refusal to 
acquiesce to the claims of Oman in 31 of 34 years.  Only Philippines has received more 
operational assertions from the United States.   Iran has received operational assertions with the 





At first glance, there appears to be little difference in the United States’ approach to these two 
coastal states.  Upon closer inspection, however, the variation in the behavior of the United 
States raises questions, especially given the similarity of Iranian and Omani maritime legal 
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the same current area of responsibility for U.S. Central Command, the geographic combatant 
command responsible for that region of the world.  Additionally, both Iran and Oman are 
assigned to the naval component commander, NAVCENT responsible for naval activities in this 
region.268  So, why is the number of operational assertions not identical?  What accounts for the 
variation in these two seemingly identically situated states?  The United States advertises a 
universal commitment to freedom of the seas, and perhaps more than any other place in the 
world this universal commitment could be manifest, so this inconsistency in behavior is 
puzzling. 
During the period 1979 to 2013, the United States issued diplomatic protests against the 
maritime claims of Iran in three years (1983, 1987, and 1994) and against the maritime claims of 
Oman in one year (1991).269   More often than not, each of the United States’ diplomatic 
communiqués responded to legal/diplomatic actions by the respective coastal states.  In 
December, 1982 Iran appended its signature of UNCLOS with a declaration of Iran’s unlawful 
requirement for notification by warships prior to exercise of innocent passage through the 
territorial sea and which a condition for extending the rights of the UNCLOS treaty only to its 
signatories.  The United States responded in 1983 with a diplomatic protest.  Later when Iran 
updated its maritime claims in May 1993 with the Act of the Marine Areas of the Islamic 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
268 The Maritime Component Commander for U.S. Central Command is Commander, Naval Forces Central 
Command (NAVCENT).  This three-star admiral is dual-hatted as Commander, U.S. Fifth Fleet. This dual 
distinction reflects his responsibilities as a commander of operational forces (NAVCENT) and his responsibilities 
for readiness and availability of forces in a geographically assigned region (Fifth Fleet). 
 
269 I observe a discrepancy in sources on diplomatic protests for Iran.  The Digest of United States Practice in 
International Law, 1991-1999 includes only one diplomatic protest against the maritime claims of Iran.  It refers to a 
diplomatic note dated January 11, 1994 in which “the United States objected to Iranian legislative provisions 
inconsistent with these requirements and to a requirement for prior authorizations.”  There is a non-specified 
reference, however, listed in the Maritime Claims Reference Manual published by the Judge Advocate General of 
the U.S. Navy on behalf of the Department of Defense, to a diplomatic protests issued against Iran in CY1993 and 
CY1994.  Due to lack of corroborating information, the dataset includes only CY1994 record. 
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Republic of Iran, the United States responded with a diplomatic note in 1994.270  In August 1991, 
the United States sent a diplomatic note to Oman to protest the unlawful requirement for prior 
notification of innocent passage that Oman articulated in its ratification of UNCLOS. 
The significance of these diplomatic protests lies in their rarity, their responsiveness, and 
the United States’ choice of medium for communicating its dispute.  First, compared to the 
assertions that occur annually, the diplomatic protests are rare events.  Second, in a sort of tit-for-
tat response pattern, each time the disputant updated its maritime claims or deposited a 
declaration at the United Nations, the chosen response of the United States was diplomatic.  As 
such, these protests are responsive to the legal actions of the coastal state, but they reveal a sort 
of “grooved thinking” which produces a routine response to a single perceived change.271  This 
type of response may represent the complexity of the situation facing American diplomats, such 
that they decompose the complex problem into manageable parts and respond to one facet of the 
problem in a preprogrammed way.272  Alternatively, this type of response may reveal simply a 
discrete channeling of communication to reduce ambiguity of signals.273  Thus, messages 
received via one medium will be responded to in the same medium—legal responses to legal 
actions—to ensure clarity of communication and to prevent misperception. 
The pattern of activity for operational assertions is strikingly different.  The United States 
has acted consistently against the maritime claims of Oman – conducting operational assertions 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
270 The text of the Iranian claim and the American analysis claim are available in the following sources: “Act on the 
Marine Areas of the Islamic Republic of Iran in the Persian Gulf and the Oman Sea, 1993” (United Nations 
(DOALOS/OLA), May 1993), http://www.un.org/Depts/los/LEGISLATIONANDTREATIES/ PDFFILES/ 
IRN_1993_Act.pdf; J. Ashley Roach, John T. Oliver, and Robert W. Smith, “Limits in the Seas, No. 114: Iran’s 
Maritime Claims” (Department of State, Bureau of Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs, 
March 16, 1994). 
 
271 Halperin, Clapp, and Kanter, Bureaucratic Politics and Foreign Policy, 22–23. 
 
272 Halperin, Clapp, and Kanter, Bureaucratic Politics and Foreign Policy. 
 
273 Jervis, The Logic of Images in International Relations. 
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annually since 1983 without exception, and in the case of Iran since 1989.  This activity is 




6.4.2 Independent Variables: Explaining the Variation in Operational Assertions 
The quantitative analysis from the preceding chapter suggests three variables for 
explaining the variation in operational assertions.  First, nuclear weapons, which tend to increase 
the likelihood of an operational assertion, do not factor in this case.  Neither Iran nor Oman 
possesses nuclear weapons during this period. Other variables within the security model which 
proxy for state power, such as military expenditure and GDP, are not statistically or substantively 
significant in the quantitative study, and they are not particularly relevant in this qualitative study 
either because they are relatively the same for each state.275  Both states rank in the top 50th 
percentile of states by Gross Domestic Product drawn from the World Bank national accounts 
data and OECD national accounts data files.276 Additionally, the annual military spending 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
274 The cells containing years are coded by color to denote legal disputes.  The cell receives a pink tinting if the 
United States has an active dispute over maritime claims.  In the year when the coastal state issues new legal decree 
to updates or adds dispute provisions, the year tinting appears red.  Two rows appear below to represent two 
categories of response from the United States: diplomatic protests and operational assertions.  A blue tint is applied 
to the years in which the United States conducts one of these measures (no annotations for multiple protests or 
assertions in a given year). 
 
275 Although Iran and Oman fall within the top 50th percentile for military spending, Iran’s development of an 
asymmetric naval ability to threaten to deny access to its coastal sea has been cause for much American concern.  
Relatively low-cost weapons such as naval mines and anti-ship cruise missiles, and fast attack craft have provided 
Iran’s naval forces a formidable capability that present a greater threat than Oman.  
 
276 Iran’s GDP lists in the top 25th percentile worldwide and outpaces the Omani GDP over the entire time period by 
an average of $8-10 billion annually (in 2011 constant currency). 
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(expenditure in total dollars) of Iran and Oman ranks in the top 50th percentile of all states.277 
Second, the quantitative analysis shows that an institutionalized democratic form of 
government tends to decrease the likelihood of an operational assertion, but both Iran and Oman 
are autocratic governments.  Iran does experience a brief period of relative liberalization of its 
autocratic government between 1997 and 2005, but this does not forestall the operational 
assertions by the United States in Iranian Waters (Figure 5).  In terms of the caveats of NSDD-72 
and subsequent policy documents—PSD-32 was in force during the brief periods of political 
liberalization—there were no “transient political events” that were considered so sensitive by 







In terms of other variables within the Liberalism Model, both Iran and Oman make nearly 
identical types of maritime claims.  The claims of both Iran and Oman seek to limit passage 
through the Strait of Hormuz to the regime of innocent passage, rather than transit passage.  
Also, each state makes straight baseline claims that the United States disputes (depicted below in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
277 Iran’s military spending outpaces Oman’s spending by $2-10 billion annually over the course of the study.  
However, Oman’s military spending exceeded Iran’s in 2011 and 2012. 
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Figure 6).278  Oman draws four distinct areas with straight lines, and Iran traces straight lines 
along its entire coastline, both in the Persian Gulf, in the Strait of Hormuz, and out into the North 




The maritime claims of Iran and Oman differ in one respect:  Article 16 of Iran’s 1993 Act of the 
Marine Areas of the Islamic Republic of Iran prohibits “foreign military activities and practices 
in the EEZ.”279  This is a sweeping, restrictive claim; Oman makes no similar claim.  
Furthermore, Iran submitted a declaration to the United Nations upon the event of its signature of 
the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, stating that the privileges of the convention were of a 
quid pro quo – not of customary law – and shall be entitled to “only states parties to the Law of 
the Sea Convention.”280  Thus, in expectation, Iran’s EEZ claim appears more likely to prompt 
protests and assertions from the United States than do the maritime claims of Oman after 1982 
and certainly after 1993 when its EEZ claim went into effect..  Nevertheless, this difference 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
278 “Maritime Claims Reference Manual.” 
 
279 “Act on the Marine Areas of the Islamic Republic of Iran in the Persian Gulf and the Oman Sea, 1993.” 
 
280 “Islamic Republic of Iran: Interpretative Declaration on the Subject of Straits” (United Nations, December 10, 
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cannot explain why the United States asserts freedom of navigation against Omani claims prior 
to 1989 but not Iranian claims.   
Finally, within the Organization model, only one variable emerges from the quantitative 
analysis as having significance—existence of an operational fleet headquarters.  Regardless of 
the number of warships available in the Navy, a fleet headquarters constitutes the institutional 
capacity for planning of operations and the communication and coordination with other entities, 
whether other joint forces, allied forces, or government agencies.  Although diplomatic 
representation seems intuitively important in sensitive matters such as when diplomatic protests 
or driving warships are options, the existence of a diplomatic exchange does not have statistical 
significance nor does it appear to factor in this case either.  Over the period from 1979-2013, the 
United States has maintained an uninterrupted, formal diplomatic relationship with Oman but not 
with Iran.  The United States initiated formal diplomatic relations in April 1972 and established 
its embassy in Muscat in July 1972. The first resident Ambassador to Oman, William D. Wolle, 
presented his credentials to the Sultanate in July 1974 and an Ambassador (Envoy Extraordinary 
and Minister Plenipotentiary) has served in residence continuously since then.281  By contrast the 
United States terminated its official diplomatic relationship with Iran on 7 April 1980 after the 
seizure of the American Embassy and hostages in Tehran in November 1979.282 Since the formal 
severing of diplomatic communications, Switzerland has served as an interlocutor on behalf of 
the United States to Iran and the Embassy of Pakistan in Washington D.C. represents the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
281 “A Guide to the United States’ History of Recognition, Diplomatic, and Consular Relations, by Country Since 
1776: Oman” (Office of the Historian, Department of State, n.d.), http://history.state.gov/countries/oman. 
 
282 “A Guide to the United States’ History of Recognition, Diplomatic, and Consular Relations, by Country, Since 
1776: Iran” (Office of the Historian, Department of State, n.d.), http://history.state.gov/countries/iran. 
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interests of Iran.283  Given the consistency of American assertions since 1989, the variation in 
diplomatic status has no demonstrable effect on observed activity.  But the absence of diplomatic 
relations with Iran during the period 1979-1989 may account partially for the lack of American 
activity against Iran during those years.  This consideration receives more attention later in the 
chapter. 
The existence of a naval headquarters appears to have significance, and in this case the 
command-and-control relationships bear mentioning because they are the organizations within 
which three important functions occur.  First, the fleet headquarters is the primary location for 
horizontal coordination with other joint forces and vertical coordination with higher political and 
military agencies for sensitive operations.  Second, the fleet headquarters generates, adapts, or 
approves of standard operating procedures for units operating in its area of responsibility.  Third, 
the fleet headquarters is the primary location for the initial planning of Freedom of Navigation 
operations.  This is where staff officers review the status of maritime claims by coastal states in 
their area of responsibility, consider the recent history of assertions against these disputants, and 
nominate countries for action in the subsequent year.  These nominations receive at least two 
levels of scrutiny and coordination.  First, the fleet commander must prioritize the many 
competing operational tasks and apportion limited resources to accomplish those missions of 
highest priority first.  Second, the fleet commander must submit for review by the State 
Department any nominations designated politically sensitive areas.  The binary coding for the 
existence of a fleet headquarters in the dataset, however, fails to capture this level of detail, and 
so the qualitative analysis permits a closer examination of the significance of this variable. 
So why do the operational assertions begin in 1983 for Oman, but not for Iran?   The 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
283 Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs, Department Of State, “U.S. Relations With Iran,” Press Release|Fact Sheet, US 
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United States Central Command (CENTCOM) was established on January 1, 1983, and since 
then Oman and Iran have been located within the boundaries of the area of responsibility (AOR) 
assigned to CENTCOM.284  Thus, it is not surprising that operational assertions against Oman 
begin in 1983.285  Secondly, NSDD-72, which provided the necessary detailed guidance to 
implement the Freedom of Navigation program, was signed in December 1983.   Third, both 
states signed the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea by 1983—each maintaining unlawful 
claims that conflicted with the treaty.  Iran immediately signed the treaty in December 1982 with 
a declaration that “only parties to the Convention shall be entitled to benefit from the contractual 
rights created therein,” and Iran claimed to limit transit passage right in Strait of Hormuz to 
signatories of 1982 Convention.  Oman signed the treaty in July 1983, but maintained Omani 
Royal Decree No. 15/81, restricting ships to innocent passage, rather than transit passage through 
the international strait.286 All else equal, one would expect assertions to begin in 1983 for both 
Iran and Oman (if not sooner for Oman).  The reason for the variation lies in the politics within 
and between the organizations tasked with executing the Freedom of Navigation program 
One factor related to the command-and-control of naval assets.  During the period in 
question, the fleet commander supporting the CENTCOM commander has changed, and until 
1989 the organizational lines for commanding naval forces were messy. The U.S. Navy’s 
headquarters in Bahrain has directed operations in the Persian Gulf since the early 1971, when 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
284 This change was the sixth revision to the 1975 Unified Command Plan, for more detail see Drea et al., The 
History of the Unified Command Plan, 1946-2012, 39–42, 44–47. 
 
285 Prior to the formal establishment of CENTCOM in 1983, Iran and Oman fell under the purview of Commander, 
Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force (RDJTF), which held responsibility for planning and operations in the Middle 
East and Africa as a subordinate element of United States Readiness Command (USREDCOM).  However RDJTF 
did not have Combatant Command of forces. 
 
286 “Royal Decree Concerning the Territorial Sea, Continental Shelf and Exclusive Economic Zone” (United Nations 
(DOALOS/OLA), February 1981), http://www.un.org/Depts/los/LEGISLATIONANDTREATIES/ 
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the Royal Navy ended its defense commitments “east of Suez” and withdrew its forces from the 
Persian Gulf.287  But even as the U.S. Navy matured its organizational capacity for action over 
the next decade, it experienced tension with other commands in charge of adjacent locations.  In 
1983, concurrent with the establishment of CENTCOM, the maritime component commander for 
CENTCOM, known as NAVCENT assumed the operational responsibilities for the Fifth Fleet 
area of operations in the Persian Gulf and the Red Sea.  But the southerly waters of the Gulf of 
Oman, Gulf of Aden, and North Arabian Sea remained assigned to United States Pacific 
Command (PACOM) along with the remainder of the Indian Ocean, which had been assigned to 
PACOM on 1 May 1976.288  According to the history of Fifth Fleet, “On 30 December 1983, the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) directed CINCCENT to coordinate with Commander in Chief, Pacific 
Command (CINCPAC) for contingency plans to integrate the Middle East Force into Pacific 
Command’s Indian Ocean battle force, Task Force 70, during certain crises.  To make matters 
even more confusing, for the rest of the 1980s, the Middle East Force flagship remained home-
ported in Bahrain, while COMUSNAVCENT headquarters stood in Pearl Harbor, Hawaii.”289  
This organizational tension reflected a service-level competition between the U.S. Army 
and Navy over which of the two services would command naval forces at sea or control forces in 
the vast Indian Ocean region.290  The establishment of CENTCOM, a predominantly land-centric 
theater, led to concerns by naval leaders in PACOM, a predominantly maritime theater, about 
whether anyone but a naval officer possessed the technical knowledge or experience to command 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
287 Robert J Schneller, Jr, Anchor of Resolve: A History of U.S. Naval Forces Central Command/Fifth Fleet 
(Washington: Naval Historical Center, 2007), 7–9, http://www.history.navy.mil/content/dam/nhhc/browse-by-
topic/War%20and%20Conflict/operation-praying-mantis/AnchorOfResolve.pdf. 
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naval vessels.  
The Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986 responded to this growing tension focused on ships 
operating in the Western Indian Ocean areas.  Goldwater-Nichols called attention to the 
geographic boundaries of the combatant commanders and directed a “revision of geographic 
area[s] for which the United States Central Command has responsibility so as to include the 
ocean areas adjacent to Southwest Asia.”291  Until 1989, two different organizations of the 
United States military divided the responsibilities for operational forces in this region.  With the 
creation of Central Command (CENTCOM) in 1983, most of the area of responsibility was 
consolidated, and both Oman and Iran were included in the new organization.  But the land and 
the water remained divided.  The waters of the Persian Gulf belonged to CENTCOM and 
everything outside the Persian Gulf  (including the Gulf of Oman, North Arabian Sea, etc.) was 
assigned to Pacific Command.  This organizational division reflected a service-level tension 
between the Army and the Navy.  CENTCOM, a land-oriented theater, had been commanded by 
an Army officer, while PACOM, comprised of a maritime-centric area of responsibility spanning 
51% of the globe, had traditionally been led by a naval officer.  Admirals in Hawai’i were loath 
to let Generals command-and-control warships in the Gulf of Oman.  This battle between the 
Army and the Navy – or CENTCOM and PACOM was not resolved until 1989.  
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In 1989, CENTCOM gained responsibility for the waters north of 5 deg N latitude and west of 
068 deg E, while PACOM retained authority over U.S. forces operating in the remainder of the 
Indian Ocean region.  This division has persisted until today and is represented in Figure 7 
(above).  
This organizational tension offers the clearest and most parsimonious explanation for this 
puzzling variation between Iranian and Omani assertions during the 1979-2013.  But naval 
officers with experience transiting the Strait of Hormuz know the traffic separation scheme is the 
same for all large surface vessels to enter and exit the Persian Gulf.  All ships have been required 
to traverse the published traffic separation scheme as part of the COLREGS updated in 1979.292  
This traffic separation scheme has two parts:  ships transiting inbound to the Gulf will pass first 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
292 “Traffic Separation Schemes” (Inter-Governmental Maritime Consultative Organization, February 2, 1978), 
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through the portion of the international strait in Omani waters, then through the portion of the 
international strait in Iranian waters.  Thus, a ship transiting the Strait of Hormuz is going to 




Thus, it remains a puzzle why the United States asserts against Oman and not Iran—
especially given the proverbial carte blanche by NSDD-72 in 1983 as discussed earlier.  
Moreover, the Reagan administration reiterated this guidance in 1987 with NSDD-265 (16 Mar 
1987), which offered program guidance to the Department of Defense stating, “International 
straits and archipelagic sea lanes will be used by both military ships and aircraft freely and 
frequently as directed by the Department of Defense.”   
Solving this puzzle demands consideration of the United States’ sensitivity to the ongoing 
conflict between Iran and Iraq.   Having begun in 1980, the Iran-Iraq War reached a level of 
international concern such that it prompted the United Nations Security Council Resolution 540 
(1983).  This resolution, adopted by a vote of 12 votes to none, provided the context for an 
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explanation of American restraint from conducting assertions against Iran in the years 1983-
1988.   
UNSCR 540 Article 3 “affirms the right of free navigation and commerce in international 
waters,” and calls attention to “sea-lanes and navigable waterways.”  However, Article 6 calls on 
“all other states to exercise the utmost restraint and to refrain from any act which may lead to a 
further escalation and widening of the conflict.”  This call for restraint explains why the United 
States may have refrained from Freedom of Navigation Operations.  The UN called further 
international attention to the importance of freedom of navigation less than next year later with 
UNSCR 552 (1984).  In the immediate aftermath of Iranian attacks on Iraqi tankers, the United 
Nations Security Council issued another resolution calling upon all states “to respect in 
accordance with international law the right of free navigation and which reaffirmed the right of 
free navigation in international waters and sea lanes for shipping en route to and from all ports 
and installations” (UNSCR 552, 1 Jun 1984).  
This context raises questions about why the United States may have abstained from 
conducting operational assertions to contest legal claims, but instead took the more involved and 
escalated measure of reflagging 11 Kuwaiti tankers and escorting them through the Strait of 
Hormuz during Operation Earnest Will in 1987.  The reflagging and escort missions were seen 
widely as a break with neutrality and an unpersuasive use of “freedom of navigation” as an 
excuse to intervene in the conflict under a false pretense.293  Indeed, as early as 1981, Iraq had 
begun attacking Iranian commercial ships, and yet the UN Security Council did not address these 
attacks.  Iran’s first attacks on shipping occurred in 1984 when it attacked 18 ships, but by that 
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time, Iraq had already attacked 43 ships.294  In 1982, two resolutions, UNSCR 514 and 522, were 
silent on issues such as maritime attacks or freedom of navigation as was the 1980 resolution on 
the Iran-Iraq War.  The number of attacks in shipping in 1986 (111) more than doubled the 1985 
totals (47) and they increased again in 1987 to 179.295  Moreover, the threat to U.S. warships 
increased with the 1986 shipment of Chinese Silkworm anti-ship missiles to Iran and the May 
1987 attack on USS Stark by an Iraqi F-1 with a French Exocet missile. 296  
By 1987, President Reagan refreshed his guidance on Freedom of Navigation, issuing 
National Security Decision Directive 265 (NSDD 265), which amplified the existing policy.  It 
would be implemented for the first time against Iran in 1989, but not until the Iran-Iraq War had 
concluded.  In the meantime, aggressive naval support was provided to ensure safe transit of oil 
tankers and to provide certainty in the energy markets and insurance rates at Lloyds of London.  
Thus, the use of the Freedom of Navigation program after the war appears to be about 
maintaining American naval presence under the justification of international law for the purposes 
of deterring aggression and assuring allies and regional partners.  This justification reflects the 
U.S. Navy’s earlier operations including the first time it sailed an aircraft carrier into the Persian 
Gulf. 
6.4.3  Past as Prologue: Balance of Power or Organization? 
According to Jack Anderson in the New York Times, Kissinger had visited Tehran 
“prepared to treat the Shah as a military ally and protector of U.S. interests in the Gulf.  
Kissinger [was] counting heavily upon the Shah’s goodwill to lower oil prices.”  Since October 
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1973, the price of oil had quadrupled.  Henry Kissinger concluded talks with the Shah of Iran on 
1 November 1974, securing an agreement to lower oil prices by 20 to 25%.297 The U.S. Navy’s 
MIDLINK 74 operations were likely offered as a security concession in exchange for lower oil 
prices.  
In the case of 1974, the transit of an aircraft carrier into the Persian Gulf at the Strait of 
Hormuz appears to be less about the legal assertion of freedom of navigation.  There is no 
indication that the transit of a naval vessel constituted an ostensible refusal to acquiesce to 
Iranian maritime claims.  Rather, USS Constellation performed a show of naval presence as an 
outward sign of American military commitment to Iran, an ally who assessed the Soviet Navy to 
be the major threat to the Persian Gulf.298  The presence of the United States Navy was intended 
as a signal of credible strength to the Soviet Union on its southern flank.  Moreover, this kind of 
periodic presence represented a necessary supplement to bolster the otherwise symbolic force 
stationed at MIDEASTFOR headquarters in Bahrain, consisting of “a converted seaplane tender 
flagship and two destroyer-type vessels.”299  
According to a Memorandum from Secretary of State Kissinger to President Nixon that 
conveyed the perspectives of Ambassador Helms, “The Shah secretly urged the sheikh of 
Bahrain to permit the U.S. to continue our naval presence (MIDEASTFOR) at Bahrain, as a 
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counter to increasing Soviet naval activity.  […] The Soviet Union has increased its naval 
activity in the Indian Ocean. The Soviets signed a Treaty of Friendship with Somalia, providing 
Somalia with tanks and MiG–21 aircraft in exchange for a 10,000-foot airstrip which can be used 
by Soviet aircraft for reconnaissance over the Indian Ocean.”300  Earlier in the summer of (July) 
1974, the U.S. Ambassador discussed the future of United States military presence in the Persian 
Gulf, specifically with regard to the MIDEASTFOR establishment in Bahrain.  During those 
talks, Bahraini Court Minister Alam asserted “it would be ‘terrible’ for United States Navy to 
leave Persian Gulf at time when Soviets were augmenting their presence and activities.301  
However, despite these security concerns, a 1971 National Intelligence Estimate on the Persian 
Gulf after the British departure assessed that the “main United States interest in the Gulf resides 
in assuring the unimpeded flow of oil from the region to consuming countries.”302  Interdiction of 
the Strait of Hormuz with the intent to prevent passage was less a concern to the United States 
Navy.  This natural chokepoint was sufficiently wide and deep that even the deliberate sinking 
multiple tankers would not inexorably impede the flow of commercial oil tanker traffic in and 
out of the Persian Gulf.  The more concerning vulnerability raised by the study was the overall 
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political stability in the region, according to Navy studies from the period.303  These concerns 
about obstruction of the international strait persist for decades.304 
Ultimately, international straits are the corridors of economic trade.  The volume of 
commercial traffic flowing through international straits is massive.  Additionally, international 
straits are the pathways for the projection of American power around the world.  Through the 
straits transits American military power – not only conventional military forces, but also nuclear 
ballistic missile submarines which are the survivable leg of the nuclear triad.  The United States 
motivation to maintain open international straits reflects an interest in providing a global public 
good—underwriting a global system of trade that benefits all participants.  This is a liberally 
motivated interest in maintaining the economic order of the world.  However, American 
motivations are not altruistic.  Of course, the United States derives great private benefit from this 
order due to its large participation but other states do as well.  
After the 1973 oil crisis, the United States updated its assessment of the political and 
military situations in the Indian Ocean region.  National Security Memorandum (NSSM) 199 and 
subsequent reports found that American interests in the region were “not vital or extensive”-- 
save for the American “dependence on Middle East oil.”   However, the operational implications 
assessment led to interagency tensions that persist today.  These tensions stemmed from two 
conditions. 
On one hand, economic and political threats dominated the attention of the analysts who 
saw energy prices and threat of embargo as the most acute challenges to national security.  
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Malign Soviet military intentions paled before this overarching concern.  Moreover, analysts 
believed the naval force posture in the Indian Ocean could do little to influence access to 
petroleum.   
On the other hand, two military conditions warranted some measure of caution.  First, if 
the Soviets were to achieve a predominant position in the Indian Ocean region, then energy 
security may be threatened, but such a situation was viewed as unlikely.  Second, the Soviets 
could seize upon the “indisputably vulnerable” tanker routes from the Persian Gulf or sea lines of 
communication through the Indian Ocean, but these possibilities were also deemed “highly 
unlikely” – as the Soviet Union would have to accept a high risk of escalation locally and more 
broadly.305  The crux of the dispute was whether a regional military presence was necessary to 
deter these Soviet threats. 
Soviet Navy Commander Admiral Sergei Gorshkov’s writings had articulated “a new, 
activist naval policy in pursuit of global interests.”306  If left unchallenged, Soviet hegemony 
over the entire region seemed certain.  Thus, an increased conventional naval presence was seen 
as necessary because the existing nuclear deterrent was less than credible for these concerns that 
fell far below the top priority of national survival.  Thus, the United States sustained a naval 
posture in the Indian Ocean region to preserve access to the littorals and to ensure stability for 
commerce.  At first glance, this naval presence represented one line of effort in maintaining our 
visibility in the Arabian Sea area, while “also help[ing to] deter lesser threats to the sea routes, 
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e.g., from a small state or radical faction bent on exploiting the vulnerability of the tankers.”  But 
this naval presence addressed the more immediate  “challenges by the littorals.”307   
By the mid-1970s, the United States increasingly viewed its imperative in the Indian 
Ocean region to ensure access.  Primary challenges to its “right to navigate the Ocean” 
necessitated that the United States “maintain some force level to preserve our contingency 
access.”  The introduction of USS Constellation to the Persian Gulf in 1974 and the commitment 
to continued naval presence in the Indian Ocean region generally, and at Bahrain more 
specifically, performed double (or triple) duty.  Not only did this presence provide assurances to 
partners like the Shah, but also this force posture signaled American commitment to the Soviets 
while pursuing a lesser-included requirement of ensuring freedom of navigation in the region.308 
Multilateral exercises such as MIDLINK 74 accomplished this task in November of 1974 with 
the aircraft carrier, USS Constellation leading an eight-ship force from the United States 
participating in the Central Treaty Organization Exercise.   This exercise marked the largest 
naval exercise ever held in the Arabian Sea. Participating were forces from the United States, 
United Kingdom, Iran, Pakistan, and Turkey.309  
6.5 Conclusion 
A decade that had begun with a 1971 United Resolution to establish the “Indian Ocean as 
a Zone of Peace” and which called on great powers to halt expansion in and eliminate bases from 
the Indian Ocean region, had resulted in the opposite.  By the end of the decade, the strategic 
situation in the Indian Ocean region had shifted and the United States saw a need for a sustained 





309 Ship History: USS CONSTELLATION (CV 64), Navy History and Heritage Command, http://www.navy.mil/ 
navydata/ships/carriers/histories/cv64-constellation/cv64-constellation.html 
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military presence. The Soviets had sponsored Cuban proxies in Ethiopia, engineered a coup in 
Afghanistan, and had increased their influence in South Yemen (Aden). By the time of the 
overthrow of the Shah, the United States would not have a regional proxy to serve as a regional 
policeman to safeguard its interests.  The Iran-Iraq War in the 1980s only exacerbated this 
concern.  Moreover, the moderate Persian Gulf states criticized the United States for failing to 
take action to support the Shah and expressed their concern that the United States lacks the 
commitment and resolve to oppose Soviet inroads in the region.  
Thus, the Posen argument that balance of power politics may trump organizational 
politics seems to apply here.  The Security Model did not appear to offer much by way of 
explanation because it focused on Iran, but as the aperture opened to include the entire southern 
flank of the Soviet Union in the Persian Gulf region, the petty organizational politics shrank in 
comparison to the primary security concern of the United States.  This concern with balancing 
the Soviets also overshadows the importance of international trade flowing through the Strait of 
Hormuz.  In the following excerpt taken from President Reagan’s speech at the memorial service 
for the fallen crew of USS Stark, that strategic chokepoint through which the greatest volume of 
energy flows, became something more—it had become a chokepoint for freedom:  
Peace is at stake here, and so too is our own nation's security and our freedom. 
Were a hostile power ever to dominate this strategic region and its resources, it 
would become a chokepoint for freedom -- that of our allies and our own. And 
that's why we maintain a naval presence there.  Our aim is to prevent, not to 




	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
310 Ronald Reagan, “Remarks at a Memorial Service for Crewmembers of the U.S.S. Stark in Jacksonville, Florida,” 
May 22, 1987, http://www.reaganlibrary.gov/major-speeches-index/35-archives/speeches/1987/6861-052287a. 
	  
	   186 
CHAPTER 7.  WHITHER FREEDOM OF NAVIGATION?  DEFENDING LAW OR 
SIGNALING POWER 
 
“The defence of the status quo is not a policy which can be lastingly successful.  It will end in 
war as surely as rigid conservatism will end in revolution.  ‘Resistance to aggression,’ however 
necessary as a momentary device of national policy, is no solution; for readiness to fight to 
prevent change is just as unmoral as readiness to fight to enforce it.  To establish methods of 
peaceful change is therefore the fundamental problem of international morality and of 
international politics [...] Since the party which is able to bring most power to bear normally 
emerges successful from operations of peaceful change, we shall do our best to make ourselves 
as powerful as we can.”311 - E.H. Carr 
 “We cannot tolerate a situation where other nations and groups of nations establish conflicting 
claims that can only be settled by force […] We will have in 15 years a struggle like the 
competition for territory during the colonial period.”312 - Henry Kissinger  
 
7.1 Introduction 
The preceding case of Iran and Oman demonstrates the effect of organizational politics 
and their routine operations and standard operating procedures.  The consistency of operational 
assertions conducted by the United States against Oman during its routine transits of the Strait of 
Hormuz from 1983 to 2013 is perhaps the clearest example in the Freedom of Navigation 
program of organizational politics effecting outcomes.  With available forces and an operational 
headquarters to direct and coordinate activities, the U.S. Navy employed its expertise in 
accordance with policies and doctrine.  Similarly, the consistency of operations against the 
claims of Iran during the period from 1989 to 2013 conforms to the same explanation.  However 
the period from 1983 to 1988 in Iran highlights the importance of security concerns and balance 
of power politics affecting the decisions to use the navy.  During that five-year period, the 
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routine military operations delegated to the U.S. Navy and Department of Defense took a 
backseat to high politics during the Iran-Iraq war.  The example of Iran and Oman suggests 
conditions under which routine military operations may be restrained by higher political 
concerns.   
In this chapter, balance of power features prominently as a force that prompts rather than 
restrains freedom of navigation operations.  I argue that such instances of the Freedom of 
Navigation program, when routine military operations may seem to be less likely due to political 
sensitivities or transient political events, leaders may use operational assertions as a legal pretext 
for signaling American power.  One example of such signaling exists in the South China Sea 
where the United States in late 2015 conducted multiple assertions of its navigational freedom.  
These assertions ostensibly demonstrated the right to operate freely in the waters around Subi 
Reef, where China had created an artificial island atop a mostly submerged land formation.  This 
“low-tide elevation” is not entitled to a territorial sea, according to Article 60 of the United 
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea.  As an artificial island, the land formation receives 
only a 500m security perimeter.  The purpose of the transit was to demonstrate freedom of 
navigation. 
In October 2015, USS Lassen, an Arleigh Burke-class guided-missile destroyer, transited 
within 12 nautical miles of the artificial island in a freedom of navigation assertion that received 
a great amount of attention from the press.  This operation was notable for the following reasons.  
First, USS Lassen’s transit was not routine. It had been nearly two years since the U.S. Navy had 
conducted previous operational assertions against China, and never before had the United States 
sailed so close to this particular land formation.  Second, unlike the majority of other routine 
navigational assertions, this transit was forewarned by nearly two weeks.  The effect of such an 
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announcement was to put China on alert and to attract the attention of regional partners and 
allies, most of whom commented in the press about freedom of navigation.  Third, the United 
States does not provide prior notification for routine operational assertions.  The goal of 
assertions is to act deliberately non-confrontational.  More often than not, the coastal state is 
never aware that the U.S. Navy was there.  Perhaps in this case, the United States anticipated a 
Chinese response and sought to prevent misperception and miscalculation by the Chinese.  
Finally, this event was coordinated at the highest levels of government and received presidential 
authorization and public commentary.   In a strained public effort to appear routine, the freedom 
of navigation transit of the USS Lassen was perceived by many as a conspicuous attempt to 
respond to growing concerns about China’s territorialization of the South China Sea and its 
capability to deny the entire area to outsiders.  The concern looming was whether this dispute 
with a nuclear power over a matter of international would escalate into a larger crisis. 
 
FIGURE 7-1313 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
313 Figure 1 Source: Cheng Wee, Teo, “Bejing’s Restrained Response Won’t Make a Difference, Straits Times, 
October 28th, 2015, http://www.straitstimes.com/asia/beijings-restrained-response-wont-make-a-difference 
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In many ways, the non-routine, high-profile transit in near Chinese land formations in the 
South China Sea resembles transits against Soviet claims decades earlier.  On 12 February 1988, 
two warships of the United States Navy entered Soviet territorial waters southwest of the 
Crimean Peninsula in the Black Sea.  They were conducting Freedom of Navigation operations.  
The Soviet Union had established a claim to these territorial seas according to new provisions in 
the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea of 1982.  However, the United States did not dispute 
this claim to sovereignty.  Rather, the United States contested the Soviet Union’s limitation of 
navigation on foreign warships in Soviet territorial seas.314  The USS Caron and USS Yorktown, a 
Spruance-class destroyer and a Ticonderoga-class guided-missile cruiser, proceeded from 
international waters into Soviet territorial seas, then exited again.  Caron and Yorktown asserted 
their right to conduct innocent passage within 12 nautical miles of the Crimean coast.315  Soviets 
argued that the passage of the United States warships was not “innocent” because it was 
gratuitous; Caron and Yorktown could have proceeded through international waters; their 
passage was not necessary.  The United States conceded that the passage of Caron and Yorktown 
through Soviet territorial seas was not necessary, but it was legal.  In 1988 as today, the threat of 
escalation over matters of international law looms in the background.  At that point in the Cold 
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State Border and the 1983 Soviet Navigation Rules, which limited innocent passage of foreign warships to 
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315 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 1982. Part II, Section 3, “Innocent Passage in the Territorial 
Sea.”  According to UNCLOS, “Ships of all States […] enjoy the right of innocent passage through the territorial 
sea.  Passage means navigation through the territorial sea for the purpose of traversing […] or proceeding to or from 
internal waters.  Passage shall be continuous and expeditious […].  Passage is innocent so long as it is not 
prejudicial to the peace, good order, or security of the coast State.” 
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War, aggressive interactions at sea were nothing new.  Chicken games between military forces 
on routine deployments were common.   
Unlike, textbook chicken games in which collision is a dominated strategy for each 
player, the games in the Black Sea ended with in an infamous bumping (or shouldering) incident.  
When two Soviet ships intercepted Caron and Yorktown inside Soviet territorial waters, they 
escorted the transiting American warships and then accelerated deliberately into them causing a 
collision. In this case, the aggressive interactions did not spiral out of control.  These actions 
represent a sort of coda to dangerous interactions between the forces of the Soviet Union and 
United States throughout the Cold War.  In fact, this event led to a landmark, eight-point 
agreement signed at Jackson Hole, Wyoming by the United States and Soviet Union in 
September 1989.  The two states harmonized their positions on innocent passage with the 1982 
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea with their own “Uniform Interpretation of 
Rules of International Law Governing Innocent Passage” agreeing that warships enjoyed the 
right to traverse the territorial sea of another coastal state.  In this case, the threat of escalation 
did not come to fruition. 
	  




The threat of escalation concerns non-nuclear states as well, not just nuclear powers.  As 
discussed in Chapter 5, Iran sits astride the world’s most important strategic chokepoint for the 
flow of energy resources, and Iran has threatened to disrupt the traffic through the narrow 
corridor.  Each day, 17 million barrels of oil (35% of seaborne traded oil) passes through the 
Strait of Hormuz on tanker ships.317  For this reason, the fear of escalation is real.  A dispute over 
maritime legal claims may not lead to war, but it may disrupt the flow of strategic resources.  
Iran’s interpretative declaration on the subject of the strait, expressed upon signature of 
UNCLOS in 1982, claims the right to withhold passage through this international strait from any 
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Affairs, “Limits in the Seas: United States Responses to Excessive National Maritime Claims,” No. 112, March 9 
1992, http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/58381.pdf, p. 58. 
 
317 U.S. Energy Information Administration, “Strait of Hormuz is the Worlds Most Important Oil Transit 
Chokepoint,” 4 January 2012, http://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.cfm?id=4430 
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In an unpublished article offered to major newspapers, the United States stated, in part,78 
Our disagreement with the USSR involves Soviet efforts to limit, indeed virtually to 
abrogate, the right of innocent passage for warships through the Soviet territorial sea.  
According to Soviet legislation, foreign warships may exercise innocent passage in 
only five specified locations out of the thousands of miles of Soviet coastline. The 
Soviets made no provisions for innocent passage in the Black Sea. 
The issue of innocent passage of warships was resolved between the United States and 
the Soviet Union by the issuance of the Joint Statement with attached Uniform Interpretation 
of the Rules of Innocent Passage signed by Secretary Baker and Foreign Minister 
Schevardnadze on September 23, 1989 (see earlier description, p. 48, and Annex III).  This 
understanding clearly reflects the right of warships to conduct innocent passage through the 
territorial sea. 
Prior Notice or Permission for Warship Innocent Passage 
78 Memorandum of Mary V. Mochary, Principal Deputy Legal Adviser, U.S. Department of State to the 
Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs, April 26, 1988. 
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state that has not signed the treaty.318  The Tanker War of 1987-1988 indicates the seriousness of 
the Iranian threat and the possibility of escalation caused by a dispute over international law.  
The threat of escalation is perhaps most acute in Southeast Asia where the People’s 
Republic of China claims nearly all of the South China Sea and unlawfully restricts activities 
within it.  Some compare the Chinese actions in the EEZ to the Soviet restrictions placed upon 
navigational activities in the Soviet territorial sea during the Cold War.319  The so-called “nine-
dashed” line represents an a Chinese claim to nearly the entire area of South China Sea, 
including the Pratas Islands, the Paracel Islands, the Macclesfield Bank, the James and 
Scarborough Shoals, and the Spratly Islands.  Somewhat mysterious in origin and ambiguous in 
legal meaning, the line can be found on Chinese maps dating back to 1947.320  Regional 
neighbors (Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, and Vietnam) challenge China’s 
claim; in early 2013, Philippines filed suit with the International Court of Justice against Chinese 
claims to the Scarborough shoals.321  This claim is a resource claim, but it has implications for 
navigation as well, and it underscores the current relevance of this research.  In late 2012, the 
competition for resources in the South China Sea also renewed a concern about navigational 
rights, when China issued new passports depicting China and the entire South China Sea within 
the nine-dash line.322  Subsequently, coastal Chinese provinces issued international warnings of 
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319 Ronald Neubauer, “The Right of Innocent Passage for Warships in the Territorial Sea: A Response to the Soviet 
Union,” Naval War College Review, Spring, 1988, 56. 
 
320 LI Jinming and LI Dexia, “The Dotted Line on the Chinese Map of the South China Sea: A Note,” Ocean 
Development & International Law 34, no. 3–4 (2003): 287. 
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their intent to stop and seize vessels “illegally entering” Chinese waters,323 which prompted India 
and Vietnam to announce patrols in these waters.324 
7.2  Commitment, Images, and Costs  
As the United States seeks to maintain navigational freedoms in the global commons, it 
must contend with the basic question about China’s intentions regarding the South China Sea:  
whether China’s designs for the maritime region are peaceful and under what conditions disputed 
claims may lead to armed conflict.  Two factors confound accurate inference of China’s intent in 
the South China Sea. 
  First, China’s rapid military modernization over the last decade has been significant.  For 
over three decades, China has transformed all aspects of its military into a modern force, and 
Chinese military expenditures have increased annually at an average 11.8 percent since 2000.325
 
 
In naval terms, the Chinese navy has recapitalized its fleet – not only exceeding the total fleet 
size of any other Asian country, but also replacing antiquated ships with a modernized 
assortment of surface combatants (e.g. destroyers and frigates), submarines, and fast-attack craft 
(e.g. missile-armed patrol craft).  According to the Office of Naval Intelligence, China initiated 
construction on over 60 naval ships in 2014 and again in 2015.  Simultaneously, China has 
improved the sensor suites and weapons systems of these platforms with particularly robust anti-
ship missile capabilities.  For example the C802/YJ-83 family of anti-ship cruise missiles are 
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lethal to 65-100nm depending on variant.  They are ubiquitous and frequently exported.  The 
C602/YJ-62 family of missiles offer lethality at nearly double the range, 150 nm,) and air-
defense systems (e.g. Luyang II/III destroyers have fielded phased-array radars and the 
formidable HHQ-9 surface-to-air missile system).  The Chinese submarine force is composed of 
primarily diesel submarines optimized for SLOC defense.  Nuclear submarines continue to 
expand in number.326 
Second, the activity of China’s naval and maritime law enforcement forces has grown 
more assertive.  As mentioned, recent naval modernization has increased ability to deny access to 
China’s “near seas.”  Moreover, the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) possesses the 
capacity for sustained operations, not only in its near seas within the first island chain, but also 
the PLAN has increased its operations beyond its local waters (e.g. anti-piracy operations of the 
Naval Escort Task Forces in the Gulf of Aden off the Horn of Africa, evacuation of Chinese 
nationals in Libya and Yemen, and a 2013 goodwill deployment to the Mediterranean Sea, 
etc.).327  In each of these cases, Chinese naval deployments have served narrow national interests 
and have not contributed to the security interests of a broader community or coalition.  To some 
observers, these Chinese naval operations have matched claims that China’s national 
rejuvenation is a “peaceful rise.” Yet, there is growing evidence of aggressive behavior that 
belies Beijing’s rhetoric of harmony.328  The behavior China’s regional neighbors experience 
offers a different view of Chinese maritime power. Operating in the South China Sea, the PLAN 
and Chinese maritime security forces frequently threaten the interests and sovereignty of 
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neighboring states.  These threats emanate from naval and non-naval forces.   Maritime law 
enforcement patrols, the establishment of an Air Defense Identification Zone in the East China 
Sea, and unprecedented land reclamation projects with dual-use features in the South China Sea 
(including deployment of tactical fighter aircraft and HQ-9 surface-to-air missiles in February 
2016) have prompted questions about China’s benign intentions with respect to disputed 
maritime claims specifically and navigational rights within international law more broadly.  
China’s verbal assurances about peaceful intentions do not appear to be consistent with China’s 
actions in the South China Sea.  After all, intentions can change, but capabilities remain.  
The basic question about China’s intentions regarding the South China Sea--whether 
China’s designs for the maritime region are peaceful and under what conditions disputed claims 
may lead to armed conflict—may be posed in an alternative way:  how committed is China to 
extending sovereignty over its claim of the nine-dashed line?  (As a corollary, one might also ask 
how committed is the United States to maintaining open and free seas in Southeast Asia?)  To 
understand the credibility of commitments, one must sort examine Chinese signals and indexes 
to distinguish cheap talk from more credible indices of Chinese maritime power.329  Specifically, 
this chapter recalls the work of Schelling and Fearon to examine the case of Chinese maritime 
disputes and consider the likelihood of conflict over disputes in the South China Sea.330  
Schelling offers two types of commitment for consideration.  First, to illustrate this point 
in contrast, Schelling presents West Berlin as an example of a commitment that was inescapable 
for the United States.  The United States’ commitment to the status quo in West Berlin was 
inescapable because it was well defined and a physically occupied commitment.  The positioning 
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of American forces in West Berlin sufficiently raised the political cost of backing down to the 
Soviets in the event of attack.  To renege on defense promises was not politically feasible, as it 
figuratively lashed them like Odysseus to the mast of the German project.  Schelling’s second 
characteristic of commitment describes the type of action required of the agreement.  The 
American commitment in Berlin was open-ended and one in which circumstances committed the 
actors to tit-for-tat exchanges anytime one provoked the other.  American commitment 
demanded response to Soviet aggression; to fail to respond was to lose credibility – not only in 
the minds of the Soviets, but also in the minds of Germans and alliance members anticipating 
American protection.  This kind of situation is “dynamic and uncertain.” Action and response, 
however, is certain.  In situations of brinksmanship, provocation is likely to develop a 
momentum of its own and may quickly get out of hand.  According to Schelling’s analogy of two 
men rocking a canoe in which each risks tipping of the canoe and pushing each other to the 
brink, the threat is credible.  In taking risks that leave something to chance, threats are credible 
when each occupant of the canoe risks getting himself wet, too. 
Second, a state may choose an “ill defined and ambiguous” commitment.  Such 
commitments may permit the state to make a graceful exit should it need to relieve itself of the 
burden.  By contrast to the “inescapable” Berlin, the Chinese claim to the South China Sea is 
neither well defined nor able to be occupied observably.  Whereas the borders of West Berlin 
were clearly defined by occupying forces in accordance with the Potsdam agreement, the borders 
of the South China Sea are less well understood.  The maritime boundaries of the nine- dashed 
line are of questionable veracity, and the competing historical claims on various terrestrial 
features are considered dubious.  Additionally, in size West Berlin is a mere fraction of the South 
China Sea.  All of Berlin measures 10,000 square miles—far smaller than the South China Sea, 
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which comprises vast area of 1.35 million square miles.  Additionally, an obvious but important 
point is that West Berlin was an inhabitable location; the South China Sea is not a finite 
objective to be held as such.  The three to four battalions that comprised U.S. Army Berlin 
actually held the location they defended for years.  Although this small fighting force represented 
more of a tripwire than a stopping force to halt the Soviet horde advancing through central 
Europe, this unit made a symbolic but sustained encampment on their objective.  The nature of 
the sea is markedly different.  
The primary obstacle or hindrance to “holding” the South China Sea is the “stopping 
power of water.”331  Because land forces historically have been the primary force of conquest, 
and because water (in its various natural forms) presents a challenging obstacle to the mobility 
and efficacy of land combat forces, it is assumed to be generally true that water stops armies.  
Whereas one of the doctrinal purposes land combat forces is to seize and hold land objectives, 
maritime forces rarely enjoy command of the sea.  Sea forces that do enjoy some command of 
the sea increase their risk as they move closer to shore and enter the weapons range of shore-
based weapons.  Moreover, sea control, as discussed by naval theorists such as Julian Corbett, is 
inherently ephemeral.  Unlike Alfred Thayer Mahan whose theory focused on the concentration 
of naval forces for decisive naval battles and blockade in order to win command of the sea, 
Corbett argued that sea control is a temporary objective and naval forces should focus instead on 
protecting sea lines of communication and temporarily enabling operations on land.332  Corbett 
argued that a country cannot conquer the sea as it can conquer an objective on land, because the 
sea is not susceptible to ownership.   
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For Schelling, the question is which side takes the political-military initiative and places 
itself in a position from which escape graceful retreat would not be possible without duress.333  
West Berlin clearly fulfilled these conditions.  However, if China cannot leverage the South 
China Sea as a physical objective from which it cannot retreat, then China may be able to raise 
the political price of compromising.  
By coupling its capabilities to the objective, China can incur a political obligation by 
committing its national honor and diplomatic reputation to the entire South China Sea.   The 
creation of artificial islands in the South China Sea in 2015 raises the ante.  The question 
however is whether this is an accurate and costly signal.  In Schelling’s example of Quemoy, the 
political commitment of the United States to Chiang Kai-Shek was not just a signal to the 
Chinese Nationalist leader but to a third-party, the USSR.  To the Soviets, the United States 
signaled that it would not back down without significant loss of prestige—as evidenced by its 
commitments to the Formosa Resolution of 1955 and the subsequent military assistance 
agreements. Commitments like Quemoy are not cheap. According to Schelling, “we cannot let 
the Soviets or Communist Chinese think that they can grab large chunks of the earth and its 
population without a genuine risk of violent reaction.”334  
Like the United States commitment to Quemoy, Chinese commitment to the South China 
Sea may be inferred as ambiguous.335  Despite incidents of acting tough, China’s claim actually 
may be perceived as weak. The same may be true of the United States in 2015.  Either side may 
be able to create advantage or signaling opportunity from weakness.  Schelling suggests, weak 
commitments appear strong, whereas strong commitments appear implicitly weak.  Thus, one 
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way to strengthen one’s signal is to employ a force that acts as a tripwire, although it is not clear 
how this would be manifest in a maritime situation.  To do this, both states will struggle with the 
problem of sea control discussed above and the inability to actually hold a maritime objective. 
China’s “great wall of sand” accomplishes that task.  Similarly, a capital ship that embodies 
Chinese resolve and symbolizes the pinnacle of naval effort in the region could communicate a 
level of commitment that other forces cannot achieve.  Thus, China appears to have a signaling 
advantage.  The United States will not create more real estate in the South China Sea; the best it 
can do is deploy three acres of sovereign American territory atop an aircraft carrier. 
 Whether China is willing to make a commitment, as Schelling describes, depends to 
some degree on whether China views the South China Sea as a “core interest.”  Holsti explains 
core interests as those objectives for which a state is willing to make ultimate sacrifices such as 
self-preservation of the political unit, territorial integrity, strategic frontiers or defensive buffer 
zones, and other sacrosanct political objectives upon which the state depends for its security.  
However, Holsti warns that core values can change.  Worse, core values can be misinterpreted.  
Whether the South China Sea represents a core interest for the People’s Republic of China is not 
clear, nor is it a fixed value.  The value of this maritime zone is likely to vary with domestic 
politics, China’s other “core interests,” and as China’s position in its region changes.  
Jervis argues that states demonstrate interest in specific issues because of the conclusions 
others will draw.336  What conclusions other states draw from China’s stance on the South China 
Sea will affect China’s pursuit of other goals.  Jervis points to the ephemeral goals pursued by 
politicians that are aspects of a states image contribute greatly to its pursuit of other goals.  States 
may pursue various objectives for reasons such as a) autonomy and controlling spheres of 
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influence, b) well- being or wealth, c) ideological or interactive milieu goals, and d) pursuit of 
glory or defense of honor, but the primary objective in anarchy is security.  Thus, China’s pursuit 
of its primary security goals may occur through indirect and occasionally problematic or 
controversial means. Yet, one should expect China to signal toughness on these lesser-related 
objectives.  Likewise, the United States will likely display toughness on issues like navigation, 
not just for its intrinsic value but also as a demonstration of commitment to regional allies, 
partners, and fence-sitters.  As Jervis states, “To get others to believe an image, a state must fully 
act out that image.”337  Thus, as the observer attempts to infer China’s level of commitment to 
the South China Sea, the observer may be mistaken in his beliefs about the costs and risks China 
is willing to take.  The observer may also underestimate the utility to the actor of a desired 
image.338  
 When viewed through a purely rational lens, Chinese interest in the South China Sea does 
not appear to be the type of commitment worth making.  In terms of natural resources, China is 
not likely to gain much more than it already legitimately claims.  According to the United States 
Energy Information Administration, the South China Sea contains approximately 11 billion 
barrels of oil and 190 trillion cubic feet of natural gas in proved and probable reserves.339  The 
majority of these current reserves exist in relatively shallow waters and the more easily explored 
depths near the shore.  These maritime areas are largely uncontested, thus it is not exactly clear 
what China might find so valuable in their claim.  However, prospect theory suggests they if 
China believes it “owns” the South China Sea, then China may be more likely to fight for it than 
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for something they merely covet.340  Despite the instrumental value of an object or issue, Jervis 
argues that states demonstrate interest in specific issues because of the conclusions others will 
draw. States may not demonstrate interest because of the intrinsic value of the object.341  If China 
were to elevate the South China Sea such that it must be protected at all costs, China would be 
establishing a goal of astonishing scope.342 For centuries, states have sought to control the seas 
adjacent to their shores. Whether for reasons of security, economic access for fishing and 
resources, protection of trade, regional autonomy, or due to a vision of a world or milieu goal 
they hope to achieve, states have extended some measure of state sovereignty offshore to their 
near seas.343  As a security goal, the ocean surface and undersea territory of the South China Sea 
is a valuable area to control, but it probably not possible in the near term.  
Fearon proposes two types of signals to communicate a state’s willingness to use force in 
a dispute. First, it can send a “tying hands” signal.  By tying hands, a state increases the cost of 
backing down to a challenge, but the state incurs no cost if it receives no challenge.  In these 
cases, a state may lay its national prestige on the line, risk audience costs, or even invest in small 
tripwire costs. Second, a state can send a “sunk-cost” signal.  By sinking costs, states make 
costly actions that do not necessarily affect the value of fighting versus acquiescing.344  
The extent to which China has “tied its hands” over the South China Sea is relatively low, 
and China may be able to side-step any perceived commitments quite easily without gravely 
affecting other core interests.  Recent diplomatic statements of Chinese foreign ministers indicate 
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some level of commitment to the South China Sea, but ambiguous. The explicit level of 
commitment pales in comparison to Taiwan and other “core interests.  If Chinese hands are tied 
depends on whether the Chinese people perceive the South China Sea claim to be linked to other 
priority claims like Taiwan and Tibet.  The sunk costs of the Chinese Navy, however, urge 
observers to consider seriously whether the South China Sea is indeed a core interest for which 
China is prepared to fight.  
Consider the massive sunk cost of the Chinese Navy.  The PLAN is a necessary, but 
perhaps not sufficient, means to denying the South China Sea to foreign interests.  As a semi-
enclosed sea or a so-called “Chinese lake,” the South China Sea represents a maximal goal to 
China.  This might be possible through naval presence and antiship missiles based at the north 
end of the sea on Hainan Island, but even these measures may be insufficient.  The PLA Second 
Artillery Corps’ recently developed DF-21D antiship ballistic missile represents the greatest of 
these land-based maritime threats as a “carrier-killing” capability with striking ranges that cover 
nearly all of the South China Sea.  Additionally, shorter-ranged antiship cruise missiles 
(supersonic and subsonic) can hold foreign warships at risk in at least one-third of the maritime 
operating area.  By coupling the capabilities of land-based, precision-guided missiles, maritime 
aircraft, distributed sensors, and improved surface combatant ships, the PLAN have fielded a 
force which threatens to deny large maritime areas of China’s near seas.  
Chinese shipbuilding has accelerated and has produced more plentiful and lethal ships 
such as the swift, Type-022 Hubei fast-attack missile boats, the Jiangkai II-class guided missile 
frigates, and Type-052 Lanzhou-class guided missile destroyers.  These surface vessels are 
complemented by a rapidly growing fleet of Chinese submarines.  The twelve diesel-electric 
Kilo-class submarines acquired from Russia are well suited to coastal defense missions, while the 
	  
	   203 
Yuan and Shang-class indigenously submarines will complement the Song submarines in 
patrolling farther from shore and increasingly beyond the second island chain.  Additionally, 
more advanced (quieter, better sensors, improved propulsion) submarines are currently in 
production.345  Also, although largely symbolic at the time of this writing, the recently completed 
aircraft carrier, Liaoning, may soon add to the projection of Chinese naval power with an 
embarked air wing of fourth-generation naval strike- fighter aircraft.  
According to Fearon’s theory, sunk-cost signals are costly for a state to make in the first 
place, but they do not affect the relative value of fighting versus acquiescing.346  Unlike the cost 
of tying of hands, which the actor pays only when backing down from a challenge, the actor 
sends its signal in paying a cost.  One may think of the Chinese naval modernization as that cost.  
However, to be effective, the sunk cost must be so great – and the deterrent capability of the 
purchased fighting force must be so substantial – that no state is willing to challenge.  In 
equilibrium, Fearon’s model suggests that actors don’t bluff; the actor will fight with certainty if 
challenged.  There is little value in a sending a “part-way signal.”  If a defender has “put his 
money where his mouth is” by making significant sunk costs to signal his type, he must act 
accordingly when challenged.  As Jervis states, the “To get others to believe an image, a state 
must fully act out that image.”347  
Whether Chinese naval modernization is a sufficient sunk cost to signal Chinese 
commitment to the South China Sea, thus, depends on how China acts when push comes to 
shove. We must ask to what extent observers are influenced by Chinese naval modernization and 
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increased activity.  Additionally, how do observers separate indices of behavior from information 
derived from signaling or reputations?  Knowing that states can and do project images “on the 
cheap,” and recognizing that the sunk cost of naval modernization may simply be the high price 
of “cheap talk, one wonders whether China is willing to sink ships to signal credibly it 
commitment to claims in the South China Sea. 
As the Chinese continue their military modernization, Chinese brinksmanship at sea is 
likely. The theory of sunk costs suggests that in order to uphold the signaling credibility of the 
Chinese fleet, China must be willing to sink a few ships—or at least to operate aggressively.  To 
be believed, states must act out their type.  Thus, at the very least, we expect the Chinese to 
create opportunities in which they allow for the possibility of escalation.  Possibility of 
escalation is the essence of brinksmanship.  According to Schelling, “it means exploiting the 
danger that someone may inadvertently go over the brink, dragging the other with him.”348  This 
uncertainty is the essence of deterrence. 
7.3 Problems of Signaling on the Cheap 
The United States’ use of the Freedom of Navigation program in October 2015 in the 
South China Sea ostensibly sought to communicate—through clear action—the United States’ 
commitment to Freedom of Navigation.  In many ways, it represented the most recent move in a 
decades-long effort to maintain Grotius’ mare liberum as the status quo.  A legal act, an assertion 
demonstrates a refusal to acquiesce to another’s disputed maritime claim.  But this assertion 
attempted to do more than demonstrate persistent objection to a unlawful claim.  By putting the 
Chinese on warning weeks prior to the operation, the transit had a signaling intent, and different 
audiences have received different messages.  Just as eyewitnesses at the same crime scene can 
produce contradictory Rashomon-like accounts of what occurred, disagreement continues about 
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what USS Lassen’s 72-mile transit around Subi Reef really meant.  As Jervis warns, “Actions are 
not automatically less ambiguous than words.  Without an accompanying message it may be 
impossible for the perceiving actor to determine what image the other is trying to project.”349  
This legal signal, however it was intended, lacked clarity.  It is seductive to think that a freedom 
of navigation assertion can convey a discrete unambiguous legal message.   
Despite deliberate efforts to be non-confrontational, USS Lassen’s transit stirred 
controversy and clouded, not clarified, the terms of the dispute.  The United States intended to 
exercise high-seas freedoms around an artificial island in a manner consistent with customary 
international law and Articles 60 and 87 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the 
Sea, but some argue USS Lassen was too careful in her transit.  In an effort to avoid provocation, 
USS Lassen appeared to have conducted Innocent Passage.  The ship’s activity within 12 nautical 
miles of Subi Reef was so non-provocative, it appeared too innocent.  The transit had gone to 
such lengths to avoid any activity “prejudicial to the peace, good order or security of the coastal 
state” (Art 19) that its transit was indistinguishable from Innocent Passage and had the 
unintended consequence of suggesting a de facto recognition of a territorial sea around Subi 
Reef, and thus inadvertently undermining navigational freedom 350  
Signaling is particularly problematic (or profitable) when actors are incentivized to send 
signals on the cheap.  From job candidates and their future supervisors, to leaders on the 
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battlefield and gridiron, the incentives for misrepresenting capabilities and intentions are well 
demonstrated.351  Following the transit of USS Lassen, Defense Secretary Ash Carter visited USS 
Theodore Roosevelt, underway in the South China Sea.  Whether his visit intended to send a 
message of American resolve to China and those facing China’s intimidation is clear from his 
press statements.  Speaking aboard the nuclear-powered aircraft carrier, nicknamed “Big Stick,” 
Carter underscored “the critical role the United States’ military power plays in what is a very 
consequential region for the American future.”352  But as convincing a force as American naval 
power has been over the last century, multiple audiences likely wonder whether this signal is 
increasingly cheap talk to a rising China.  International politics can be unforgiving in cases of 
signaling confusion.  “Great dangers arise if an aggressor believes that the status quo power is 
weak in capability or resolve.”353  Playing chicken and manipulating risk may be a valid strategy, 
but it changes the game from one about navigational freedoms and international law into 
something very different. 
7.4 Conclusion 
An operational assertion aims to conduct legal business, not warring business.  Yet it is 
no small detail that the ships assigned to conduct operational assertions are warships and not 
rowboats. The deployment of a naval warship constitutes what Morgenthau refers to as a display 
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of military force.  The mobility of navies and their ability to show the flag and project power far 
beyond the borders of a state make them a favored instrument for a “policy of prestige.”354   
Implementing the Freedom of Navigation assertions in sensitive areas require civilian 
control of otherwise routine operations.  Despite the obvious connotation of military force that a 
warship implies as an implement of statecraft, many career naval officers would argue that a 
navy ship conducting navigational assertions does not present a threatening force.  To them, it is 
merely a transiting vessel that intends no harm.  Moreover, one ship cannot hold maritime space 
in the same way that a deployed army can hold decisive terrain on land.  The limits of sea control 
are well established, and one ship can control very little—and then only for a limited time.355  
One ship may not seem like much, but the significance of sending a warship and not a merchant 
or fishing vessel deserves more scrutiny—both within the Department of Defense, Department of 
State, and at higher levels.  First, the Freedom of Navigation program is rarely used.  Although 
annual reports of operational assertions tally up to an average of approximately 15 states each 
year, these assertions are often against the “usual suspects” many of whom are along the U.S. 
Navy’s most efficient transoceanic transit routes.  As the data in Chapters 3 and 4 demonstrate, 
merely 10% of disputants, in terms of country-year-disputes, receive operational assertions.  The 
United States issues diplomatic protests even less frequently.  Second, a warship’s capacity for 
clear messaging is poor.  They do not send  “statements or actions the meaning of which are 
established by tacit or explicit understandings among the actors.”  To some audiences a warship 
is like “big stick,” which backs up backs up a spoken message with military muscle.356  But not 
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all military demonstrations or maneuvers convey what they might appear to convey.  Finally, 
control of forces through doctrine, standing orders may suffice for standard operational 
assertions – those routine transits that are simply legal in nature.  But national leaders who 
employ the Freedom of Navigation program for balance of power politics would do well to 
consider the political objective as well as the strategy or concept of operations that govern the 
employment of navies.357  History shows us that problems often arise that create friction and 
complicate even the simplest operations.358 
The Black Sea shouldering incident provides a good example of Soviet brinksmanship at 
sea, and it is the type of behavior we should expect more of from the Chinese due to the potential 
for escalation into major conflict.  In 1988 as in 2015, the threat of escalation over matters of 
international law looms in the background.  In 1988, waiting for the U.S. ships were two Soviet 
Navy warships, Bezzavetny and SKR-6, a Krivak-class frigate and a Mirka-class frigate.  These 
Soviet ships intercepted Caron and Yorktown at approximately 8 nm from shore.  Then, during 
the escorted transit, the Soviet vessels deliberately collided with the United States’ warships.359  
At that point in the Cold War, aggressive interactions at sea were nothing new.  In fact, Caron 
and Yorktown had conducted the same operations in the same territorial sea in 1986.  That event 
prompted the exchange of formal diplomatic protests between the United States and Soviet 
Union.360  Two years later, however, “push” literally had come to “shove.”361  For decades, the 
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navies of the two superpowers had been engaged in similar games of “chicken,” but often the 
results were not so benign.  Many interactions led to loss of life and costly damage—both in 
terms of materiel and diplomatic relations. The threat of escalation was ever present. Some 
reckless interactions were the result of aggressive or inexperienced sailors and airmen, but policy 
often directed these interactions occur as in the case of the Caron and the Yorktown.362  Threat of 
escalation is a matter of great concern when the bumping ships belong to nuclear states.  
China has already established a precedent for brinksmanship at sea. For example, in 2001 
China signaled toughness when asserting its sovereignty during two aggressive intercepts in the 
EEZ.  Within one week in 2001, on 23 March and 1 April, a Chinese frigate intercepted USNS 
Bowditch conducting hydrographic research in the Chinese EEZ approximately 70 nautical miles 
south of Hainan Island.363  Then, a Chinese F-8 jet intercepted and collided with American EP-3 
aircraft killing the Chinese air force pilot and leading to the destruction of the EP-3 and the 
detention of the crew for 11 days.364  Many more events have occurred since 2001, such as USNS 
Impeccable incident in 2009, which transpired similarly to USS Bowditch incident in 2001.365  In 
each of these incidents, China aggressively employed its armed forces and signaled toughness.  
These naval conflicts thus offer no threat of conquering.  Rather, they offer a mechanism for 
hurting and raising costs.  Naval conflict is a bargaining process of “endurance, nerve, obstinacy, 
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and pain.”366  The likelihood of a shouldering incident in the South China Sea is not a matter of 
whether; it’s a matter of when.  
In the 2015 episode, USS Lassen’s transit showed too much caution to effectively 
manipulate risk for signaling purposes.  It demonstrated a high sensitivity to the risk and an 
unwillingness to rock the boat lest the situation escalate.  As a signaling effort, it risked 
communicating weakness.  Moreover, the transit was so innocent, it failed to accomplish its 
objective as a legal device. 
In their search for security, states have an incentive to signal strength and resolve.  For 
observers the challenge becomes separating cheap talk from accurate indexes of power.  As 
China’s rise continues, the United States and regional neighbors attempt to draw inferences about 
the extent to which China poses a threat to their various national interests and the liberal Western 
order.  The South China Sea represents one area in which China appears most likely to clash with 
neighboring states.  Nathan and Scobell acknowledge the rapid modernization of the PLAN, but 
argue there is no near-term prospect that the PRC can achieve its maximum goal of controlling 
all of the island groups and the EEZ.367  The plan to create a blue-water navy articulated in 1982 
by Chinese Admiral Liu Huaqing proceeds on pace, but given the vast area of the South China 
Sea, such a goal may not be achievable.  Given China’s rhetorical ambiguity regarding the South 
China Sea, the best indication of China’s commitment to the South China Sea as a core interest is 
its willingness to resort to use force.  The modernizing PLAN forces represent an index of 
Chinese power, and that relative strength of that index is growing.  Realists have opined that 
although “Asian countries would be exceedingly leery of attacking each other's homelands, naval 
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and air battles over distant islands are precisely the sort of military exchange one might use to 
demonstrate resolve and capability but at little or no risk of escalation.”368  States with interests 
in the South China Sea must be willing to rock the boat.  To infer accurately whether threats of 
force are merely bluffs one must be willing to take initiate a process that risks getting both actors 
wet.  This objective does not align well with the Freedom of Navigation program.   
Some may argue in the contemporary age, that a legal provision for innocent passage is 
unnecessary.  After all, the vast majority of traded goods in the global economy travel by sea 
with few if any perturbations.  To most minds, security at sea is like oxygen; one only notices it 
when its supply is disrupted.  Seizure of goods at sea has been a problem for the maritime 
community for centuries.  For as long as ships have moved valuable cargo, merchants have 
risked losing their valuable cargo to storms, shipwreck, pirates, and state seizure.  Even 
Shakespeare knew well the perils lurking offshore, both natural and criminal:  Merchant of 
Venice opens with a consideration of risks to a merchant’s fortune sailing at sea, and even 
Hamlet fell prey at sea to “pirate[s] of very warlike appointment” (Hamlet, IV.6.5-10).  To most 
contemporary minds, however, ship seizures and piracy are the stuff of literature and the stage.  
Today, maritime security is taken for granted.369  Even those who depend on foreign trade tend to 
overlook the substantial challenges to freedom at sea that the seafaring states once faced.  
The importance of overseas trade to the United States in its first half-century or today 
cannot be overestimated.  In the early decades of American independence, the future of the 
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republic rested on the viability of international commerce.  The majority of consumers of 
American goods were overseas.  Leaders such as Hamilton and Jefferson understood that the 
priority of trade with as many nations was paramount; the future of American trade was pursued 
by “unshackling it rather than directing it.”370   The Jay Treaty recognized that the future of 
America lay in the security of oceanic commerce, and it allied the United States with the 
dominant naval power even though it meant cozying up to our enemy of American 
Revolution.371  This diplomacy averted (or delayed) a subsequent war, while leading to massive 
commercial growth through increased trade.  America’s first foreign war against the Barbary 
pirates, who preyed on American commercial shipping, was distinguished by Jefferson’s 
willingness to use naval force.  Jefferson advocated for the use of force to ensure access through 
sea lanes of communication, and the War of 1812 confirmed American willingness to fight to 
secure passage for its shipping. 372 
As China asserts its claim to increased trade, secure supply of resources, and access to 
markets, the tensions produces by its growth and friction with the current order constitutes “one 
of the great dramas of the twenty-first century.”  Whether “China will overthrow the existing 
order or become part of it” was the inspiration of this dissertation.373   As the United States 
considers what to do to maintain its position, the task is to encourage China to embrace existing 
institutions and to promote Chinese growth as a mature member of the liberal western world 
order.  Yet, the decision not to intervene or to challenge disputed claims of states like China, but 
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also states less powerful, risks the establishment of a new legal precedence.  After all, silence is 
consent.  Now more than ever, a thoughtful, consistent, and simplified approach to legal action 
under the Freedom of Navigation program is necessary.  Brinksmanship will continue to have a 
role, but the United States must take greater care not to mix its signals.   
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